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Psychological Approach

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Psychologists, social psychologists in particular, have been interested in the study of conflict for several decades. Indeed, one can probably trace the study of conflict back to the work of Kurt Lewin in the 1930s and 1940s, when he examined the factors affecting group decision making under conditions of conflict. Lewin pointed out that individual behavior is the result of three considerations: the person as an individual, the situation in which the person is immersed, and the interaction of person and situation. The first factor was covered by James Sebenius in Chapter Fourteen; this chapter therefore addresses the psychology of the situation as well as the interaction of person and situation as these play out in the domain of international negotiation.

It is a long way, of course, from the study of interpersonal conflict to that of international conflict. It is also a long way from conflict to negotiation. Serious interest in international conflict dates to the pioneering work by Kelman, who edited perhaps the first important collection on the subject, *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis* (1965). Subsequent work by Pruitt and Snyder, *Theory and Research on the Causes of War* (1969); Oskamp, *International Conflict and National Public Policy Issues* (1985); White, *Psychology and*

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the Prevention of Nuclear War (1986); and Tetlock, "Social Psychology and World Politics" (1998), have continued the tradition begun by Kelman.

The transition from the psychological study of conflict to a focus on the important topic of negotiation has occurred gradually over the past two decades. Partly responsible for this transition has been the growing awareness of the important role played by *enlightened self-interest* in the management of conflict (Rubin, 1988). Although researchers and theorists such as Deutsch (1973) had long argued for the importance of cooperation (and the attitude change that accompanies cooperation) in the resolution of conflict, writings by scholars and practitioners (Axelrod, 1984; Fisher and Ury, 1981; Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Raiffa, 1982) have made clear that people in conflict are often able to do well simply by focusing on the attainment of their own objectives—in ways that also make it possible for others to do well. Instead of trying to develop a cooperative relationship, characterized by attitude change and *conflict resolution*, a focus on enlightened self-interest opens the door to behavior change through negotiation and the simpler, more modest attainment of *conflict settlement*. Negotiation is not a tool that can easily be used in the resolution of conflict (with its concomitant change in underlying attitudes). But it is the right tool if one's objective is to change behavior, to bring about a settlement of a dispute when none seemed possible before.

In summary, while social psychologists have had a long-standing interest in conflict, it is only recently—within the past several decades—that attention has shifted from interpersonal and intergroup conflict to international conflict; and even now it is fair to say that psychology has contributed relatively little to the international domain. The field has been more productive over the years in the study and application of findings on the negotiation process per se.

An impressive number of books and articles have reviewed the empirical and theoretical psychological literature on conflict and negotiation in domestic and international settings (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993; Deutsch and Coleman, 2000; Druckman, 1977b; Fisher, 1989; Kramer and Messick, 1995; Pruitt, 1981, 1998; Pruitt and Rubin, 1986; Rubin and Brown, 1975; Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994; Stroebe, Kruglanski, Bar-Tal, and Hewstone, 1988; Thompson, 2001; Worchel and Austin, 1985; Worchel and Simpson, 1993). Chapters Six (by Pruitt) and Seven (by Rubin) in this volume also present a decidedly psychological interpretation of negotiation. On the basis of these works, as well as other publications by political scientists (Jervis, 1976; Lebow, 1981; Zartman, 1978, 1987a, 1997) and lawyers (Fisher, 1964; Fisher and Ury, 1981) with a particularly "psychological" bent, it is possible to characterize a distinctly psychological approach to the study of international negotiation; this will be the focus of the first part of the chapter. Having characterized the quintessential features of a so-called psychological approach and briefly considered the strengths and weaknesses of works that exemplify each approach, the chapter closes by discussing

several areas in which psychology and psychologists may be able to contribute distinctively to the theory and practice of international negotiation in the future.

WHAT IS A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION?

