


# Προτιμήσεις για αναδιανομή: Το ζήτημα της κοινωνικής κινητικότητας.



# Προτιμήσεις για αναδιανομή: Το ζήτημα της κοινωνικής κινητικότητας.

## ΔΟΜΗ ΠΑΡΟΥΣΙΑΣΗΣ

**Πως αλλάζουν τα αποτελέσματα του υποδείγματος Meltzer-Richard (1981) όταν υπάρχει κοινωνική κινητικότητα;**

**Επιβεβαιώνουν τη θεωρία τα στατιστικά δεδομένα;**

**Ποιες θεωρίες μπορούν να εξηγήσουν τα στατιστικά δεδομένα;**

# Προτιμήσεις για αναδιανομή: Το ζήτημα της κοινωνικής κινητικότητας.

Τα περισσότερα στοιχεία βρίσκονται στα άρθρα:

Alesina, A., La Ferrara, E., (2005). **Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities**, *Journal of Public Economics* 89, 897-931.

Alesina, A., Guiliano, P., (2011). **Preferences for redistribution**. *Handbook in Social Economics*, 93-132. North Holland

Alesina, A., Stancheva, S., Teso, E., (2018). **Intergenerational mobility and preferences for redistribution**. *American Economic Review* 108, 521-554.

**Ποιες οικονομικές παράμετροι περιμένουμε βάσει της θεωρίας να επηρεάζουν τις προτιμήσεις για αναδιανομή;**

[1] **Ανισότητα** (Meltzer and Richard, 1981)

[2] **Κοινωνική Κινητικότητα** (Benabou and Ok, 2001)

[3] **Αισιοδοξία σχετικά με τη κοινωνική κινητικότητα**  
Benabou and Tirole (2006)

## Το υπόδειγμα Meltzer and Richard (1981)

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Βάσει του υποδείγματος **Meltzer and Richard (1981)**, η θέση ενός ατόμου στην εισοδηματική κλίμακα καθορίζει πλήρως και τις προτιμήσεις του για δημοσιονομική αναδιανομή.

Έτσι, τα άτομα με εισόδημα υψηλότερο ή ίσο με το μέσο εισόδημα (δηλαδή οι σχετικά πλούσιοι) δεν επιθυμούν αναδιανομή ενώ τα άτομα με εισόδημα χαμηλότερο από το μέσο (οι σχετικά φτωχοί) επιθυμούν αναδιανομή.


**Ποιος φορολογικός συντελεστής θα επικρατήσει;**

$$\tau_M^* = \frac{\bar{y} - y_M}{2\bar{y}}$$

## Το υπόδειγμα Meltzer and Richard (1981)

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*Όλοι ένα σχέδιο μέχρι τη στιγμή που θα φάνε τη πρώτη μπουνιά στη μούρη [Mike Tyson]*



## Το υπόδειγμα Meltzer and Richard (1981)

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*Όλοι ένα σχέδιο μέχρι τη στιγμή που θα φάνε τη πρώτη μπουριά στη μούρη [Mike Tyson]*

Πεποιθήσεις αναφορικά με τη φτώχεια		
	Η.Π.Α.	Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση
«Πιστεύω ότι οι φτωχοί είναι εγκλωβισμένοι σε κατάσταση φτώχειας»	29%	60%
«Πιστεύω ότι η τύχη καθορίζει το εισόδημα»	30%	54%
«Πιστεύω ότι οι φτωχοί είναι τεμπέληδες»	60%	26%

Source: *World Values Survey*

## Το υπόδειγμα Benabou and Ok (2001)

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$$U_i = c_{i1} + c_{i2} + 2T \quad 2T = 2\tau\bar{y} - \tau^2\bar{y}$$

$$W_i(\tau) = (1 - \tau)[y_{i1} + E(y_{i2})] + 2\tau\bar{y} - \tau^2\bar{y}$$

Οι προτιμήσεις του ατόμου  $i$  για δημοσιονομική αναδιανομή περιγράφονται από τη σχέση:

$$\tau^* = 1 - \frac{[y_{i1} + E(y_{i2})]}{2\bar{y}}$$

Δηλαδή αν το εισόδημα του ατόμου τις δύο περιόδους είναι μικρότερο από το μέσο εισόδημα το άτομο  $i$  επιθυμεί αναδιανομή

$$[y_{i1} + E(y_{i2})] < 2\bar{y}$$



## Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities

Στο άρθρο αυτό τα στοιχεία είναι Household Panel Νοικοκυριών στις ΗΠΑ

- **General Social Survey (GSS):** 1500 άτομα από το 1974 και έπειτα.
- **PSID:** 5000 άτομα από το 1968 και έπειτα.

