ΠΑΙΓΝΙΑ, ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΕΣ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΥΣΕΙΣ (GAMES, STRATEGIES AND NEGOTIATIONS)
ΚΩΝΣΤΑΝΤΙΝΟΣ ΡΟΥΜΑΝΙΑΣ
In Games, Strategies and Negotiations we will examine core elements of Game Theory as a main tool of analysis of decisions under strategic interaction. That is when the actions of agents have an impact upon the welfare and actions of other agents. We will discuss the main solution notions of a game, and the predictions of how involved parties will act under strategic interaction.
We shall analyse the notion of Nash equilibrium and the ways it might be instructive to use it to predict strategic behaviour. We shall also discuss refinements of Nash equilibrium for dynamic games. We shall mostly discuss its explanatory power and situations under which Nash equilibrium might perform well as an explanatory tool, or even fail in real situations.
A significant part of our lectures will focus on laying bare which stage of a negotiation can be analysed by Game Theory, as well as how its basic predictions might be enriched or overturned when we examine richer and more complex aspects of a negotiation. We will discuss how altering the number of dimensions of a negotiation might affect the strategic predictions and results as well as how the setup of a negotiation might change the predictions of the game theoretic approach which focuses on the final stage of a negotiation.
Στο μάθημα Παίγνια, Στρατηγικές και Διαπραγματεύσεις θα εξετάσουμε βασικά στοιχεία Θεωρίας Παιγνίων ως κύριο εργαλείο ανάλυσης αποφάσεων υπό καθεστώς στρατηγικής αλληλεπίδρασης, όταν δηλαδή οι ενέργειες των δρώντων έχουν επίδραση πάνω στην ευημερία και κυρίως πάνω στις ενέργειες άλλων δρώντων. Θα αναπτυχθούν βασικές έννοιες επίλυσης ενός παιγνίου, και οι προβλέψεις για το πώς θα δράσουν τα εμπλεκόμενα μέρη υπό στρατηγική αλληλεπίδραση.
Θα αναλυθεί η ιδέα της ισορροπίας Nash και οι λόγοι γιατί εστιάζουμε σε αυτήν, καθώς επίσης και παραλλαγές - εκλεπτύνσεις (refinements) της ισορροπίας Nash. Κυρίως θα συζητηθεί η ερμηνευτική της δύναμη και πότε αυτή επιτυγχάνει ή αποτυγχάνει να προβλέψει στρατηγική συμπεριφορά στην πραγματικότητα.
Σημαντικό μέρος των διαλέξεων θα εστιάσει στην κατανόηση του ποιου μέρους της διαπραγμάτευσης αφορά η θεωρία παγνίων, τί μπορεί να επηρεάσει μια καλύτερη κατανόηση εργαλείων ανάλυσης στρατηγικής συμπεριφοράς, καθώς και επίσης το πώς οι βασικές προβλέψεις ανατρέπονται ή και εμπλουτίζονται όταν εξετάζουμε πιο σύνθετες και πλούσιες πτυχές μια διαπραγμάτευσης. Θα εξετάσουμε πώς η μεταβολή των διαστάσεων μιας διαπραγμάτευσης μπορεί να επηρεάσει και τα στρατηγικά αποτελέσματα καθώς επίσης και πώς το στήσιμο μιας διαπραγμάτευσης αλλάζει τις προβλέψεις τις θεωρίας παιγνίων.
ΛιγότεραIn Games, Strategies and Negotiations we will examine core elements of Game Theory as a main tool of analysis of decisions under strategic interaction. That is when the actions of agents have an impact upon the welfare and actions of other agents. We will discuss the main solution notions of a game, and the predictions of how involved parties will act under strategic interaction.
We shall analyse the notion of Nash equilibrium and the ways it might be instructive to use it to predict strategic behaviour. We shall also discuss refinements of Nash equilibrium for dynamic games. We shall mostly discuss its explanatory power and situations under which Nash equilibrium might perform well as an explanatory tool, or even fail in real situations.
A significant part of our lectures will focus on laying bare which stage of a negotiation can be analysed by Game Theory, as well as how its basic predictions might be enriched or overturned when we examine richer and more complex aspects of a negotia
In Games, Strategies and Negotiations we will examine core elements of Game Theory as a main tool of analysis of decisions under strategic interaction. That is when the actions of agents have an impact upon the welfare and actions of other agents. We will discuss the main solution notions of a game, and the predictions of how involved parties will act under strategic interaction.
We shall analyse the notion of Nash equilibrium and the ways it might be instructive to use it to predict strategic behaviour. We shall also discuss refinements of Nash equilibrium for dynamic games. We shall mostly discuss its explanatory power and situations under which Nash equilibrium might perform well as an explanatory tool, or even fail in real situations.
A significant part of our lectures will focus on laying bare which stage of a negotiation can be analysed by Game Theory, as well as how its basic predictions might be enriched or overturned when we examine richer and more complex aspects of a negotia