Scholars and practitioners in the various fields represented in this volume have each had unique insights into the nature of negotiation—and international negotiation in particular. This is true of psychology as well. This section of the chapter outlines the distinctive features of such a psychological approach. The material that follows makes no attempt to distinguish “negotiation” from “international negotiation.” This is not because the two domains are synonymous but because the nature of psychological insights into these two domains does not differ. Because the heart of the psychological approach is a focus on *process*, insights apply to negotiations at any level of complexity, from interpersonal and intergroup to international. Quite apart from the substantive issues under discussion—the focus of Part Three of this volume—psychologists have been interested in understanding the features of negotiation and other forms of conflict settlement that transcend interpersonal, intergroup, and international settings. The overarching interest in negotiation for psychologists concerns the issue of *how* people negotiate. As such, a psychological approach is clearly and unequivocally concerned with issues of *process*.

A Focus on Interaction

Social psychologists have always understood that negotiation is a quintessential manifestation of social interaction; and while this understanding is universally shared, it is they who have systematically incorporated this insight into their theory and research.

Two implications of this interactive focus are worthy of special mention. First, any serious attempt to understand negotiation in terms of the exchange or interaction among the protagonists necessarily increases the complexity of the analytical task. To understand an exchange of negotiation offers between two players, for example, requires that one not only examine an offer made by party *A* and the response that it generates from party *B* but also consider the extent to which *A*'s offer has been provoked by previous offers (by both *A* and *B*) or has been made in the context of some anticipated future offer by either side. As decision analysts have been quick to point out, careful evaluation of the decisions made by a single decision maker is a woefully difficult task. Once a second player is added to the loop and the focus shifts as well to decision making under conditions of uncertainty (as is necessarily the case in negotiation),

the job of interpreting the moves made by both sides in their interactive *pas de deux*—as well as acting on one's interpretation—becomes all but impossible.

The writings of social psychologist Kelley (1966) nicely illustrate a research and conceptual approach that is attentive to the complexity of the negotiation process. He writes, for example, about the inherent tension in negotiation between obtaining and disclosing information. Even as one proceeds to ask questions of the other party, questions that enable one to do a better job of ascertaining what offers the other is likely to proffer and likely to accept, the act of questioning in and of itself discloses information that may be used by the other side. Because the two players in negotiation are inextricably bound together through their joint commitment to exploring solutions that are mutually acceptable, it is virtually impossible to disentangle the dynamic nature of the exchange that takes place. More recently, a statistician and an economist, Lax and Sebenius (1986), have developed a similar distinction in their writings, in describing the tension between creating value and claiming it.

If a first implication of an interactive focus, then, is that the interpretive, theoretical task becomes terribly complex, a second implication is that this opens the door to examining relationships not only between two protagonists but also among the members of groupings larger than the dyad. Indeed, social psychologists have had a long-standing interest in group behavior, as reflected in writings on topics ranging from leadership to group cohesiveness, intergroup conflict, and group decision making. Writing in each area has found its way, sooner or later, into thinking about negotiation.

By way of broad illustration, consider the writings on "groupthink" by social psychologist Janis (1972). Groupthink is the phenomenon by which individual group members, who are harboring private reservations about the wisdom of some recommended course of action, keep these reservations to themselves. The result is often a group decision in favor of some risky course of action (for example, the U.S. decision to support an invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961) that is contrary to the private views of dissenting group members. When foreign policy decision-making bodies of different countries are engaged in a groupthink mode of analysis and decision making (for example, the United States and the Soviet Union during aspects of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, or perhaps the Iranian and American governments during the so-called Iranian hostage crisis of 1980), the result may be international conflict and negotiation played out under the shadow of a dangerous form of group behavior.

