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ARTICLE

The EU's Performance in the United Nations Security Council

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ABSTRACT Performance in the United Nations (UN) is a key element of the EU's 'effective multilateralism' strategy, especially in the UN Security Council (UNSC) that constitutes one of the two most significant political organs of the organization. In this article, we assess the EU's performance in the UNSC by looking at two particular aspects of the EU-UNSC interaction: first, the broader political and financial contribution of EU member states in the UNSC functioning and second, the engagement of EU member states in the different stages of the UNSC reform process. On the first aspect, the analysis suggests a positive EU performance, with some inevitable variation across the cases examined, reflecting different political constellation dynamics in the intra-EU deliberations. On the second aspect, there is a clear lack of a coherent, articulated EU position beyond the rhetorical adherence to the necessity of institutional reform, highlighting the minimal EU relevance for its priority stakeholders to meet their political aspirations.

KEY WORDS: EU, performance, UN, Security Council

Introduction

The articulation of the EU security doctrine in 2003 with the embrace of 'effective multilateralism' has further increased the significance of the United Nations (UN) to the EU international presence.¹ An overall assessment of EU performance bounces against the organizational complexity of the UN system, its multi-thematic nature, and the varying political and institutional *modus operandi* of the various UN bodies and agencies. As a result, existing literature offers quite different insights of EU performance vis-à-vis collective security and EU presence in the Security Council (UNSC), the economic and social components of the UN system, human rights, and environment (see for example Hill 2005;

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Laatikainen and Smith 2006; Missiroli 2005). Thus, from the beginning it is important to stress that caution is required in any attempt to generalize organ- and issue-specific findings (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2011).

In this paper, we examine the EU's performance in the UNSC along the four core elements of organizational performance identified in the Introduction to this collection. Three points of clarification are necessary. First, the EU has no state status and as such is not and cannot become a member of the UN, let alone the UNSC. There are of course a few indications of EU *collective* presence in the UNSC, in the form of statements from the Presidency and the High Representative (HR), but focusing exclusively on them would provide a limited and distorted picture. Thus, we need also to examine eclectically the contributions of individual EU member states in the UNSC, when they reflect and encompass the EU dimension.² Second, methodologically speaking, whereas voting patterns of EU member states have been used to analyze the EU presence in the UNGA, it is questionable whether this approach can provide meaningful results for the EU's performance in the UNSC. For this reason, we have chosen to rely not so much on the voting behaviour of EU member states in the UNSC but mainly on their (co-)sponsorship of resolutions as an indicator of their active engagement in UNSC political functioning.³ Third, the use of the identified indicators of the analytical framework assumes a clear benchmark of objectives in the first place, upon which performance can be analyzed. The bottom line of our analysis is the European Security Strategy and the overarching EU security objectives identified there.

Our assessment evolves along two thematic axes: first, the contribution of EU member states in the general UNSC functioning and second, the engagement of EU member states in the different stages of the UNSC reform process. As regards the former, the UNSC is the most important political organ of the UN (Lowe *et al.* 2008; Malone 2007). As regards the latter, the EU as proponent of 'effective multilateralism' should be particularly interested in the UNSC becoming more representative and legitimized. In that respect, the reform of the UN system in general and the UNSC more specifically constitutes a critical test for the assessment of the EU's 'multilateral' credentials (Chevallard 2005: 23). The time-spans of the two thematic axes differ: in the former, we place particular emphasis on the last decade and especially on post-Lisbon developments, whereas the reform case constitutes an evolutionary process rather than a one-off opportunity and as such we look at it from the early 1990s when it first came to the foreground (Missiroli 2005: 42). Our research draws on verbatim records of the UNSC, the UNGA, and Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) meetings as well as relevant secondary literature, especially related to country-specific foreign-policy objectives and priorities.

In the next section, we focus on the EU member states' contributions to UNSC functioning, before moving on to the examination of the UNSC reform debate. Following that, we assess EU-27 performance in the UNSC and discuss the implications of our findings for the broader research project.