**Εξαρτημένη μεταβλητή :** Μια μεταβλητή που παίρνει τιμές (από 1 έως 7) και δείχνει προτιμήσεις για αναδιανομή με 7 → μεγάλη υποστήριξη σε πολιτικές αναδιανομής

- **Βασικές ανεξάρτητες μεταβλητές:** Καλύτερο επάγγελμα από του πατέρα  
Καλύτερη μόρφωση από του πατέρα  
Άτομα σαν και εσένα προοδεύουν;

**Άλλες ανεξάρτητες μεταβλητές:** Φύλο, Ηλικία, Μορφωτικό επίπεδο, Θρησκεία, Εισόδημα, Μισθωτός/ αυτοαπασχολούμενος.

## Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities

Η σχέση που εκτιμά οικονομετρικά το άρθρο είναι η ακόλουθη:

$$Y_{ist}^* = X_{ist}\beta + M_{ist}\gamma + S\lambda + T\xi + \varepsilon_{ist}$$

Όπου **Y<sub>ist</sub>\***: Υποστήριξη σε πολιτικές αναδιανομής

**X<sub>ist</sub>**: Διάφορα χαρακτηριστικά του ατόμου (πχ φύλο, ηλικία)

(\*) Το ζήτημα του αλτροισμού και της απέχθειας κινδύνου

**M<sub>ist</sub>**: Κοινωνική Κινητικότητα

**Sλ**: State Dummies, **Tξ**: Time Dummies

## Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities

Πως μετράμε όμως το **Mist** (Κοινωνική Κινητικότητα):

[1] Με την **ιστορία της προσωπικής κοινωνικής κινητικότητας**

[2] Με τις **υποκειμενικές προσδοκίες** (πχ «Δεδομένης της κατάστασης στη χώρα σας, άτομα σαν εσάς ή την οικογένειά σας έχουν ευκαιρίες να βελτιώσουν το επίπεδο διαβίωσής τους» Κλίμακα 1-5 (συμφωνώ απολύτως/ διαφωνώ απολύτως)).

[3] **Αντικειμενικά μέτρα** διαγενεακής κινητικότητας

## Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities

Table 1

Transition matrix for US ( $t, t+1$ ), average 1972–1992

Deciles	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th
1st	61.78	22.74	8.42	3.70	1.50	0.95	0.48	0.18	0.11	0.13
2nd	20.70	43.42	20.03	7.98	4.16	1.79	0.87	0.59	0.29	0.17
3rd	8.08	18.36	39.54	18.53	8.05	3.66	1.79	1.12	0.55	0.30
4th	4.16	6.53	18.14	36.50	19.44	8.00	3.79	1.94	1.00	0.50
5th	2.21	3.71	7.09	18.55	35.44	18.78	8.08	3.83	1.62	0.69
6th	1.47	2.15	3.16	7.07	18.98	35.12	20.51	7.79	2.72	1.03
7th	0.91	1.31	2.20	3.74	7.18	19.52	36.41	20.02	6.77	1.94
8th	0.57	0.64	1.14	1.94	3.73	7.15	19.72	41.51	19.60	4.01
9th	0.34	0.28	0.57	1.03	1.50	2.95	5.96	19.43	51.24	16.70
10th	0.29	0.32	0.47	0.50	0.83	0.94	2.04	4.11	16.30	74.20

## Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities

Table 2

Transition matrix for US ( $t, t+5$ ), average 1972–1987

Deciles	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th
1st	47.54	23.66	11.67	5.89	3.76	2.71	1.90	1.30	1.03	0.53
2nd	21.58	30.52	20.52	10.24	6.47	4.37	2.53	1.95	1.25	0.57
3rd	10.97	18.55	26.25	17.43	10.60	6.65	4.23	2.67	1.75	0.90
4th	6.39	9.13	17.48	22.55	17.30	11.27	6.94	4.53	2.84	1.57
5th	4.77	6.00	9.25	17.55	22.10	16.77	10.68	6.69	3.91	2.29
6th	3.51	3.80	5.93	9.50	17.14	21.29	17.37	11.49	6.81	3.16
7th	2.92	2.21	4.23	6.77	10.87	17.25	22.13	17.92	10.84	4.86
8th	2.21	1.88	2.61	4.52	5.75	11.06	19.28	24.06	19.38	9.23
9th	1.71	1.36	1.79	2.29	3.71	6.14	10.75	19.72	32.42	20.12
10th	1.17	1.03	1.08	1.52	2.08	2.93	4.69	8.80	19.91	56.79

Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities




Fig. 1. Probability of moving above the sixth decile for the median voter.

