ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΟ ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟ ΑΘΗΝΩΝ

ATHENS UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS

MSc in International Negotiations

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

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NORMS AND SYSTEMS

- **Norms:**
  - ✓ Unified: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Economy is the main entity that determines strategy, sets priorities and shapes relations with other actors. This is a traditional organizational model characterized by centralized decision-making. In Italy and Greece, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the most important authority, while in Spain it is the Ministry of Economy.
  - ✓ Mixed: Responsibility is shared between the MFA and the MOE (e.g. in the UK), with independent trade missions and separate economic advisors.
  - ✓ Decentralized: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a limited role focused on coordinating external economic relations, while implementation is carried out by independent departments and agencies.
- **Systems:**
  - ✓ Anglo-Saxon: Diplomatic officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs perform the tasks of economic and commercial attachés (e.g. UK, Italy).
  - ✓ Latin: Responsibility lies with the Ministry of Economy, which oversees an independent body of economic diplomats (e.g. France).



GREEK ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

Actors

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- **Ministry of Foreign Affairs:**
  - ✓ Deputy Minister for Economic Diplomacy and Foreign Affairs.
  - ✓ General Secretariat for International Economic Affairs and Openness.
  - ✓ Directorate General for International Economic Relations.
  - ✓ Offices for Economic and Commercial Affairs. Staffed by graduates of the Department of Economic and Commercial Affairs of the National School of Public Administration and Local Government.
  - ✓ Supervision of legal entities under public law (Enterprise Greece and OAEP since 2019).
  - ✓ Agora: supplied with information from trade offices and providing the Greek business community with up-to-date insights on foreign markets, key trends, and new opportunities.
- **Ministry of Development and Investment:**
  - ✓ Strategic investment
  - ✓ Supervision of the Hellenic Development Bank of Investments.
- **Ministry of the Interior:**
  - ✓ Thessaloniki International Fair
  - ✓ Hellenic Exhibitions

GREEK ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

Offices for Economic and Commercial Affairs

MSc in International Negotiations

- Analyzing economic developments.
- Monitoring the growth of trade.
- Facilitating the establishment of foreign investment in Greece.
- Communicating with product importers to provide information on Greece's potential.
- Organizing trade/business missions, symposiums, conferences, and seminars.
- Making recommendations for the organization of product exhibitions, as well as for the promotion and advertising of exportable products.
- Preparing the groundwork for the conclusion of programmatic agreements on economic cooperation.
- Monitoring European and international technical and economic cooperation programs.
- Mediating the settlement of trade disputes through arbitration.
- Protecting the industrial and intellectual property rights of companies and individuals.

CASE STUDIES (India vs Enron)

Parties

MSc in International Negotiations

- **The central government of India**
  - ✓ The Indian economy is highly regulated, with a significant share of state ownership and limited foreign investment. The goal is to reduce the reluctance of foreign MNCs to invest in India.
  - ✓ Energy demand in India is rising.
- **Enron**
  - ✓ Sought to become the leading power generation company.
  - ✓ Viewed the project as an opportunity for international recognition.
- **GE and Bechtel**
- **State government of Maharashtra**
  - ✓ Political differences existed between the parties involved (the Congress Party and the BJP/Shiv Sena alliance).
  - ✓ The project was seen as a reliable source of energy to support economic development.

VS ENRON®



CASE STUDIES (India vs Enron)

1st Round of Negotiations (1992-95)

- **In the first months of 1992:** India opened its energy sector to foreign investors.
- **June 1992:** Start of negotiations between Enron and the Maharashtra government, which were approved by the Indian government.
- **April 1993:** The World Bank refused to finance the project on the grounds that it was not financially viable. Despite this, the Maharashtra government granted its approval.
- **December 1993:** Signing of a 20-year contract for the project, leading to the formation of Dabhol Power Company (80% Enron - 10% GE - 10% Bechtel).
  - ✓ The Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB) committed to purchasing 90% of the power generated, regardless of whether a lower-priced alternatives existed.
  - ✓ In case of non-payment by the Maharashtra government, state assets would be subject to confiscation.
  - ✓ Educational ‘‘gifts’’ $20m.
  - ✓ Dispute resolution under English law through international arbitration.
  - ✓ Project costs $2.9bn.
  - ✓ The agreement negotiation lacked transparency, and details had not been made public.
- **1994-January 1995:** Project financing and insurance guarantees totaling 635 million dollars from the Bank of America, a group of Indian banks, the US Export-Import Bank, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).