Or consider the "conflict workshop" approach to the study of international conflict, as developed by social psychologist Kelman (1979, 1992), who in turn built on the work of other scholars (Burton, 1969; Doob, 1970, 1974). Applying the findings of many dozens of laboratory experiments on leadership and group decision making to his interest in intergroup and international conflict,

Kelman convenes small group meetings of parties to real, ongoing international conflicts and gives the participants an opportunity to work toward some modest improvement in their ability to settle their conflict. A conflict of particular interest to Kelman has been that between Palestinians and Israelis, and he has run dozens of conflict workshops in which middle-level Israeli and Palestinian leaders have been brought together under special "laboratory" conditions, where they have been tutored in more effective communication, have been gently helped to understand and modify their interpersonal perceptions, and so on. While the effectiveness of this work by Kelman (as well as others) does not easily lend itself to quantification, it is important work nevertheless and constitutes a clear illustration of the kind of interactive analysis and intervention that psychologists are capable of bringing to the world international conflict.

Psychologists have also taken an interest in a more conventional form of third-party intervention—mediation (Bercovitch and Rubin, 1992; Kressel, Pruitt, and Associates, 1989; Wall and Lynn, 1993). Several studies support the view, first advanced by Rubin (1980), that vigorous mediator intervention is effective when conflict is intense or escalated but is counterproductive when conflict is mild, and there is also evidence that most experienced mediators take this approach (Pruitt, 1998). In addition, research supports the commonsense belief that disputants who see a third party as neutral are more receptive to mediation by that party than those who perceive the third party as biased against them (Welton and Pruitt, 1987). However, the traditional view that mediator bias is a fatal flaw has been disproved by three sets of researchers (Bercovitch and Houston, 1993; Kressel, 1972; Touval and Zartman, 1985), who note that a biased third party may be all that is available and is often the best one to influence a highly recalcitrant disputant.

As one final illustration of a psychological approach to the complexities of interaction, consider the classic studies of intergroup conflict by Sherif and Sherif (1953, 1969). In a series of field experiments, the Sherifs brought preadolescent boys to summer camps in the American Midwest and, through a series of competitive activities, induced conditions of intergroup conflict between the different cabins of the camps. Having created intergroup conflict, the researchers then set out to evaluate the effectiveness of various means for reducing such conflict. Among the techniques that they tried, without success, were simply bringing the group leaders together for a face-to-face exchange (given the fact that the cabins were not ready to make peace, this "summit" idea proved to be of no avail) and bringing the cabins together for feasts and other occasions in which they might enjoy each other's presence (again, given the continuing animosity between the cabins, such moves only created additional opportunities to hurl food and insults at the rival cabin). What *did* work was the introduction of "superordinate goals"—that is, goals that managed to supersede or transcend the existing bases of conflict. Thus the Sherifs arranged for a truck that was tak-

ing two rival cabins on a camping trip to run out of gasoline. Since there were no gas cans available, the only way to refuel the truck was by towing it to a nearby gasoline station, and the only way to do that was to require all the boys in both cabins to jointly pull on a rope that was tied to the truck (a rope, incidentally, that had previously been used for tug-of-war matches between the rival cabins). Thus it was only when new group tasks were introduced, requiring the collaboration of the groups in conflict, that a new, higher order of cooperation could be devised.

As the foregoing examples suggest, psychologists have done a great deal of field and laboratory research on decision making within and between groups, and much of this work lends itself readily to extrapolation into the complex realm of international negotiation processes.

A Focus on Perceived, Rather Than Actual, Conflict

Whereas economic theorists are likely to study the effect on conflict settlement and negotiation of actual divergence of interest, psychologists (as well as some other social scientists) tend to focus on divergence of interest as it is subjectively experienced. Thus it is not actual differences that typically drive parties to behave in particular ways but perceived differences, the *belief* that such differences exist. Two people, groups, or nations may have little objective conflict between them but may nevertheless act *as if* such conflict existed. Similarly, parties to a conflict may be divided by deep objective differences but may nevertheless believe that no such differences exist and may act on their (illusory) view of reality and avoid overt conflict or confrontation.