Table 4  
Individual determinants of preference for redistribution

Dependent variables	REDISTR ordered probit					REDISTR01 probit	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]
Age	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.0005 (0.002)
Married	0.020 (0.020)	0.025 (0.020)	0.019 (0.030)	0.003 (0.023)	-0.015 (0.066)	0.004 (0.018)	-0.014 (0.058)
Female	0.130** (0.027)	0.137** (0.028)	0.142** (0.028)	0.130** (0.030)	0.094 (0.078)	0.090** (0.014)	0.076 (0.056)
Black	0.439** (0.056)	0.451** (0.059)	0.445** (0.058)	0.400** (0.056)	0.317** (0.112)	0.195** (0.028)	0.162* (0.083)
Educ.<12	0.291** (0.023)	0.288** (0.023)	0.257** (0.057)	0.331** (0.028)	0.177** (0.090)	0.158** (0.025)	0.036 (0.106)
Educ.>16	-0.186** (0.029)	-0.192** (0.028)	-0.179** (0.032)	-0.220** (0.032)	-0.215** (0.097)	-0.088** (0.023)	0.007 (0.075)
Children	-0.005 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.021)	0.012 (0.029)	-0.008 (0.021)	-0.020 (0.069)	-0.001 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.055)
ln(real income)	-0.159** (0.012)	-0.158** (0.012)	-0.153** (0.017)	-0.158** (0.013)	-0.174** (0.045)	-0.083** (0.013)	-0.059* (0.033)
Self-employed	-0.179** (0.033)	-0.180** (0.033)	-0.113** (0.032)	-0.184** (0.041)	-0.112 (0.111)	-0.117** (0.025)	-0.134 (0.085)
Unemployed last 5 years	0.140** (0.022)	0.139** (0.023)	0.117** (0.030)	0.156** (0.025)	0.073 (0.108)	0.092** (0.017)	0.043 (0.054)
Protestant		-0.088* (0.050)					
Catholic		-0.010 (0.047)					
Jewish		-0.099 (0.076)					
Other religion		0.224** (0.079)					
Help others			0.149** (0.050)				
Job prestige> father's				-0.047** (0.021)	-0.061 (0.073)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.043 (0.055)
Educ.—father's				0.018** (0.002)	0.028** (0.010)	0.006** (0.002)	0.009 (0.008)
Expect better life			35		-0.245** (0.056)		-0.105** (0.051)
No. obs.	11352	11339	6217	8396	980	4360	502
$R^2_{M&Z}$	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.14	0.18	0.18
$R^2_{Constant}$	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.23	0.25	0.66	0.66

Table 4  
Individual determinants of preference for redistribution

Dependent variables	REDISTR ordered probit					REDISTR01 probit	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]
Age	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.0005 (0.002)
Married	0.020 (0.020)	0.025 (0.020)	0.019 (0.030)	0.003 (0.023)	-0.015 (0.066)	0.004 (0.018)	-0.014 (0.058)
Female	0.130** (0.027)	0.137** (0.028)	0.142** (0.028)	0.130** (0.030)	0.094 (0.078)	0.090** (0.014)	0.076 (0.056)
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Educ.>16	-0.186** (0.029)	-0.192** (0.028)	-0.179** (0.032)	-0.220** (0.032)	-0.215** (0.097)	-0.088** (0.023)	0.007 (0.075)
Children	-0.005 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.021)	0.012 (0.029)	-0.008 (0.021)	-0.020 (0.069)	-0.001 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.055)
ln(real income)	-0.159** (0.012)	-0.158** (0.012)	-0.153** (0.017)	-0.158** (0.013)	-0.174** (0.045)	-0.083** (0.013)	-0.059* (0.033)
Self-employed	-0.179** (0.033)	-0.180** (0.033)	-0.113** (0.032)	-0.184** (0.041)	-0.112 (0.111)	-0.117** (0.025)	-0.134 (0.085)
Unemployed last 5 years	0.140** (0.022)	0.139** (0.023)	0.117** (0.030)	0.156** (0.025)	0.073 (0.108)	0.092** (0.017)	0.043 (0.054)
Protestant		-0.088* (0.050)					
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Other religion		0.224** (0.079)					
Help others			0.149** (0.050)				
Job prestige> father's				-0.047** (0.021)	-0.061 (0.073)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.043 (0.055)
Educ.—father's				0.018** (0.002)	0.028** (0.010)	0.006** (0.002)	0.009 (0.008)
Expect better life			35		-0.245** (0.056)		-0.105** (0.051)
No. obs.	11352	11339	6217	8396	980	4360	502
$R^2_{M&Z}$	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.14	0.18	0.18
$R^2_{Count}$	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.23	0.25	0.66	0.66