CASE STUDIES (India vs Enron)

1st Round of Negotiations (1992-95)

- **March 1995:** Elections were held in Maharashtra, leading to the formation of a coalition government of nationalist parties.
- **May 1995:** Hundreds of protesting villagers swarmed the site to oppose the displacement of people that would occur, and a riot broke out. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International later accused the security forces guarding Dabhol for Enron of human-rights abuses.
- **August 1995:** The newly elected Maharashtra government cancelled the investment.
- **September/October 1995:**
  - ✓ Enron filed an arbitration claim for 300 million dollars.
  - ✓ A public relations campaign was launched to influence public opinion.
  - ✓ Enron asked President Clinton to intervene with the Indian government.
  - ✓ The US Secretary of Energy stated that cancelling the project would discourage the American FDI.

CASE STUDIES (India vs Enron)

2nd Round of Negotiations (1995-2004)

- **November 1995:** Negotiations began between Enron and the Maharashtra government, involving experts rather than politicians, with the aim of revising the agreement.
- **February 1996:** A new agreement was reached, maintaining the same terms:
  - ✓ MSEB would purchase 90% of the power generated.
  - ✓ In the event of non-payment by the Maharashtra government, state assets would be subject to confiscation.
- **1998:** Enron's financing plan – including 1.87 billion dollars from 40 lenders for the implementation of Phase II - received international recognition.
- **May 1999:** Phase I of the project was completed, and the Dabhol power plant began generating power.

	Old Contract	New Contract
Power Tariff	Rs 2.4/KwH	Rs 2.03/KwH in Ph 1 and Rs 1.84 in Ph 2
Capital Costs	Rs 90.6 Billion	Rs. 64.2 Billion
Ownership	Enron-80;GE-10, Bechtel-10	Enron-65;MSEB-10%, GE,Bechtel - 10
Fuel	LNG	LNG and locally available Naphtha
Environment		Enron agrees to manage this

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CASE STUDIES (India vs Enron)

2nd Round of Negotiations (1995-2004)

MSc in International Negotiations

- **January 2001:** The Maharashtra government (led by the Democratic Front coalition elected in October 1999) failed to pay the DPC because the MSEB was purchasing power at a higher price than it was charging consumers (purchase at Rs 2.03/kwH - sale at Rs 1.89/kwH). The price paid by MSEB for power from the Dabhol station was more than double the price paid to other power stations in the state.
- **April 2001:** Enron rejected a proposal to renegotiate the settlement and proceeded to arbitration.
- **May 2001:**
  - ✓ Dabhol's operations were shut down.
  - ✓ The Bush administration's energy plan, which included provisions favouring Enron's operations in India, was implemented.
- **December 2001:** Enron filed for bankruptcy.
- **April 2004:** GE and Bechtel acquired 65% of Enron through a court settlement for 20 million dollars.

CASE STUDIES (India vs Enron)

3rd Round of Negotiations (2004-2006)

- **May 2004:** Start of negotiations between India and Maharashtra with GE/Bechtel.
  - ✓ GE/Bechtel initiated arbitration proceedings.
  - ✓ The Maharashtra government failed to comply with payment obligations and threatened expropriation of assets.
  - ✓ Power outages in Mumbai (lasting up to 8 hours per day) and other industrial cities leading to riots.
  - ✓ India facing increased competition from China for FDIs.
- **July 2005:** An agreement was reached.
  - ✓ GE sold its stake for 145 million dollars + a contract for consultancy services + supply of turbines.
  - ✓ Bechtel sold its stake for $160 million.
- **May 2006:** Dabhol was reopened by RGPPL.

CASE STUDIES (India vs Enron)

Conclusions

Actors	Power	Interests	BATNA
GE/BECHTEL	Obstruction of DPC operation	Compensation	Arbitration
Indian & Maharashtra Government	Non-payment Property expropriation	Supply of energy at a reasonable price Maintenance of international reputation Good relations with the USA Securing FDI	Securing energy from other states

ENRON

- The project was structured as a public-private partnership with contractual guarantees(financing, a secured market for production, etc.). It could succeed if:
  - ✓ The investment strategy has been slowed down.
  - ✓ A more transparent approach had been adopted.
  - ✓ Greater efforts had been made to gain political and social support.
- Trust - building and flexibility in contract terms are more effective practices than rigid contracts.