The EU Member States at the UNSC

In the past, the EU could make its voice heard in the UNSC in two ways: first, the country holding the rotating Presidency could take the floor to deliver a common statement on behalf of all EU member states, and second, the EU HR could address the UNSC after the agreement of all UNSC members (Rasch 2008: 179–80).⁴ The Lisbon Treaty has reinforced the role of the HR in that respect, rendering him or her more actively engaged in UNSC functioning, reflecting EU aspirations to provide leadership in international organizations, not least in the UN (Laatikainen 2010). According to Article 34, '[w]hen the Union has defined a position on a subject which is on the United Nations Security Council agenda, those member states which sit on the Security Council shall request that the High Representative be invited to present the Union's position' (para. 2.iii).⁵ Obviously, this strengthening of the institutional potential of the EU *collective* presence in the UNSC should not be discarded. However, it is still relatively early to assess the EU's performance in the UNSC on that basis alone.

In the absence of such a strong collective EU presence, special emphasis has been laid upon intra-EU coordination to ensure that EU member states that are also UNSC members raise EU views and positions.⁶ Still, information-sharing in the UNSC has lagged behind in comparison to the other UN main and subsidiary organs (Brantner and Gowan 2009: 47–50; Degrand-Guillaud 2009) and coordination has remained problematic (Farrell 2006). Despite the existence of relevant provisions already in Article J. 9 of the Maastricht Treaty, little formal or informal coordination among member states on UNSC affairs was taking place in the 1990s (*contra* Verbeke 2006). Despite sporadic attempts by some member states to enhance information exchange and the urging of the two EU permanent UNSC members to improve coordination with the other EU partners, no regular coordination mechanism was formally established. Only recently, pragmatic arrangements have increased the flow of information, prospective coordination, and EU visibility in the UNSC (Marchesi 2010: 101–03; Pirozzi 2010: 3–5), in conformity with the Lisbon Treaty obligation of member states in the UNSC to keep the other EU member states and the HR fully informed (A. 34, paragraph 2.2).

Thus, coordination emerges as a key parameter of EU performance in the UNSC. The gradual transformation of the duty of information into practice on UNSC affairs reflects broader concerns that the EU is not an actor *per se* in the UNSC, in contrast to other UN organs (Rasch 2008: 78–86). This coordination has a dual objective: first, to fine-tune the positions of EU member states and avoid split votes in the UNSC decision-making process that would stress the intra-EU heterogeneity and thus distort the implicit or explicit projection of individual member states' positions as those of the EU; second, to ensure the least possible divergence of these positions from ESS rhetoric and objectives. Out of the 62 resolutions that were put forward in the period 2010 and up to May 2011, only 11 featured no EU member state as a (co-)sponsor. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, in only two cases EU member states

voted in divergence in the UNSC, with France abstaining over Iraq and Germany over Libya⁷. Even if the time-span of this analysis is relatively short, it clearly suggests that either individually or in groups, EU member states have effectively supported multilateral UN-centred efforts in full concordance with the ESS strategic objectives and modality of international engagement. The association of individual EU member states' actions in the UNSC with the EU security doctrine generates positive connotations of political actorness for the EU as a whole.

One possible point of criticism of looking at (co-)sponsorship records of EU member states as a measurable indicator of effectiveness and subsequently performance might be that the EU members are only passive takers of intra-UNSC politics without actively participating in the political negotiations that precede these resolutions. In this vein, EU members are simply invited to (co-)sponsor resolutions to increase their legitimacy and political leverage without shaping their content and affecting their outcome. We do not argue, of course, that EU member states are the main driving force behind every UNSC resolution and decision. However, a closer look at two international crises and the EU contribution to their handling at the UNSC level offers a credible counter-argument. The Iranian, and to a lesser extent, the Libyan cases offer a positive outlook of the EU performance in the UNSC, showing how effective EU diplomacy can be in orchestrating the response of the international community at the UNSC level.