Table 4  
Individual determinants of preference for redistribution

Dependent variables	REDISTR ordered probit					REDISTR01 probit	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]
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Children	-0.005 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.021)	0.012 (0.029)	-0.008 (0.021)	-0.020 (0.069)	-0.001 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.055)
ln(real income)	-0.159** (0.012)	-0.158** (0.012)	-0.153** (0.017)	-0.158** (0.013)	-0.174** (0.045)	-0.083** (0.013)	-0.059* (0.033)
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Children	-0.005 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.021)	0.012 (0.029)	-0.008 (0.021)	-0.020 (0.069)	-0.001 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.055)
ln(real income)	-0.159** (0.012)	-0.158** (0.012)	-0.153** (0.017)	-0.158** (0.013)	-0.174** (0.045)	-0.083** (0.013)	-0.059* (0.033)
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Job prestige> father's				-0.047** (0.021)	-0.061 (0.073)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.043 (0.055)
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Expect better life			35		-0.245** (0.056)		-0.105** (0.051)
No. obs.	11352	11339	6217	8396	980	4360	502
$R^2_{M&Z}$	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.14	0.18	0.18
$R^2_{Constant}$	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.23	0.25	0.66	0.66

Table 4  
Individual determinants of preference for redistribution

Dependent variables	REDISTR ordered probit					REDISTR01 probit	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]
Age	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.0005 (0.002)
Married	0.020 (0.020)	0.025 (0.020)	0.019 (0.030)	0.003 (0.023)	-0.015 (0.066)	0.004 (0.018)	-0.014 (0.058)
Female	0.130** (0.027)	0.137** (0.028)	0.142** (0.028)	0.130** (0.030)	0.094 (0.078)	0.090** (0.014)	0.076 (0.056)
Black	0.439** (0.056)	0.451** (0.059)	0.445** (0.058)	0.400** (0.056)	0.317** (0.112)	0.195** (0.028)	0.162* (0.083)
Educ.<12	0.291** (0.023)	0.288** (0.023)	0.257** (0.057)	0.331** (0.028)	0.177** (0.090)	0.158** (0.025)	0.036 (0.106)
Educ.>16	-0.186** (0.029)	-0.192** (0.028)	-0.179** (0.032)	-0.220** (0.032)	-0.215** (0.097)	-0.088** (0.023)	0.007 (0.075)
Children	-0.005 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.021)	0.012 (0.029)	-0.008 (0.021)	-0.020 (0.069)	-0.001 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.055)
ln(real income)	-0.159** (0.012)	-0.158** (0.012)	-0.153** (0.017)	-0.158** (0.013)	-0.174** (0.045)	-0.083** (0.013)	-0.059* (0.033)
Self-employed	-0.179** (0.033)	-0.180** (0.033)	-0.113** (0.032)	-0.184** (0.041)	-0.112 (0.111)	-0.117** (0.025)	-0.134 (0.085)
Unemployed last 5 years	0.140** (0.022)	0.139** (0.023)	0.117** (0.030)	0.156** (0.025)	0.073 (0.108)	0.092** (0.017)	0.043 (0.054)
Protestant		-0.088* (0.050)					
Catholic		-0.010 (0.047)					
Jewish		-0.099 (0.076)					
Other religion		0.224** (0.079)					
Help others			0.149** (0.050)				
Job prestige> father's				-0.047** (0.021)	-0.061 (0.073)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.043 (0.055)
Educ.—father's				0.018** (0.002)	0.028** (0.010)	0.006** (0.002)	0.009 (0.008)
Expect better life			35		-0.245** (0.056)		-0.105** (0.051)
No. obs.	11352	11339	6217	8396	980	4360	502
$R^2_{M&Z}$	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.14	0.18	0.18
$R^2_{Constant}$	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.23	0.25	0.66	0.66