CASE STUDIES (Greek ED / Balkans 1989-2008)

Reasons

1. The internationalization of companies, - especially within the nearest geographical area - is driven by the globalization of markets, as well as the prospects of expanding international trade, FDI and financial transactions.
2. Participation in the EU is an important goal in order to obtain benefits and remain at the core of the EU.
3. The country's strategic importance has changed, now carrying a significant military dimension, while its involvement in the Balkans also has economic implications.
4. A lack of interest of international investors in the Balkans has been noted. Greek companies have several comparative advantages over foreign competitors, including:
   - ✓ lower production costs
   - ✓ geographical proximity
   - ✓ lower transportation costs
   - ✓ historical and cultural ties
   - ✓ familiarity with uncertain conditions, the informal economy, and the bureaucracy
5. All governments have declared their intention to change the country's production model, increase competitiveness, and improve entrepreneurship.

CASE STUDIES (Greek ED / Balkans 1989-2008)

1989-1995

- **Foreign policy:**
  - ✓ Main objective: Maintaining a united Yugoslavia.
  - ✓ Imposition of an embargo (1994) due to the change in the political stance of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).
  - ✓ Exploiting Greece's position as a full EU member; warning Sofia by using EU integration as leverage in preventing the recognition of FYROM under its constitutional name.
  - ✓ Deterioration of relations with Albania, FYROM, and Bulgaria, which negatively affected prospects for cooperation in the Balkans.

- **Economic activities:**
  - ✓ Development of private initiatives without state support.
  - ✓ Increase in Greek exports and investments.
  - ✓ Relocation of productive activities of companies from Northern Greece.
  - ✓ Lack of coordination between the public and private sectors, and lack of strategic planning aligned with foreign policy objectives.





CASE STUDIES (Greek ED / Balkans 1989-2008)

1995-1999

- **Foreign policy:**
  - ✓ Improving political relations with all countries and promoting multilateral cooperation programmes.
  - ✓ Trilateral Cooperation Forum(1995): Greece, Bulgaria and Romania participated at the level of foreign ministers. Its aim was to facilitate understanding among the countries in order to find solutions to specific problems. It served as a nucleus for partial regional cooperation.
  - ✓ Southeast European Cooperation Process(1996): Involving 13 countries, its objective was to promote regional peace and stability in Southeastern Europe. Results were limited; the crisis in Kosovo has weakened the initiative.

- **Economic activities:**
  - ✓ Increase in Greek exports and investments, despite the 1997 economic crises in Bulgaria and Albania.
  - ✓ Greek companies invested on a long-term basis.
  - ✓ Promotion of a narrative of regional leadership, with Greek investment viewed as a sign of economic and political influence, as well as a factor strengthening the Greek economy.
  - ✓ In contrast to the 1989-95 period, government policy became the most important factor driving expansion.

CASE STUDIES (Greek ED / Balkans 1989-2008)

1999-2008

- **Foreign policy:**
  - ✓ Support for the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU.
  - ✓ Significant contribution to shaping EU policy in the Western Balkans.
  - ✓ South East European Stability Pact 1999 – involving 9 countries: An institutional framework aimed at promoting peace, democracy and the economic development in Southeast European states. It was later replaced by the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) in 2008.

- **Economic activities:**
  - ✓ Significant increase in exports (Greek exports account for 34% of Albania's imports and 38% of FUROM's imports from EU countries).
  - ✓ Significant contribution to the Balkan economies in transition, supporting regional growth and prosperity.
  - ✓ Expansion of major Greek companies, which developed extensive networks (e.g., OTE acquiring 20% of the Serbian and 35% of the Romanian telecom organizations; DEI operating in Albania, Bosnia, and Yugoslavia; DELTA–3E–Athens Brewery; National Bank establishing subsidiaries in Albania, FYROM, Romania, and Bulgaria).
  - ✓ Ongoing narrative concerning the outflow of FDI and its perceived negative consequences for the Greek economy.