The first case is the Iranian nuclear program, against which the European diplomacy mobilized from 2003 onwards to hinder Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The EU's active engagement came shortly after the adoption of the ESS, with its emphasis on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and has been closely associated with the member states' desire to re-establish EU international actorness after the highly divisive Iraq crisis (Dryburgh 2008). The original minilateral format of the diplomatic team in charge of the negotiations with Iran comprised only Germany, France and the UK. Following intra-EU pressures for a closer collective EU engagement and addressing calls for the explicit recognition of the EU role in the process, the HR joined the team in autumn 2004 to increase the authority and legitimacy of the negotiating team that now spoke more authoritatively on behalf of the EU as a whole (Harnisch 2007: 5). In this first phase, the EU3 offered a package deal to the Iranian government to stop its nuclear program, but negotiations came to a halt after the 2005 Iranian elections. From 2006 onwards, the three remaining permanent UNSC members (US, Russia and China) joined the EU3 team. In this process, the HR emerged as the prime interlocutor for the 'EU3+3' team in the direct negotiations with the Iranian government, playing a critical role in the efforts to cement the team's unity. As successive sets of proposals were rejected, the 'EU3+3' turned to the UNSC to impose sanctions against Iran as a means to coerce compliance with the requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. The EU diplomatic efforts overcame reactions and forged the necessary consensus, especially among the permanent UNSC members, on the necessity and the exact content of these sanctions (Sauer 2008: 278–82). The effective interventions of the

EU3 and the HR ensured the successful outcome of five EU-sponsored resolutions,⁸ further backed up by EU Council decisions to implement them unequivocally.

The case of Libya is another example that illustrates the effective involvement of EU member states in UNSC decision-making, shaping rather than taking decisions. In the face of the escalation of violence in Libya in early 2011, the four EU permanent and non-permanent UNSC members co-sponsored Resolution 1970, on 26 February 2011, that imposed among others a complete arms embargo on Libya as well as an assets freeze for key Libyan leaders. Much more important was the role the EU played with regard to UNSC Resolution 1973, on 17 March 2011. A few days before the passing of the resolution, an extraordinary European Council adopted a Declaration that reflected the EU's willingness to work with the UN to stop immediately the use of force *by all necessary means*. The adopted Declaration set the political direction of EU member states' course of action in the UNSC, as expressed by the UK and France. Orchestrating and co-sponsoring Resolution 1973, they established a no-fly zone in the airspace of Libya. It is important to notice, though, that Resolution 1973 was one of the two cases where EU member states voted differently in the UNSC, with Germany abstaining (but not rejecting it).⁹

In terms of resources, the EU member states bring to the UNSC their substantial financial and personnel contributions, playing a critical role in the implementation of UNSC resolutions, among others by imposing sanctions and orchestrating peacekeeping operations. Setting aside the individual and collective contributions in the regular UN budget, the EU member states cover in aggregate approximately 40% of the expenses of UNSC-authorized peacekeeping operations and about 7% of the troops and other personnel involved in these operations.¹⁰ Success stories indicating the close cooperation between the UN and the EU in the implementation of a UNSC resolution comprise military and civilian interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2003 and 2006, Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2003, Lebanon in 2006, Kosovo in 2008, and the naval force against piracy in Somalia. However, cooperation is not always smooth, as shown by the EU failure to respond to another UN request for intervention in the DRC, in autumn 2008. The opposition of Germany and the UK as well as the hesitance of Italy and France clearly indicate the conditional willingness and capacity of the EU to engage in the handling of an international crisis, subject to the intra-EU political dynamics (Pirozzi 2010: 9). Such cases undermine EU credibility and have a negative effect on EU performance. Such problematic cases notwithstanding, we can still come to the conclusion that the EU member states commit substantial resources to UNSC functioning in view of implementing the UNSC decisions that also reflect the main EU security preoccupations.