Table 6  
 Preferences for redistribution and future income prospects


Dependent variables	REDISTR ordered probit				REDISTR01 probit			
	Transition matrix				Transition matrix			
	By state		By year		By state		By year	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Age	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.001** (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001** (0.0006)	-0.001* (0.0006)
Married	0.018 (0.025)	0.011 (0.025)	0.018 (0.025)	0.013 (0.025)	0.006 (0.019)	0.002 (0.019)	0.006 (0.019)	0.003 (0.019)
Female	0.116** (0.031)	0.116** (0.031)	0.116** (0.031)	0.117** (0.031)	0.081** (0.017)	0.082** (0.016)	0.081** (0.017)	0.082** (0.016)
Black	0.398** (0.057)	0.400** (0.058)	0.398** (0.057)	0.400** (0.058)	0.190** (0.030)	0.192** (0.030)	0.190** (0.030)	0.191** (0.030)
Educ.<12	0.310** (0.031)	0.317** (0.031)	0.311** (0.031)	0.316** (0.031)	0.144** (0.026)	0.146** (0.026)	0.144** (0.026)	0.146** (0.026)
Educ.>16	-0.223** (0.030)	-0.211** (0.030)	-0.223** (0.030)	-0.214** (0.030)	-0.099** (0.024)	-0.095** (0.024)	-0.099** (0.024)	-0.094** (0.024)
Children	-0.007 (0.022)	-0.008 (0.022)	-0.007 (0.022)	-0.009 (0.021)	0.004 (0.018)	0.004 (0.018)	0.004 (0.018)	0.003 (0.018)
ln(real income)	-0.089** (0.024)	-0.050** (0.024)	-0.095** (0.025)	-0.464 (0.032)	-0.044** (0.021)	-0.029 (0.024)	-0.046** (0.021)	-0.015 (0.025)
Self-employed	-0.201** (0.042)	-0.191** (0.041)	-0.201** (0.042)	-0.191** (0.041)	-0.119** (0.028)	-0.114** (0.028)	-0.119** (0.028)	-0.115** (0.028)
Unemployed last 5 years	0.153** (0.026)	0.154** (0.027)	0.153** (0.026)	0.155** (0.026)	0.090** (0.017)	0.091** (0.018)	0.090** (0.018)	0.091** (0.017)
Prestige>father's	-0.044* (0.023)	-0.046** (0.023)	-0.044* (0.023)	-0.047** (0.022)	0.001 (0.017)	-0.000 (0.017)	-0.001 (0.017)	-0.001 (0.017)
Education— father's	0.018** (0.003)	0.018** (0.003)	0.018** (0.003)	0.018** (0.003)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)
Prob(7–10 decile)	-0.219** (0.023)		-0.192** (0.058)		-0.108** (0.045)		-0.098** (0.042)	
Expected * income		-0.004** (0.001)		-0.004** (0.001)		-0.002** (0.001)		-0.002** (0.001)
No. obs.	7537	7537	7537	7537	3885	3885	3885	3885
$R^2_{M\&Z}$	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18
$R^2_{Count}$	0.23	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66

**Table 2.**  
**Preferences for Redistribution, Family Background and Social Mobility**  
**General Social Survey 1972-2004**