What ultimately matters in negotiation, this psychological view argues, are the perceptions, beliefs, and assumptions that protagonists bring with them into the fray, rather than any objective measure of difference. It is beliefs that determine how people are inclined to act—whether it is in the spirit of escalating conflict or moving more resourcefully toward its settlement. And it is the realm of beliefs and perceptions that therefore warrants the full and complete attention of scholars and practitioners alike.

This point of view is reflected both in books on social conflict and negotiation (Deutsch, 1973; Druckman, 1977b; Kelman, 1965; Pruitt and Rubin, 1986; Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994) and in much of the research of social psychologists. For example, consider once again the conflict workshop approach developed by Kelman. The primary focus of these workshops is not behavioral change but modification of perceptions of and attitudes toward the conflict. As Kelman (1979, p. 298) notes, "The unique claim of the approach is precisely that it is capable of promoting system-level changes by producing changes in individuals—that is, changes in policy by way of changes in individual perceptions and attitudes." It is not only actual but especially perceived conflict that is of interest to Kelman, and it is here that virtually all of his attention has been directed.

Is this an appropriate analytical decision by psychologists? In my judgment, the answer is clearly yes. Conflict deriving from real and objective resource discrepancies is important, of course. Of equal or greater importance, ultimately, is how the conflict is regarded by the decision makers and others charged with influencing public opinion. There may be objective bases for serious divergence of interest among the member nations of the European Union; however, given a mentality of collaborative problem solving, characterized by a view that calls for a new outlook bridging traditional national boundaries, any objective basis of disagreement among the members of the EU hardly matters at all.

A Focus on Cognitive Biases

A psychological focus on perceptions extends beyond the conflict *per se* to views of the other side. People, and negotiators in particular, bring with them in the field of conflict a host of biases that may overdetermine their characteristic ways of evaluating the conflict, the other negotiator, and themselves. These biases have been extensively studied by psychologists as cognitive processes that are at play in a great many situations. (Indeed, the topic of cognitive processes is of sufficient importance, and has received such extensive attention, that Chapter Sixteen of this volume is devoted to this topic alone.) Among the cognitive biases studied by psychologists over the past several decades are such things as the phenomenon of selective perception, by which decision makers attend to certain features of their cognitive environment while ignoring others. For example, in the research on intergroup conflict described earlier, Sherif and Sherif (1953, 1969) demonstrated the role of selective perception in the following way: The campers in two rival cabins were invited to take part in a jelly bean hunt to see which cabin could collect the larger number in a fixed period of time. When the hunt was over, the researchers showed the boys a photograph of a jar of jelly beans, telling some boys that this contained the jelly beans collected by the boys in their cabin and telling others that the jar contained the collection of the boys in the other, rival cabin. Interestingly, the Sherifs found that when asked to evaluate the results of their own group's effort, the boys systematically overestimated the group's productivity. But when asked to evaluate the work of the "outgroup," the number of jelly beans was systematically underestimated. In fact, the identical photograph was shown to both groups, so any differences were purely a matter of selective perception—a tendency to see a half-full glass as half empty.

A special form of selective perception is "distorted hypothesis testing," by which people in conflict go out of their way to pose interpersonal hypotheses about their adversary that are guaranteed to generate confirming data. For example, to follow up the hypothesis that one's adversary is an unduly defensive person by asking the question "Why, exactly, are you so defensive?" is to guar-

antee a response that will confirm the hypothesis. Research on distorted hypothesis testing has been conducted by a number of social psychologists, including Chapman and Chapman (1969) and Hamilton and Gifford (1976). (See Cooper and Fazio, 1979, for an excellent essay on the research mentioned in this section on cognitive biases; and see Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994, for additional coverage of this body of research.)