The EU and its Member States in the UNSC Reform Debate

Following the end of the Cold War, there emerged a strong need for the UNSC to reform in order to reflect the new international developments. However, little actual progress has been achieved so far, not least because

of the multiplicity of national interests involved, the need to keep a balance between representation, legitimacy and efficiency, as well as the constitutional requirements for a UN Charter amendment (Weiss 2003). Broadly speaking, the reform debate has evolved in three stages: first, around the 'quick-fix formula' between 1992 and 1995 (Germany and Japan); second, around the 'two plus three formula' that featured in the 1997 Razali Plan (Germany, Japan and three rotating countries from the African, Asian, and Latin American regional groupings); and third, following the 2004 Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change after the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration (Bourantonis 2005). The release of the Report led UN members to regroup, forming three major blocs: first, the Group of Four (G4: Japan, Germany, India, and Brazil), supported by the UK, France and the majority of the EU member states; second, 53 states of the African Union; and third, the 'Uniting for Consensus' (UfC) group, with the participation among other countries of Italy, Malta, and Spain.¹¹ Since 2007, UN members, while retaining more or less their initial positions, have explored possible alternative avenues for making progress, seeking intermediary arrangements with a mandatory review to take place later at a predetermined date.¹² This progress has led to an all-encompassing text that compiles the positions of the UN member states in a single document, tabled in May 2010 as the basis for further negotiations.

From the very beginning of the negotiations, France and the UK have been more than hesitant with regard to any reform initiative that would question their privileged position. The main EU-related feature of the first reform debate stage was the adamant Italian opposition to the 'quick-fix formula' and the deriving German candidature, which the UK and France had accepted seemingly as the lesser of two evils, namely a broader questioning of their own UNSC status (Hill 2006: 61–65). These early positions have remained more or less constant throughout the reform debate, albeit occasionally put in a different wrapping. Germany has not hidden its aspirations to a permanent seat, based on the country's significant financial contribution to the UN budget. Actually, the German quest for a permanent UNSC seat emerged as one of the unspoken but burning issues in German foreign and security policy in the early 1990s (Schlör 1993: 57). Hence, the German side repeatedly sponsored proposals that would increase the number of permanent members, under the assumption of being the rightful owner of one of them.

However, the international ascendance of Germany, once such status had been achieved, would have had serious consequences for Italy in terms of prestige and international political clout (Fulci 1999). To undermine such perspective, Italy put forward at this early stage the idea of a single EU seat in the UNSC, tactically aiming at the support of smaller EU member states that were also proponents of further political integration in the EU (Tsakaloyannis and Bourantonis 1997: 198–201). This proposal was rather short-lived and failed to gain the necessary momentum after meeting the French and British implicit and explicit rejection as well as the lukewarm reception by other EU member states, not least Germany (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2002: 11). Bouncing back, Italy and Spain

submitted almost identical reform proposals, tailor-made to ensure more frequent UNSC participation for themselves and to counter German claims for a permanent seat (Pedrazzi 2000: 55). These proposals did not challenge the current status of the permanent seats in terms of numbers and rights, but introduced a new class of ten *rotating* non-permanent seats *with a longer serving period* (i.e. more than two years). Candidates for these new seats would be selected according to specific objective criteria and a geographical distribution formula.¹³

The shelving of the Italian, single EU seat, proposal paved the way for some small and medium EU member states, which had previously remained ambivalent, to embrace the German candidacy for permanent membership though in different formats from the 'quick-fix formula'. Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, in individual contributions or collectively with the Nordic Group, supported a UNSC in the low 20s, preferably 23 but without granting the veto right to the new permanent members.¹⁴ Actually, among the EU member states, only Portugal sided – at a later stage – with Germany on the veto right extension to new permanent members.¹⁵ Belgium, Austria, and Ireland, together with a series of candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia), expressed in favour of a UNSC with less than 25 members, with the selection of the new members left to the UNGA under certain criteria.¹⁶

In the second stage, several EU countries (Austria, Ireland, Finland, Sweden, Belgium, and Portugal) embraced the envisaged reform in the 'Razali plan'.¹⁷ The majority of Central and Eastern European states, such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, also favoured this plan because it would ensure one additional non-permanent seat for their region.¹⁸ Opposition came once again primarily from the Italian side, which characterised the plan as a constitutional absurdity.¹⁹

