International Negotiations Games, Strategies and Negotiations Adding dimensions to bargaining

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- Up until now, analysis has focused on the level of tactics (level 3)
- This is one contributing factor in a negotiation (rational)
- A more integrated approach to negotiations includes more dimensions

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 Other (non-rational) factors affecting a negotiation at the tactics level

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Value design

 Other (non-rational) factors affecting a negotiation at the tactics level

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- Value design
- Setup of the negotiation

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Bet 1: You toss a fair coin. Heads win you €120. If tails is up, you lose €100.

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On average you leave with money but most people refuse to play such bets, why? (risk aversion)

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- ► €100 of loss weigh more on us (negatively) than €120 of gains weigh on us (positively).
- when faced with losses, we become risk lovers. When faced with a possibility of gain, we become risk averse

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- can explain patterns of behaviour that classical expected utility theory could not
- adds dimensions in the way we might approach transactions/negotiations

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- Game 4: Independently of your economic status, you are given €2000. You are asked to choose between: 50% probability of losing €1000 or lose €500 for sure
- You can easily verify that in terms of expected payoffs, earnings and probabilities, Games 3 and 4 are identical (do it please)!

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Ask yourself what you would choose in reality

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People react differently to gains than the do to losses

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Experiment:

 Teachers incentive scheme 1: Pay teachers a base salary + bonus if their students achieve learning targets (extra profit)

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People are more motivated/incentivized when they risk losing something they own/have earned

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Mental experiment: selling a house



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Approach 1: if buyers pay, they will get the house

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Mental experiment: selling a house

- Approach 1: if buyers pay, they will get the house
- Approach 2: stay in the house for a month. Then if you don't pay, you will need to move out

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Repeated experiments have shown that when we feel something is ours, its value increases (Endowment effect) We need to include behavioural/psychological findings when we design mechanisms to extract surplus People who buy houses/negotiate are subject to behavioural traits...

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 In this case, negotiating on price only cannot possibly lead to a deal

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What if we added an extra dimension?



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Dimension 1: price of new machinery



- What if we added an extra dimension?
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Dimension 2: exclusive maintenance contract

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- Dimension 1: price of new machinery
- Dimension 2: exclusive maintenance contract

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Seller: red Buyer: green

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 Seller's reservation price above buyer's higher price

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We add to the negotiation the length of an exclusive contract for maintenance



Seller: willing to drop the price if he gets one year of mainenance

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- Seller: willing to drop the price if he gets one year of mainenance
- Or drop it even further if seller throws in 2 year of maintenance

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Seller: indifferent between three red points



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Red curve: indifference curve of seller



- Seller: Prefers contracts above the red indifference curve
- they involve higher price for any given maintenance length

The seller prefers anything above the red indifference line (highlighted area) to a unidimensional contract at price p_S



 Buyer: willing to sign a maintenance contract of 1 year with seller to achieve a drop in price

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- Buyer: willing to sign a maintenance contract of 1 year with seller to achieve a drop in price
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Buyer: indifferent betwee 3 green points



- Buyer: willing to sign a maintenance contract of 1 year with seller to achieve a drop in price
- Or to increase length of contract in exchange for a further drop

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Green curve: indifference curve of buyer


- Buyer: willing to sign a maintenance contract of 1 year with seller to achieve a drop in price
- Or to increase length of contract in exchange for a further drop

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 Anything below the green curve is preferred by buyer to a unidimensional contract at price p_B

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- Green area: area of contracts preferred by Buyer
- Red area: area of contracts preferred by Seller

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- Green area: area of contracts preferred by Buyer
- Red area: area of contracts preferred by Seller

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Common area: both prefer it to NO DEAL



- Green area: area of contracts preferred by Buyer
- Red area: area of contracts preferred by Seller

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- Green area: area of contracts preferred by Buyer
- Red area: area of contracts preferred by Seller

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- Common area: both prefer it to NO DEAL
- Anything in the blue area is preferred by both parties to not signing



Point A: one of the possible points of agreement

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- Point A: one of the possible points of agreement
- Unidimensional negotiation: "leaves money on the table"

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- Point A: one of the possible points of agreement
- Unidimensional negotiation: "leaves money on the table"
- Adding a dimension to the negotiation can save a deal that would not happen otherwise