Also included among the cognitive biases of interest to psychologists is the general and important topic of "stereotypical distortion," the tendency to simplify a truly complex cognitive environment in ways that make it easier to sort information into extreme categories: good versus bad, black versus white, with us versus against us, and so on. Several important contributions to an understanding of international conflict have been made by social psychologists with an interest in stereotypical distortion. Thus developmental psychologist Bronfenbrenner (1961), in a classic essay on Soviet-American relations, years ago described the role of the "mirror image" in understanding the kinds of stereotyping that each side used to characterize the other during the height of the Cold War. He argued that five major themes characterized each side's (parallel) view of the other nation: "They are the aggressors," "Their government exploits and misleads the people," "The mass of their people are not really sympathetic to the regime," "They cannot be trusted," "Their policy verges on madness." Each side, he argued persuasively, managed to develop information in support of the identical stereotypical views of the other. In his 1984 book *Fearful Warriors: A Psychological Profile of U.S.-Soviet Relations*, social psychologist White similarly describes the role of what he calls a "diabolical enemy image" (according to which Satan is always on the side of the enemy) and a "moral self-image" (God is on one's own side).

"Attributional distortion" is yet another illustration of a cognitive bias that people in conflict typically bring with them into the fray. Kind acts by one's adversary are attributed to manipulative intent, while uncharitable acts are attributed to an undesirable and untrustworthy disposition. One's own kind acts, in turn, are attributed to one's being a truly nice, kind person, while one's less wonderful behavior is attributed to circumstances or to behavior by the other person that made an unkind response unavoidable. Research demonstrating the important contribution of attributional bias has been conducted by social psychologists Regan, Straus, and Fazio (1974) and Hayden and Mischel (1976), among others.

A final illustration of the kind of cognitive bias that has been the object of study by psychologists is the self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby party *A* expects party *B* to behave in some way (for example, aggressively), and hence *A* protects itself by raising a hand in defense; this move is regarded by *B* as an aggressive assault and leads *B* to respond by raising its own hand (in defense), an

act that confirms A's expectation. In this way, A's prophecy is fulfilled. Research documenting the significance and ubiquity of the self-fulfilling prophecy is reviewed by Harris and Rosenthal (1985), Jussim (1986), and Snyder (1992).

My list is meant to illustrate a growing movement in the field of psychology, a movement that has increasingly turned to understanding individual behavior in terms of cognitive processes (see Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Higgins and Kruglanski, 1996). And as the list suggests, much of this work has relevance to the more specific realm of conflict and negotiation.

The application of this work on cognitive biases to the realm of international negotiation is potentially of great importance. Foreign policy decision makers are frequently placed in the position of having to make judgments about a set of issues, the nature of a conflict, and the negotiators on the other side of the table before sitting down to engage in the work of negotiation. The burgeoning area of research on cognitive biases has made eminently clear that the kinds of judgments such policymakers are likely to make may well be affected—often adversely—by the baggage that they carry with them in the form of various biases and perceptual predispositions.

A Focus on Learning and Change over Time

Psychologists have historically been interested in the processes by which individuals learn. Learning entails the incorporation of new information or insights, new ways of seeing the world, and new ways of behaving, and this process necessarily involves *change over time*. Things that individuals once did not know or did not do are now part of their repertoire.

To be sure, other disciplines (economics and game theory, in particular) share psychology's interest in change over time. Still, psychology has brought special enthusiasm and perspective to this area, and this has manifested itself in two distinct ways: first, in a focus on conflict spirals and escalation, and second, in a focus on strategies for settling or resolving conflict.

While political scientists have been interested in conflict spirals, psychologists have focused on the *dynamics* of these escalatory exchanges in far greater detail. For example, the research on the social psychology of "entrapment" has examined the process by which people commit themselves to a course of action; in pursuit of some objective, decision makers often find themselves incurring costs that they subsequently feel compelled to justify by incurring even greater costs (Teger, 1980; Brockner and Rubin, 1985). The importance of this social psychological work, based on extensive laboratory research, is that it bears directly on a great many decisions that negotiators are called on to make in international affairs. To the extent that negotiators find themselves locked in to particular points of view, lines of argument, or positions during negotiations or find themselves developing a particular style of negotiating (tough and ruthless, for example) from which they feel they cannot easily budge without incurring

significant loss, they may well be entrapped. As a result of entrapment, they may see things differently in the midst of an escalating conflict than they did at the outset. Caught up in the investment that has already been made in some course of action, foreign policy decision makers may find themselves unable to engage in the kind of rational, dispassionate analysis that is necessary to make wise decisions in the throes of international crises. Needless to say, the consequences for international negotiation could be profound.

