### **WORLD ECONOMIC CHALLENGES:**

**Selected Topics of the World Economy** 

Organizations Problems Projects

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2014

#### **WORLD ECONOMIC CHALLENGES:**

Global institutions: G8, G20, the IMF, the World Bank.

- I. Mainly-economic <u>GLOBAL THREATS</u>
- 1. Global inequalities
- 2. FINANCIAL CRISES (2008)
- 3. Debt traps, debt-forgiveness.
- 4. Aid / Conditionality Programs.
- II. Non-mainly-economic <u>GLOBAL THREATS</u>
  - 1. CLIMATE CHANGE / ENVIRONMENT
  - 3 CONTAGIOUS DISEASES (AIDS)
  - 3. NATURAL DISASTERS (Fukusima)
  - 4. other .....

## **GLOBAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS**

- G7 / G8 / G9? (with China) → Now G20
- IMF
- WORLD BANK
- UNCTAD / UN
- OECD
- WTO

# Σημαντικά οικονομικά γεγονότα και η αναγκαιότητα ΝΕΩΝ θεσμών

1944-50: Συμφωνία Μπρέτον Γουντς Ίδρυση ΔΝΤ, Παγκόσμιας Τράπεζας Αργότερα ΠΟΕ, ΟΟΣΑ

1972: Κρίση Δολαρίου, G7

1980-90: Συναλλαγματικές κρίσεις Λατινικής Αμερικής: ΔΝΤ

1987: Χρηματοπιστωτική κρίση: Εποπτεία (Basel I)

1989-90: Κατάρρευση Σοβιετικών οικονομιών: EBRD

1999: Υιοθέτηση του Ευρώ: ΕΚΤ

2000: Χρηματοπιστωτική κρίση, Εποπτεία (Basel II)

2008: Χρηματοπιστωτική κρίση, G20, Εποπτεία (Basel III)

### ΔΝΤ

Αρχικά: Στήριξη της συναλλαγματικής σταθερότητας

Παρέμβαση μετά από συναλλαγματικές κρίσεις

Διάδοση των οικονομικών της προσαρμογής:

- 1. Προγράμματα διαρθρωτικής προσαρμογής
- 2. Μείωση δημόσιου τομέα, ιδιωτικοποιήσεις,
- 3. ελεύθερη διακύμανση ισοτιμίας, ελεύθερο εμπόριο

Η "Συναίνεση της Ουάσιγκτον"

## Παγκόσμια Τράπεζα

Αρχικά: Δανειοδότηση φτωχών χωρών

Εποχή Μακναμάρα1970-80: Από 20 -> 210 οικονομολόγοι

<u>Διάδοση των οικονομικών της ανάπτυξης</u>:

Συσσώρευση κεφαλαίου, υποδομές, επιχειρηματικότητα Χρηματοδότηση και αποτελεσματικότητα επενδύσεων

Θεσμοί, εκπαίδευση, πολιτικό σύστημα

Προϋποθέσεις χορήγησης βοήθειας (αιρεσιμότητα)

## Περιφερειακές αναπτυξιακές Τράπεζες

**EBRD** 

**African Development Bank** 

**Asian Development Bank** 

Sovereign Funds (Norway, Qatar, Iran)

# Global inequalities

#### **GLOBAL INCOME CATEGORIES**

	Annual income (\$)	Population	Life expectancy (years)
RIC	30.000	1 bn	82
Upper MIC	5.000	1.5 bn	74
Lower MIC	1.600	2 bn	73
PIC	500	1.5 bn	60

### **BIG CONTROVERSIES**

- 1. Climate change? Only RIC pay
  - Remote benefits

2. Anti-poverty aid to India, China?

- Pay from economic growth
- Reduce social damping
- Upgrade working safety / rights

### 3. Aid conditional or unconditional?

- US: Link to democratization
- WB: Link to governance / Anti corruption
- EU: Link to Growth? Reforms
- China: No links, No condition! (Just UN votes)

# 4. Commodity Production Agreements?

- Oil
- Narcotics
- Diamonds/minerals
- Extraction transparency (EITI)
- Hydro-plants (Revenue sharing)

## **GLOBAL AGREEMENTS**

1997: KYOTO PROTOCOL

2000: MILLENIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDG)

- Health: Half Malaria by 2015

- Water: Provide drinking water to 1.5 bn by 2015

- Sanitation: Water to 2.1 bn by 2015

1985: HIPC (Brady Bonds)