	Preferences for redistribution	Preferences for redistribution	Preferences for redistribution	Preferences for redistribution
Age	0.042 (0.034)	0.022 (0.043)	0.046 (0.037)	0.034 (0.053)
Age squared	-0.013 (0.003)***	-0.013 (0.004)***	-0.014 (0.004)***	-0.013 (0.005)**
Female	0.157 (0.018)***	0.146 (0.022)***	0.166 (0.019)***	0.117 (0.027)***
Black	0.565 (0.032)***	0.560 (0.038)***	0.559 (0.034)***	0.623 (0.046)***
Married	-0.059 (0.020)***	-0.042 (0.024)*	-0.059 (0.021)***	-0.013 (0.031)
Unemployed	0.091 (0.061)	0.090 (0.069)	0.114 (0.064)*	0.136 (0.088)
High school	-0.314 (0.030)***	-0.328 (0.034)***	-0.328 (0.034)***	-0.284 (0.042)***
College and more	-0.347 (0.034)***	-0.357 (0.039)***	-0.377 (0.043)***	-0.270 (0.049)***
Father with high school	-0.090 (0.022)***	-0.081 (0.026)***	-0.062 (0.030)**	-0.080 (0.033)**
Father with college and more	-0.129 (0.029)***	-0.109 (0.037)***	-0.080 (0.045)*	-0.170 (0.047)***
Family income	-0.047 (0.004)***	-0.046 (0.005)***	-0.047 (0.005)***	-0.054 (0.006)***
Family income at 16		-0.052 (0.015)***		
Mobility (diff. in years of education)			0.006 (0.004)	
Mobility (diff. in occupational prestige)				-0.078 (0.028)***
Observations	15339	10920	14104	7194
R-squared	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09

**Table 3.**  
**Preferences for Redistribution and a History of Misfortune**  
**General Social Survey 1972-2004**

	Preferences for Redistribution	Preferences for redistribution	Preferences for redistribution
Ever unemployed in the last ten years	0.121 (0.020)***		
Trauma last year		0.073 (0.018)***	
Trauma last 5 years			0.039 (0.013)***
Age	0.060 (0.031)**	0.028 (0.042)	0.021 (0.042)
Age squared	-0.012 (0.003)***	-0.011 (0.004)**	-0.010 (0.004)**
Female	0.173 (0.017)***	0.144 (0.023)***	0.144 (0.023)***
Black	0.579 (0.028)***	0.595 (0.035)***	0.599 (0.035)***
Married	-0.047 (0.019)**	-0.003 (0.025)	-0.002 (0.025)
Unemployed	0.053 (0.055)	0.069 (0.075)	0.091 (0.074)
High school	-0.309 (0.026)***	-0.278 (0.033)***	-0.281 (0.033)***
College and more	-0.377 (0.029)***	-0.358 (0.038)***	-0.359 (0.038)***
Family income	-0.041 (0.004)***	-0.049 (0.005)***	-0.050 (0.005)***
Observations	17811	9948	9948
R-squared	0.09	0.10	0.10



Το πρόβλημα με όλες αυτές τις εμπειρικές έρευνες είναι ότι βρίσκουν συσχετίσεις αλλά όχι κατ' ανάγκην αιτιώδεις σχέσεις

Γιατί ???

$X \rightarrow Y$  or  $Y \rightarrow X$  ....ή (ακόμα χειρότερα)  $Z \rightarrow X$  και  $Z \rightarrow Y$

## Το Halloween των οικονομολόγων






# Το πρόβλημα της μη παρατηρήσιμης αντι-πραγματικότητας.




# Το πρόβλημα της μη παρατηρήσιμης αντι-πραγματικότητας.



Για να βρούμε αιτιώδεις σχέσεις χρειαζόμαστε **randomized experiments**



Για να βρούμε αιτιώδεις σχέσεις χρειαζόμαστε randomized experiments.



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
Survey Data από 5 διαφορετικές χώρες (US, UK, France, Italy, Sweden)

Πως μετράμε τις πεποιθήσεις αναφορικά με τη κοινωνική κινητικότητα

*For the following questions, we focus on 500 families that represent [THE COUNTRY'S] population. We divide them into five groups on the basis of their income, with each group containing 100 families. These groups are: the poorest 100 families, the second poorest 100 families, the middle 100 families, the second richest 100 families, and the richest 100 families.*

*In the following questions, we will ask you to evaluate the chances that children born in one of the poorest 100 families, once they grow up, will belong to any of these income groups. Please fill out the entries to the right of the figure below to tell us, in your opinion, how many out of 100 children coming from the poorest 100 families will grow up to be in each income group.*

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**[Perceptions conditional on “effort”:]** *Consider 100 children coming from the poorest 100 families. These children are very determined and put in hard work both at school and, later in life, when finding a job and doing that job.*

**[Perceptions conditional on “talent”:]** *Consider 100 children coming from the poorest 100 families. These children are very talented.*

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TABLE 1—SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