In general, while relatively little is known about the exact circumstances that surround the escalation of conflict, it is the psychologists who have paid particular attention to this important process (see Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994, ch. 5-7). As another illustration of the type of psychological contribution that has been made in this regard, consider the writings of Deutsch (1973, 1983); he has attempted to characterize a "malignant (spiral) process of hostile interaction" in international affairs. Among the characteristics of such a process, Deutsch identifies a win-lose competitive orientation, inner conflicts within each party, cognitive rigidity, misjudgments and misperceptions, unwitting commitments, vicious escalating spirals, and a gamesmanship orientation.

A final kind of psychological research on escalation may have applications for international negotiation. Tetlock (1983, 1985, 1998) has conducted extensive research into the relationship between policymakers' "cognitive complexity" (as measured by the complexity of the arguments that they develop in their written and spoken rhetoric) and the escalation of conflict. Tetlock finds that as conflict escalates in intensity, moving the parties closer to a confrontation, the arguments advanced by each become *less* cognitively complex. There is a tendency, in other words, for increasing conflict intensity to predispose decision makers to develop relatively simplistic, stereotypical views of the other side and the issues under discussion. This tendency, in turn, makes it all the more difficult to disconfirm each side's pet hypotheses about the other, causing escalation to persist once it gets started.

The second implication of psychological interest in learning and change over time, as mentioned earlier, has been represented by continuing research on strategies for settling or resolving conflict. This tradition has had a long and distinguished history, as exemplified by the laboratory experimentation by social psychologist Deutsch and his students (see, for example, Deutsch, 1973). This body of research has examined the strategies that can be used to convert an adversary into an ally; among the strategic maneuvers examined in this work have been a "reactive defensive" strategy (in which cooperation is responded to in kind, but attack is reciprocated with defensive maneuvering), one that is instead "reactive aggressive" (again responding to cooperation with cooperation, but reacting to attack with counterattack), and a Christian-like turn-the-other-cheek strategy, as well as several strategies that first create a sense of intimidation and then shift to a more conciliatory strategy.

The political scientist Axelrod (1984) has summarized the extensive writings on strategies for inducing cooperation in an adversary—notably the so-called tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy, by which one starts off being kind and then responds to kindness with kindness and to aggression with aggression. In his book *The Evolution of Cooperation*, Axelrod argues that the TFT strategy is the single most important and effective way of changing a competitor into a cooperator. While generally endorsing this position, Pruitt (1998) points out three defects of the TFT strategy: retaliation may start a conflict spiral, in such a spiral the adversary may never learn that one is willing to reward cooperation, and cooperation established in response to tit-for-tat seldom endures beyond the cessation of this strategy.

Underlying this extensive body of laboratory and conceptual work, a small portion of which has been alluded to already, is the assumption that negotiation and conflict management are learning processes, according to which protagonists acquire new behavior and beliefs as adjustments to changing realities and changing perceptions of an adversary. This is a potentially important body of work, with many potentially practical implications for the realm of international negotiation. Like the psychological focus on interaction, a learning emphasis correctly acknowledges the changing and complex nature of negotiation process and invites interventions that are responsive.

A Focus on Relationships

As indicated, psychologists have had an abiding interest in the nature of interaction. A related but distinct arena of psychological concern involves the *relational* aspects of negotiation. Thus psychologists—more than scholars in other disciplines—have tended to analyze the implications of reaching agreement, or failing to do so, for an emerging relationship between protagonists. While much of the research and writing on negotiation processes has focused on the “bottom line”—that is, the tangible outcome or payoff that is yielded as a result of agreement—many negotiations have as their focus considerations other than economic ones. Thus while many negotiations would appear to take place as one-time-only exchanges, far more actually occur on an ongoing basis. Even in what we believe to be one-time-only negotiations, our reputation has a way of surviving us and of transforming even these exchanges into ones with the properties of ongoing relationships.