Ad hoc: G8 EITI Agreement

"Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative"



#### 5. Debt crises

The debt trap

Debt repudiation

Debt discount Haircuts, extensions

Debt forgiveness

Moral hazard: Reneging strategies

Brady bonds


## Πώς δημιουργείται η παγίδα χρέους

### Υψηλά επιτόκια


- → πτώση επενδύσεων
- → μείωση ΑΕΠ → μείωση εσόδων
- → αύξηση συντελεστών φορολογίας
- → πτώση επενδύσεων και κατανάλωσης

## **→** πτώση ΑΕΠ

Αύξηση λόγου Β/Υ 🗪 υψηλότερα επιτόκια



Expected repayments F = probability\*B = p(B/Y)\*B How you maximize expected payments ?




### II: International aid

Project valuation techniques.

Regional Development Banks (EIB, EBRD, etc).

## **BENEFIT- COST analysis**



$$B = PV(benefits) = \sum_{t=1}^{T} (1+\rho)^{-t} \cdot Benefit(t)$$

$$C = PV(Costs) = \sum_{t=1}^{T} (1+\rho)^{-t} \cdot Cost(t)$$

## **BENEFIT- COST RATIO**

$$BCR = \frac{B}{C} = \frac{PV(benefits)}{PV(Costs)}$$

$$\frac{\partial B}{\partial \rho} < 0, \qquad and \frac{\partial C}{\partial \rho} < 0$$


but 
$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \rho}BCR$$
 ambiguous

#### BENEFIT- COST RATIO: Sensitive to Discount rate and time horizon

$T\rightarrow$	10	50	100	200
	years	years	years	years
Disc				
Rate				
1%	0.90	0.61	0.37	0.13
3%	0.74	0.23	0.05	.002
5%	0.61	0.09	.008	0


**Table**: How a price is discounted  $1/(1+\rho)^t$ 

## Selection of projects not easy. Some cases are clear-cut, good or bad



## In several cases it depends on the discount rate.

### Question: Who determines DR?



# The attraction of Projects benefits and costs

	Project	Medium-term	Long-term	Features
I	Back-loaded			Clear beneficiaries
II	Front-loaded			Uncertain beneficiaries
III	Early benefits			Depends on disc. rate
IV	Late benefits			>>

## **Examples**

Farm subsidies: For RIC: Type II

For PIC: Type I

Climate change: Type II

Education: Type IV

Subsidies by borrowing: Type I

Health-malnutrition: Type III

## Other factors affecting B/C ratio

### 1. PROJECT UNCERTAINTY

Involve beneficiaries in managing risks Example: Public-Private Partnership

2. RISK: Pay end-users

3. EFFECTIVENESS: Fight Corruption

# I. GLOBAL THREATS

1. FINANCIAL CRISES (2008)

2. CLIMATE CHANGE / ENVIRONMENT

3. CONTAGIOUS DISEASES (AIDS)

4. NATURAL DISASTERS (Fukusima)

### II. POVERTY – related CHALLENGES

- 1. HUNGER MALNUTRITION
- 2. DISEASES (AIDS, MALARIA, LBW: low birth weight)
- 3. ILLITERACY
- 4. WATER SANITATION
- 5. ARMED CONFLICTS (Commodities related wars, eg oil, diamonds)
- 6. POOR GOVERNANCE, CORRUPTION

## III. MUTUAL CHALLENGES

MIGRATION

TRADE BARRIERS and FARM SUBSIDIES

TERRORISM

• TRAFFICKING (women, children, drugs)

## Why KYOTO doesn't work?

- 1. Effects: exaggerated and uncertain
- 2. Discount rates used are set superficially low (we are more impatient, and less caring for too remote generations)
- 1. Climate change brings <a href="new">new</a> benefits, not just costs:
  - Northern Europe, less cold, less fuel
  - New extraction industries in Arctic / Antarctica
- 4. Unequal distribution of costs and benefits
- → Costs to be shared by BRICS, not just US, EU
- → Future beneficiaries SHOULD pay the policies

# The economics of global diseases

At 2002:	57 m deaths 20% children	
		<ul><li>•98% in PIC</li><li>•60% comm. diseases</li></ul>
	18 m premature deaths of adults	30% in PIC 20% in RIC