The intra-EU division has continued in the third stage of the debate, with EU member states taking different sides on the G-4 plan (Brantner and Gowan 2008: 50–51). France and the UK supported it, clearly having in the back of their minds that any reform along these lines would take pressure off them and neutralize challenges to their own permanent membership status at least for some time (Hill 2005). An overwhelming majority of 'old' and 'new' EU member states also embraced the plan, either co-sponsoring it in the form of a draft resolution put forward in 2005 (Belgium, Denmark, the Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Poland, and Portugal)²⁰ or expressing their support in various formats (Finland, Sweden, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania, Estonia, Luxembourg, and Slovenia).²¹ The Netherlands and Cyprus did not take clear sides but appeared very reluctant to embrace it.²² Malta joined Italy and Spain in rejecting the proposal.²³

The UNSC reform debate has not been confined to the UN setting. Closely associated with CFSP developments, it has had inevitable spillovers to EU political deliberations. Already at the end of the first stage of the debate, and in view of the 1996–97 Intergovernmental Conference, the European Parliament made a futile effort to bring up the single EU seat in the UNSC

again.²⁴ Since then, it has reinstated its embrace of the single seat also in the third stage of the debate as soon as the political, constitutional and legal conditions for it are met.²⁵ Public endorsements of the single EU seat perspective came, in 2007, also from officials from other EU bodies, like HR Javier Solana and the Commissioner for External Relations and the European Neighborhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner (Roos et al 2008: 49). Especially for Solana, this was not the first time he expressed his support, having backed in 1999 the Italian short-lived proposal for an embryonic European seat (Bates 1999).

The EU's Performance in the UNSC

If we take for granted the EU rhetorical commitment to UNSC reform, then the obvious conclusion is that the EU performance in terms of both effectiveness and efficiency is very poor. Little if any progress has been achieved despite the investment of a great deal of resources on a *national* basis. Still, such an assessment does not tell the whole story and may be misleading about the origins of such EU under-performance. In the three stages of the debate, the EU member states have not managed to articulate a single position to defend and push forward collectively, in which case a proper evaluation would be meaningful. For the majority of member states, resources have been mostly invested in efforts to safeguard their own privileged position (e.g. the UK and France), pursue their own national priorities (e.g. Germany, 'new Europe'), and undermine other EU partners' political aspirations (e.g. Italy and Spain to a lesser extent). Thus, the EU engagement in the UNSC reform debate lacks focus and cohesion, reflecting the varying relevance attributed by its member states to the EU as a forum to pursue national objectives. This feature, however, has little to do with the question of UNSC reform *per se* or more broadly the EU's international performance. It is a constitutive element of the European integration process, in which member states' heterogeneity leads to different degrees of EU relevance for the priority stakeholders, that is the member states. In that respect, the EU stance in the UNSC reform debate – or more accurately the lack of such a stance – does not come necessarily as a surprise: the member states' different status in the UN system and their diverging political aspirations predispose against such a uniform approach.

In that case, developments in the EU performance pattern are bound to be incremental in nature. For most parts of the reform debate, a strengthening of the EU presence in the UNSC has been monolithically associated with a single EU seat or an additional seat for an EU member state, proposals still not feasible politically 20 years after they were first launched in the early 1990s. Although the political potential of these proposals, especially of the single seat, is not negated, we should pay more attention to the increasingly effective coordination mechanisms that have been set in place in the last decade and the constitutional developments in the Lisbon Treaty that cater for a more important role for the HR in the UNSC. They may create an impetus for additional small-scale adjustments, further enhancing the cohesion and the *collective* EU presence in the UNSC. The

emphasis on coordination and information sharing reveals that EU member states attribute an increasingly greater value to their common standing in the UNSC. Thus, it becomes evident that in a changing international environment with the ascendancy of new countries in international politics, the relevance of the EU for member states as a means to ascertain collectively their international clout rises, improving the future EU performance in the UNSC.