	United States		United Kingdom		France		Italy		Sweden	
	Sample	Pop	Sample	Pop	Sample	Pop	Sample	Pop	Sample	Pop
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Male	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.49	0.50	0.48	0.50	0.48	0.47	0.50
18–29 years old	0.26	0.27	0.26	0.24	0.23	0.21	0.19	0.19	0.21	0.24
30–39 years old	0.18	0.19	0.18	0.20	0.20	0.19	0.22	0.21	0.18	0.19
40–49 years old	0.19	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.20	0.23	0.24	0.19	0.21
50–59 years old	0.21	0.20	0.18	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.21	0.18
60–69 years old	0.16	0.14	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.19	0.17	0.17	0.21	0.18
Income bracket 1	0.16	0.18	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.32	0.27	0.27	0.33	0.33
Income bracket 2	0.22	0.20	0.35	0.35	0.30	0.30	0.28	0.28	0.26	0.29
Income bracket 3	0.23	0.22	0.11	0.11	0.14	0.14	0.18	0.19	0.22	0.22
Income bracket 4	0.39	0.39	0.23	0.23	0.25	0.24	0.27	0.26	0.18	0.17
Married	0.51	0.49	0.47	0.41	0.44	0.46	0.55	0.46	0.41	0.33
Native	0.94	0.85	0.89	0.87	0.94	0.85	0.97	0.92	0.91	0.82
Employed	0.62	0.58	0.65	0.61	0.63	0.47	0.64	0.45	0.66	0.67
Unemployed	0.08	0.08	0.05	0.03	0.12	0.05	0.11	0.06	0.07	0.05
College	0.42	0.28	0.37	0.42	0.30	0.25	0.38	0.15	0.33	0.36



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
TABLE 2—PERCEIVED AND ACTUAL TRANSITION PROBABILITIES ACROSS COUNTRIES

	US		UK		France		Italy		Sweden		US versus EU	
	Actual	Perceived	Actual	Perceived	Actual	Perceived	Actual	Perceived	Actual	Perceived	Perceived	Perceived
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	US	EU
Q1 to Q5	7.8	11.7 (0.00)	11.4	10.0 (0.00)	11.2	9.1 (0.00)	10.4	10.1 (0.48)	11.1	9.2 (0.00)	11.7	9.6 (0.00)
Q1 to Q4	12.7	12.0 (0.00)	12.9	10.6 (0.00)	12.8	10.5 (0.00)	15.6	11.2 (0.00)	17.3	11.2 (0.00)	12.0	10.9 (0.00)
Q1 to Q3	18.7	22.3 (0.00)	19.9	19.4 (0.13)	23.0	21.5 (0.00)	21.0	21.9 (0.03)	21.0	24.5 (0.00)	22.3	21.6 (0.06)
Q1 to Q2	27.7	21.8 (0.00)	25.1	22.2 (0.00)	23.8	23.6 (0.55)	25.8	23.1 (0.00)	23.8	23.1 (0.09)	21.8	23.0 (0.00)
Q1 to Q1	33.1	32.2 (0.07)	30.6	37.8 (0.00)	29.2	35.3 (0.00)	27.3	33.6 (0.00)	26.7	32.0 (0.00)	32.2	34.9 (0.00)
Observations		2,170		1,290		1,297		1,242		881	2,170	4,710
<i>p</i> -value from joint test		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00


*Notes:* The first five rows of the table report the average perceived probabilities (in odd columns) and actual probabilities (in even columns) that a child born to parents in the bottom quintile of the income distribution will be in quintiles 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 respectively, when adult. Columns 11 and 12 show the perceived probabilities for the United States and the four European countries. *p*-values for tests of equality of the average perceived probability to the actual probability, or of the average perceived probability in the United States to the one in Europe are in parentheses. The last row shows the *p*-value from the joint test that the average perceived probabilities are jointly different from the actual probabilities, and, in column 12, that the average perceptions in the United States are jointly different from those in Europe. See Section IA for a description of the data sources on actual mobility.