ΟΙ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΕΣ ΤΡΑΠΕΖΕΣ ΣΤΗ ΡΟΥΜΑΝΙΑ

ΤΡΑΠΕΖΑ	ΕΝΕΡΓΗΤΙΚΟ 2007 (σε εκατ. ευρώ)	ΜΕΡΙΔΙΟ ΑΓΟΡΑΣ (%)	ΕΝΕΡΓΗΤΙΚΟ 2006 (σε εκατ. ευρώ)	ΜΕΡΙΔΙΟ ΑΓΟΡΑΣ (%)
Bancpost (Eurobank)	3.671	5,3	2.281	4,5
Alpha Bank	3.558	5,1	2.113	4,1
Banca Romaneasca (Εθνική)	1.885	2,7	1.053	2,1
Piraeus Bank	1.661	2,4	570	1,1
Marfin (πρώην Egnatia)	430	0,6	227	0,5
ATE Bank	176	0,3	-	-
Emporiki Bank	123	0,2	111	0,2
ΣΥΝΟΛΟ	11.504	16,6	6.355	12,5

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CASE STUDIES (Greek ED / Balkans 1989-2008)

Economic Aid

MSc in International Negotiations

- **1990-95:** 200-700 million drachmas (e.g. Bulgaria). Inadequate use of the limited funds due to fragmentation into small projects, lack of evaluation and absence of clear priorities.
- **1997-2001:** Bilateral development aid program of 400 million dollars. The Balkans were the main target of the aid.
- **2002-06:** Hellenic Economic Development Plan € 550 million. Extended by 5 years to allow for full absorption of resources.
  - ✓ Problems with planning and management on the Greek side.
  - ✓ Weak capacity of Balkan countries to implement large - scale projects.

Η κατανομή του ποσού των 550 εκατ. ευρώ ανά χώρα

	ΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΣ ΕΠΕΝΔΥΣΕΙΣ/ ΕΡΓΑ 79%	ΙΔΙΩΤΙΚΕΣ/ ΠΑΡΑΓΩΓΙΚΕΣ ΕΠΕΝΔΥΣΕΙΣ 20%	ΤΑΜΕΙΟ ΜΙΚΡΩΝ ΕΡΓΩΝ 1%	ΣΥΝΟΛΟ ΧΩΡΑΣ
Αλβανία	39.413.100€	9.978.000€	498.900€	49.890.000€
Βοσνία/Ερζεγοβίνη	15.428.700€	3.906.000€	195.300€	19.530.000€
Βουλγαρία	42.889.100€	10.858.000€	542.900€	54.290.000€
Μαυροβούνιο	13.825.000€	3.500.000€	175.000€	17.500.000€
πΓΔΜ	59.123.600€	14.968.000€	748.400€	74.840.000€
Ρουμανία	55.639.700€	14.086.000€	704.300€	70.430.000€
Σερβία	183.675.000€	46.500.000€	2.325.000€	232.500.000€
Κοσσυφοπέδιο	11.850.000€	3.000.000€	150.000€	15.000.000€
Διαχειριστικό/ Διοικητικό κόστος (3%)				16.020.000€
Μερικό σύνολο	**421.844.200€**	**106.796.000€**	**5.339.800€**	

CASE STUDIES (Greek ED / Balkans 1989-2008)

Conclusions

MSc in International Negotiations

1. During the period 1989 - 1995, Greece merely observed developments, whereas after 1995 it began to shape them.
   - ✓ Until 1995, there was no well-functioning state support mechanism.
   - ✓ After 1995, efforts to provide institutional and material support remained incomplete.
2. Measures ranged from embargoes to economic aid, with milder measures proving more effective.
3. Greek entrepreneurial activity expanded steadily, but it did not function as a lever for political influence, as it failed to change the foreign policy positions of the Balkan states (e.g. the name dispute with North Macedonia).
4. Levels of ED: Bilateral, regional, EU.
5. Two conflicting narratives emerged regarding Greek investment.

CASE STUDIES (FTA EU-ROK)

MSc in International Negotiations

- **Signed:** October 2009 - **Valid from**: July 2011.
- The EU's most comprehensive trade agreement and the second largest in the world (after NAFTA).
- Elimination of tariffs on 92% of Korean products and 98.7% of total trade volume.
- The first "new generation" trade agreement developed by the EU, reflecting its renewed focus on regional initiatives. It covers not only trade but also issues related to:
  - ✓ Competition
  - ✓ Public procurement
  - ✓ Intellectual property
  - ✓ Investments
  - ✓ Environmental protection
  - ✓ Human rights
  - ✓ Consumer and labor rights

CASE STUDIES (FTA EU-ROK)

Negotiations

- **Start:** May 2007 - **End:** October 2009.
- 8 rounds of negotiations were held on various "problematic" areas, such as rules of origin, the automotive industry and, tariff reductions.
- Automotive industry:
  - ✓ Italian and French concerns about competition with the Korean automotive industry. Italy threatened to issue a veto.
  - ✓ Korean arguments: Most Asian brands manufacture their cars within the EU and account for only a small share of imports EU car imports.
  - ✓ Italy withdrew its objections in exchange for the postponement of the provisional application of the agreement and the inclusion of a clause protecting European car manufacturers in the EU.