Coming to the second component of our analysis, the assessment of the EU performance vis-à-vis the UNSC general functioning is by and large positive. The EU makes coordinated attempts to meet the ESS objectives in the UNSC and at least in terms of effectiveness and relevance this seems to be working, as indicated for example in the rate of (co-)sponsoring UNSC resolutions that are put into effect and the EU engagement in the Iranian and Libyan crises. The data provide a glimpse rather than a comprehensive outlook of how involved the EU members are in the UNSC efforts to address security crises, be they regional or associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and others. Still, this glimpse is adequate for our understanding of the EU performance, because it reveals a by and large successful behavioural pattern of international engagement in concordance with the ESS priorities. Of course, heterogeneity of national interests at the EU level does occasionally take its toll, as indicated for example in the French and German abstentions over two resolutions on Iraq and Libya in 2010 and 2011 respectively, undermining the coherence of the EU. But these constitute seemingly isolated incidents, though they provide some food for further thought to avoid a repetition of the 2003 nadir in the history of the EU performance in the UNSC.

In terms of efficiency, the outcome of the analysis is more problematic, considering at least the magnitude of the EU member states' contribution to UNSC functioning. It is difficult to tell whether the EU gets good value for the quantity of resources committed to UNSC functioning, especially if we complement these resources with the EU political and economic leverage that supports, for example, the implementation of UNSC sanctions. In other words, the efficiency criterion encompasses not only the disclosed resources in terms of financial contributions, military and civilian personnel in peacekeeping operations, and so on, but also a large amount of political and economic capital that is difficult to identify, let alone assess. For these reasons, it is more difficult to evaluate the EU performance in the UNSC on the grounds of efficiency.

Conclusions

The overview of the EU's performance in the UNSC provides a mixed picture. On the one hand, EU member states participate effectively but arguably not so efficiently in the shaping of UNSC activities. They often bring along and project explicitly or implicitly the EU dimension in their actions, acting in concordance with ESS objectives and priorities, as indicated in the handling of regional crises and non-proliferation issues. On the other hand, in the reform debate the EU member states have been

bowling mostly alone or in other non-EU clusters, often adopting a competitive rather than a cooperative attitude. In that respect, using only the rhetorical endorsement of reform as the benchmark criterion, the EU performance record would be very poor. However, performance is improving, as shown by the degree of achieved coordination and the progress in the actual implementation of the relevant treaty clauses that testify to the growing relevance of the EU for its member states as a means to ascertain collectively their international clout in the context of a changing international environment. Developments along these lines have the potential to increase significantly the EU international presence, without necessarily awaiting the outcome of the UNSC-reform deliberations.

Notes

1. See for example European Commission (2005), European Union (2004).
2. Besides the two permanent members (UK and France), EU member states are members of three different regional groups, the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), the Eastern European Group (EES) and Cyprus in the Asian Group. Thus, in theory, six EU members can serve in the UNSC simultaneously.
3. Any UNSC member can (co-)sponsor a resolution; a non-UNSC member can also submit a proposal but it is put to the vote only at the request of a UNSC member (Rule 38 of the UNSC Rules of Procedure).
4. The Presidency statements have had mainly a declaratory and symbolic nature and were usually less than 40 per year. From 2000 to 2006, the EU HR, Javier Solana, was invited to address the UNSC only four times.
5. See, for instance, the statements of the EU HR, Lady Ashton, in the UNSC meetings on 4 May 2010 and 8 February 2011 (UN Doc. S/PV.6306, 4 May 2010 and UN Doc. S/PV. 6477, 8 February 2011). For these UN documents, see <http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact.htm>
6. However, the two permanent UNSC members have fought hard to preserve the acknowledgement of their special status as enshrined in the EU treaties from Maastricht onwards. This provision has not been challenged in the Lisbon Treaty, which also stipulates that '[m]ember states which are members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, defend the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter' (Art. 34, para 2.ii).
7. Resolution 1958 of 15 December 2010 and Resolution 1973 of 17 March 2011. See <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc>
8. These are Resolutions 1737 of 2006 (23 December 2006), 1747 of 2007 (24 March 2007), 1803 and 1835 of 2008 (3 March 2008 and 27 September 2008, the latter together with other European non-permanent UNSC members – Italy, Belgium, and Croatia – as well as the US and Russia), and 1929 of 2010 (9 June 2010, together with the US). For these UNSC Resolutions, see <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc>
9. However, Germany approved the Council legislation set in place to implement Resolution 1973 (Council Decision 2011/ 178/CFSP of 23 March 2011).
10. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of UN peacekeeping operations, UN Doc. A/64/220, 23 September 2009. The data are based on the results of the application of the methodology used in preparing the scale of assessments for the period 2007–2009 to GNI data for the period 2002–2007, and Global Policy Forum (2011).
11. The UfC group is a direct descendant of the 'Coffee Club' that blocked the Razali initiative in 1997.
12. See United Nations (2007).
13. The Italian reform proposal can be found in UN Doc. A/AC.247/5 (g), annex, 15 May 1995, found in UN Doc. A/49/965, 18 September 1995. For the Spanish positions, see the remarks of the Spanish Permanent Representative in the UNGA (UN Doc. GAOR, A/50/57, 13 November 1995, pp. 8–9).
14. See the common position of the Nordic countries (UN Doc. A/AC.247/5 (j), found in UN Doc. A/49/965, 18 September 1995). On the positions of the 'middle powers' (including the Netherlands), see Laatikainen 2006.