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Panel A. Q1 to Q1 probability



Panel B. Q1 to Q5 probability



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


FIGURE 5. THE PERCEIVED ROLE OF EFFORT

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


FIGURE 7. PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNMENT AND FAIRNESS

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TABLE 3—CROSS-SECTIONAL RELATION BETWEEN PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY PREFERENCES

	Budget opp. (1)	Support estate tax (2)	Support equality opp. policies (3)	Government interv. (4)	Unequal opp. very serious problem (5)	Budget safety net (6)	Tax rate top 1 (7)	Tax rate bottom 50 (8)	Govt. tools (9)
<i>Panel A. Unconditional beliefs</i>									
Q1 to Q1	0.030 (0.007)	0.000 (0.000)	0.004 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.000)	0.013 (0.005)	0.057 (0.012)	-0.035 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.000)
Q1 to Q5	-0.044 (0.011)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.004 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.041 (0.019)	0.060 (0.011)	-0.000 (0.000)

*Notes:* The table reports estimates of regressions of the variable in the column on mobility perception (interacted with political affiliation in panels B and D). Interactions of mobility perceptions and “moderate” are not reported. Outcome variables are defined in online Appendix OA.2. *p*-value diff. is the *p*-value of a test of equality of the effects on left- and right-wing respondents. Panels A and B consider unconditional perceptions; panels C and D consider perceptions when respondents are asked to think about very hard-working individuals. The *p*-value of a joint test of equality of the left- and right-wing effects across equations is 0.133 for Q1 to Q1 perceptions and 0.11 for Q1 to Q5 perceptions. The mobility perceptions Q1 to Q1 and Q1 to Q5 are expressed as the number of children out of 100 from the bottom quintile. Example how to read the coefficients: if a respondent who is left-wing thinks 10 more children out of 100 from the bottom quintile will remain in the bottom quintile, their preferred spending on opportunities (education and health) as a share of the total budget increases by 0.3 percentage points. Controls included in all regressions are: indicator variables for gender, age less than 45, having children, being in the top quartile of the income distribution, having a college degree, political affiliation, having a job with a status higher than father, having at least one of the parents not born in the country, and country times survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.

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### The randomized experiment

Η παρέμβαση στο συγκεκριμένο πείραμα είναι μία «ταινία». Πιο συγκεκριμένα τα άτομα παρακολουθούν δύο βίντεο όπου το ένα παρουσιάζει τη ζωή των παιδιών από οικογένειες χαμηλών εισοδημάτων και το άλλο τη ζωή των παιδιών από οικογένειες υψηλότερων εισοδημάτων.

Στην εισαγωγή αναφέρεται ότι τα βίντεο που ακολουθούν στηρίζονται σε ευρήματα επιστημονικών ερευνών αναφορικά με τις προοπτικές των παιδιών -από οικογένειες διαφορετικών εισοδημάτων- να πετύχουν στην ζωή τους. Το βασικό μήνυμα που προκύπτει από την «ταινία» είναι ότι δεν υπάρχει έντονη κοινωνική κινητικότητα. Πιο συγκεκριμένα:

*The chances of a poor kid staying poor as an adult are extremely large. Only very few kids from poor families will ever make it and become rich.*

*Children born in rich families are extremely likely to remain rich themselves when they grow up, like their parents. It is extremely rare for a child from a rich family to become poor later in life.*

Alesina, A., Stancheva, S., Teso, E., (2018). **Intergenerational mobility and preferences for redistribution.** *American Economic Review* 108, 521-554

TABLE 4—FIRST-STAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS ON MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS

	Q1 to Q1 (1)	Q1 to Q2 (2)	Q1 to Q3 (3)	Q1 to Q4 (4)	Q1 to Q5 (5)	Q1 to Q4 (qual.) (6)	Q1 to Q5 (qual.) (7)	American dream alive (8)
<i>Panel A. Unconditional beliefs</i>								
Treated	9.691 (0.560)	-2.123 (0.278)	-5.885 (0.304)	-1.806 (0.201)	0.123 (0.344)	-0.197 (0.018)	-0.212 (0.020)	-0.031 (0.009)

TABLE 6—TREATMENT EFFECTS ON POLICY PREFERENCES

	Budget opp. (1)	Support estate tax (2)	Support equality opp. policies (3)	Government interv. (4)	Unequal opp. very serious problem (5)	Budget safety net (6)	Tax rate top 1 (7)	Tax rate bottom 50 (8)	Govt. tools (9)	Redistribution index (10)
<i>Panel A. Treatment effects</i>										
Treated	0.108 (0.227)	0.002 (0.010)	0.010 (0.022)	-0.020 (0.030)	0.046 (0.013)	0.225 (0.160)	0.357 (0.398)	0.155 (0.226)	-0.017 (0.013)	0.013 (0.009)