Evaluation of the Implementation of the Free Trade Agreement between the EU and its Member States and the Republic of Korea

Final Report:

Main Report

Prepared by Civic Consulting and the Ifo Institute
May 2018

The views expressed in the report are those of the consultants and do not present an official view of the European Commission.

CASE STUDIES (FTA EU-ROK)

Trade Balance





CASE STUDIES (FTA EU-ROK)

Tariffs

1: EU tariffs on imports, Korea vs. MFN countries



2: Korean tariffs on imports, EU vs. MFN countries



CASE STUDIES (FTA EU-ROK)

Tariff Income



CASE STUDIES (FTA EU-ROK)

Exports

Composition of EU goods exports to Korea, 2010



: 17: Composition of EU goods exports to Korea, 2015



CASE STUDIES (FTA EU-ROK)

Imports

Composition of EU goods imports from Korea, 2010



Composition of EU goods imports from Korea, 2015



CASE STUDIES (FTA EU-ROK)

Imports (m-s) / Exports (m-s)

MSc in International Negotiations

Table 5: Imports of goods from Korea at country level

MS	2010		2015	
	EUR million	Share (%)	EUR million	Share (%)
AT	854	2.2	614	1.5
BE	1 656	4.2	1 954	4.6
BG	74	0.2	84	0.2
CY	42	0.1	21	0.1
CZ	978	2.5	2 325	5.5
DE	9 927	25.1	6 533	15.5
DK	349	0.9	1 577	3.7
ES	1 539	3.9	2 185	5.2
EE	15	0	39	0.1
FI	314	0.8	261	0.6
FR	2 136	5.4	2 349	5.6
GB	2 715	6.9	5 674	13.4
GR	1 831	4.6	1 472	3.5
HR	128	0.3	123	0.3
HU	1 895	4.8	1 236	2.9
IE	165	0.4	316	0.8
IT	2 986	7.6	3 198	7.6
LT	49	0.1	125	0.3
LU	5	0	11	0
LV	24	0.1	43	0.1
MT	81	0.2	46	0.1
NL	2 622	6.6	3 530	8.4
PL	2 711	6.9	2 365	5.6
PT	245	0.6	338	0.8
RO	440	1.1	483	1.1
SK	3 486	8.8	3 642	8.6
SI	557	1.4	963	2.3
SE	1 659	4.2	707	1.7
Total	*39 496*	*100*	*42 228*	*100*

Table 6: Exports of goods to Korea at country level

MS	2010		2015	
	EUR million	Share (%)	EUR million	Share (%)
AT	688	2.5	819	1.7
BE	1 152	4.2	1 361	2.9
BG	93	0.3	55	0.1
CY	4	0	4	0
CZ	202	0.7	455	1
DE	10 210	37	18 038	38.1
DK	513	1.9	847	1.8
ES	732	2.7	1 845	3.9
EE	21	0.1	50	0.1
FI	611	2.2	693	1.5
FR	3 213	11.6	4 820	10.2
GB	2 360	8.5	6 249	13.2
GR	50	0.2	298	0.6
HR	4	0	6	0
HU	223	0.8	361	0.8
IE	290	1.1	514	1.1
IT	2 484	9	4 476	9.5
LT	20	0.1	57	0.1
LU	22	0.1	44	0.1
LV	9	0	41	0.1
MT	33	0.1	15	0
NL	3 197	11.6	4 152	8.8
PL	209	0.8	382	0.8
PT	46	0.2	93	0.2
RO	215	0.8	414	0.9
SK	92	0.3	106	0.2
SI	49	0.2	70	0.1
SE	863	3.1	1 016	2.1
Total	*27 620*	*100*	*47 292*	*100*

CASE STUDIES (FTA EU-ROK)

Growth of Imports / Exports

Growth of goods imports 2010-2015, % p.a.