### Life-cost measurements

Life expectancy:

Female, non-smoker, RIC

83 years

(i) Avoidable deaths =

(Actual deaths) – (population)x(RIC death rate)

(ii) DALY = disability affected life years

Disease	Deaths pa	Geography	Infected
MALARIA	1 – 3 m in 103 countries	90% in SSA 75% children	500 m
AIDS	3 m	SSA (mainly), CIS, Asia, US	45 m in 2010
	Growth loss	Means	Value
MALARIA  Benefits	- 1.3% pa	Nets, Pregnancy, drugs	Costs \$ 140 bn Benefits \$275 – 660 bn
AIDS	-1.2 %- 3.2%	Needles, Condoms, drugs	Costs\$ 337 bn Benefits \$ 871 bn

# The economics of ILLITERACY (lack of education)

**INPUTS** 

OUTPUT

Schools (+)

Competence

Teachers (+)

(vs OECD standards)

**Enrollment (+)** 

**Drop-outs (-)** 

TARGET: Universal primary education

	SUPPLY POLICIES	
1	More schools	
2	Better teaching/teachers	
3	Impact evaluation	
	DEMAND POLICIES	
1	Raise family income	
2	Raise returns to education	
3	Reduce household costs (transfer,	
	provide meals, waive fees, etc)	
	COVER children	120 m
	TOTAL COST	\$10 – 27 bn

## THE ECONOMICS OF WATER

	PIC	RIC
Households	30 lit/d	200 lit/d
Production (food, energy, etc)	2.000 lit/d	10.000 lit/d
	MDG by 2015	

## **MDG** by 2015

Households	Drink	Sanitation
SSA	360 m	360 m
M East –N Africa	130 m	140 m
SE Asia + Pacific	910 m	1.400 m
Latin America	150 m	160 m
Various countries	30 m	30 m
TOTAL	1.580 m	2.090 m

### **WATER POLICY APPROACHES**

1	Recycle waste water for small farming	
2	Farming in wet-lands	"dambos"
3	Small-scale irrigation	manual pumps
4	Local water management	
5	Desalination process	Israel, Cyprus
6	Dams (small: check-dams, big: hydro)	

# **Benefits** = avoidance of loss (e.g. deaths, DALY) + new benefits (e.g. better life)

#### Losses:

- Drought
- Hygiene-linked diseases: 50% population in PIC
  - 2 bn parasitic diseases
  - 300 m serious illness
  - 50 m arsenic in water (Asia)
    - 82 m DALY per annum

Costs: *Irrigation:* \$ 110 – 180 bn

Sanitation + Water Supply: \$ 12 bn

Benefits: DALY: \$82bn

**Double crops** 


## The economics of Armed Conflicts

1	Average period of war	7 years	
2	Conflicts per year	2 wars	
3	Fall in growth rate	- 2.2 %	
4	Output loss		-16% GDP
5	Recovery	16 years	
6	Period of suffer	23 years	
	TOTAL LOSS	ρ = 5%	115% GDP



# Country A in civil war

**Δgrowth =** - 2.20%







Country B In trouble

 $\Delta g = -0.9\% \text{ pa}$ 


Country C In trouble

 $\Delta g = -0.9\%$  pa


Country D In trouble

 $\Delta g = -0.9\% \text{ pa}$ 

## **Armed Conflicts and GDP**



GREEK GDP IN THE WAR AND THE CIVIL WAR Source: Bank of Greece 1978, Tb 45, and 1992, Tb 2a.



1939-1960 = 21 years = 8y wars + 13y recovery

	COSTS OF WAR	Details	Value
1	REGIONAL		
	- country	$\Delta g = -0.9\%$ pa	PV = 43% GDP
	- neighbors	Avg. 3 borders	PV = 129% GDP
2	MILITARY	For 22 years:	Total for region
	- country	+ 0.4% GDP	
	- neighbors	+ 3x(1/5) GDP	= 14% GDP
3	HUMAN	500.000 DALY	
	DALY = disability affected life years In PIC terms	1 DALY = \$1.000	PV = \$ 5 bn
	TOTAL COST per war		253% of GDP
	for all involved countries		
	Average GDP of all involved	\$ 20 bn	
	Money COST per war		\$ 56 bn
	avg number of new wars	2 wars per year	
	GLOBAL COSTS OF WARS	Per year	\$112 bn

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