15. See the speech of the Portuguese Permanent Representative in the UNGA (UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, 4 December 1997, pp. 43–44).
16. These criteria comprised the capacity and willingness of the candidate states to contribute to international peace and security through peacekeeping and peacemaking operations and by assuming additional financial obligations. However, they avoided taking a clear position on the thorny question of extending the veto to new permanent members. See UN Doc. A/AC.247/5 (c), 9 May 1995, found in UN Doc. A/49/965, 18 September 1995; and UN Doc. A/50/PV. 59, 14 November 1995, pp. 15–16. On the positions of the ‘new Europe’, see also Johansson-Nogués 2006.
17. For Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Belgium, and Portugal, see UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, 4 December 1997, and for Ireland, UN Doc. A/52/64, 5 December 1997.
18. See UN Doc. A/52/PV.64, 5 December 1997.
19. See the speech of the Italian Permanent Representative in the UNGA (UN Doc. GAOR, A/53/PV.66, 23 November 1998, p. 5).
20. See UN Doc. A/59/L.64, 6 July 2005.
21. See, for instance, for Finland UN Doc. A/60/PV.95, 20 July 2006, p. 18; and UN Doc. A/61/PV. 73, 11 December 2006, pp. 22–23. For Sweden see UN Doc. A/61/PV. 74, 12 December 2006, pp. 21–22. See the speeches of the Slovakian, Bulgarian and Slovenian Permanent Representatives in the UNGA (UN Doc A/60/PV. 96, 21 July 1996, p. 10, UN Doc A/60/PV. 95, 20 July 1996, pp. 25–26; and UN Doc A/60/PV. 95, 20 July 1996, pp. 27–28). See also the statement of the Lithuanian Secretary of Foreign Affairs at the 60th session of UN Plenary Assembly (20 September 2005).
22. See the statement of the Dutch Permanent Representative in the UNGA (UN Doc. A/61/PV. 73, 11 December 2006, pp. 8–10). See the speech of the Cypriot Permanent Representative in the OEWG and the UNGA (UN Doc. A/60/PV. 96, 21 July 2006, p. 27; and UN Doc. A/61/PV.75, 12 December 2006, pp. 22–23).
23. See the speeches of the Italian, Spanish and Maltese Permanent Representatives in the UNGA (UN Doc. A/60/PV.95, 20 July 2006, pp. 23–24; and UN Doc. A/60/PV. 96, 21 July 2006, pp. 27–28).
24. Question No. H-856/95 by Mr. Kranidiotis on the representation of the EU in the Security Council, Doc. 95/389, 12 December 1995. According to Mr. Westendorp, then President-in-Office of the Council, the IGC would not be an appropriate venue to discuss the issue, reinstating the lack of a common EU position on this matter.
25. Resolution on the reform of the United Nations, B6-0328-2005, 6 June 2005; and Recommendation to the Council on the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 8 June 2011, based on the Report A7-0189-2011.

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