Growth of goods exports 2010-2015, % p.a.



CASE STUDIES (FTA EU-ROK)

FDI

MSc in International Negotiations

- Before the FTA, the average FDI growth rates were:
  - ✓ From the EU to Korea: 5%
  - ✓ From Korea to the EU: 7%

- After the FTA, the average FDI growth rates were:
  - ✓ From the EU to Korea: 8%
  - ✓ From Korea to the EU: 19%

Stock of bilateral foreign direct investments (annually, EUR billion)



CASE STUDIES (FTA EU-ROK)

GDP

- In absolute figures:
  - ✓ EU: GDP increase of € 4.4 billion
  - ✓ Korea: GDP increase of € 4.4 billion
- In relative terms:
  - ✓ Korea: GDP increase of 0.3%
  - ✓ EU: GDP increase of 0.03%

Change (%) in real GDP for EU Member States



CASE STUDIES (FTA EU-ROK)

Employment

- **Employment indicators:** Increase in Korea after the financial crisis with minimal impact of the FTA, decrease in the EU before the FTA due to the Eurozone crisis.
- **Unemployment:** Increase in the EU and decrease in Korea before the FTA (these trends continued until 2013).
- **Labor rights:** Limited impact on strengthening the enforcement of workers' rights. Korean authorities remain guided primarily by domestic policies rather than international agreements.





CASE STUDIES (FTA EU-ROK)

Wage Change

Country	Wage Change (%)	Country	Wage Change (%)
AT	0.04	IE	0.05
BE	0.05	IT	0.03
BG	0.03	LT	0.02
CY	0.07	LU	0.02
CZ	0.07	LV	0.03
DE	0.05	MT	0.44
DK	0.03	NL	0.04
ES	0.02	PL	0.04
EE	0.04	PT	0.02
FI	0.04	RO	0.06
FR	0.03	SK	0.15
GB	0.02	SV	0.13
GR	0.02	SE	0.03
HR	0.36	KOR	0.59
HU	0.07	-	

CASE STUDIES (FTA EU-ROK)

SME's

- Clear objectives in the European Union's trade policy.
- Challenges for SMEs due to the lack of concrete forecasts regarding the consequences of the free trade agreement.
- Increase in the diversity of goods.
- SMEs in the EU -particularly in Belgium and Spain- have benefited from the reduction of trade barriers.
- The Korean economy is heavily oriented towards SMEs and applies disproportionately low preferences in its trade with the EU, as is the case with any other free trade agreement (e.g. with ASEAN).

Table 19: Characteristics of firm-level exports of Belgium to Korea

Belgium					
		2006	2010	2013	Change (%, 2013 vs. 2010)
KOR	Number	1 146	1 339	1 318	-2
	Mean	919 600	992 633	1 107 240	12
	1st Quartile	7 823	4 038	8 217	103
	Median	38 205	28 300	44 336	57
	3rd Quartile	249 539	195 598	302 996	55
Average RoW	Number	668	757	681	-10
	Mean	557 223	612 110	678 354	11
	1st Quartile	10 647	10 235	11 097	8
	Median	47 418	49 210	49 469	1
	3rd Quartile	208 217	213 829	229 057	7

CASE STUDIES (FTA EU-ROK)

Human Rights & Environment

MSc in International Negotiations

- The human rights provisions in the FTA are addressed, with a focus on fundamental rights:
  - ✓ Freedom from discrimination (supported by social homogeneity).
  - ✓ Peaceful freedom of assembly and association (partly problematic given the recent transition to democracy).
  - ✓ Access to food (satisfaction due to a well-developed market and prices comparable to those in Central European countries).

Sector	Price change in Korea (%)
Agriculture	-0.21
Processed food	-0.70

- Environmental impact: The emphasis is on regulatory rights, compliance with multilateral agreements, and sustainability impact assessments. There are few quantitative measures or environmental targets. The results include:
  - ✓ An increase in CO2 emissions in both the EU and Korea.
  - ✓ Although the environmental clauses did not improve environmental conditions, they also did not contribute to environmental degradation through increased trade.

Region	CO_2 level without FTA (million tonnes)	CO_2 level with FTA (million tonnes)	Difference in CO_2 level (million tonnes)	Change in %
Korea	129.6	129.8	0.24	0.19
EU28	1 467	1 469	1.7	0.12