A focus on relationships, psychologists believe, is therefore important in negotiations. It has also been largely neglected in the literature. Perhaps in keeping with the cultural traditions of the United States and Western Europe—rather than cultures such as those of the Middle East, South and East Asia, and Africa, where ongoing relationships among parties to a negotiation are the norm rather than the exception—the emphasis in the negotiation literature has largely been on economic considerations. Clearly, negotiation scholars, researchers,

and practitioners need to write more about the relational aspects and implications of negotiation. Pruitt's discussion of working relationships in Chapter Six is a step in this direction.

A related need, also largely neglected to date in the literature, is for more thoughtful and extensive writing on the relationship between culture or nationality and negotiation. So much of what has been written has assumed an economic focus of negotiation, whereas, as noted, many cultures are likely to have a far more relational focus. While there are numerous books and manuals that prescribe the right and wrong ways for decision makers to negotiate with representatives from other nations, these contributions have done little to identify the underlying processes that are at work when one negotiates with individuals from a background different from one's own. A beginning in this direction has been made by the contributors to Faure and Rubin's *Culture and Negotiation* (1993) and to Weiss and Tinsley's special issue of the journal *International Negotiation* on international business negotiation (1999).

A Focus on Multiple Research Approaches

A final distinctive marking of psychological approaches to the study of negotiation concerns the plethora of research techniques to which psychologists typically resort. While it is true that each discipline described in Part Two of this book has its characteristic approach to the study of conflict and negotiation (the case-analytical method in the case of legal approaches, archival methods in the case of history, the field study methodology of anthropologists, the field survey for sociologists), psychologists have had a long-standing commitment to *multiple* research approaches. The reason for this is perhaps self-evident: individual behavior and group behavior are often so complex and difficult to study systematically that what is typically required is a rich mixture of different research approaches, each bringing a somewhat different lens to view the problem at hand. Only when multiple lenses (in the form of a combination of research approaches—laboratory experimentation, archival study, field experimentation, field study, simulation research, and so on) lead to convergent findings can the psychological researcher begin to have confidence that the findings generated through this research are valid and reliable.

CONCLUSION

In his influential and important book *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, the political scientist Jervis (1976) wrote a scathing, if somewhat overstated, critique of psychological contributions to international relations. Among the litany of faults that he has laid at the doorstep of psychology are

paying more attention to emotional than to cognitive factors, an almost exclusive reliance on data derived from laboratory experiments, and research attention to relatively simple beliefs and decisions to the exclusion of more complex and realistic matters.

While some of Jervis's critical comments seem justified, others do not. For example, the last criticism does appear to be warranted, at least not entirely. Psychologists *have* tended to focus on relatively simple decision-making tasks and arrangements because these are the ones that lend themselves most readily to empirical study. Clearly, more work must be addressed in the future to complex social arrangements in which the dynamics of interaction are difficult to trace but important nevertheless. However, researchers should not lose sight of the potential elegance of simplicity. The fact that a phenomenon is capable of analysis in terms of a relatively small number of conceptually moving parts may be a strength rather than a liability—if the result is more parsimonious theory.

Jervis's criticisms certainly seem outdated and unjustified when it comes to the first and second comments cited. As this chapter has indicated, psychologists have increasingly turned their attention to the role of cognitive factors in international conflict and negotiation—and they have done so without neglecting the contributing role of affective (emotional) considerations. And it is also true that far less research is being done by psychologists exclusively in the laboratory; the profession has moved increasingly toward the use of other research methods, as noted earlier.

The sad reality is that the profession of psychology has moved to the margins of research and writing about international negotiation over the past decade or so. What was once a boom industry—the study of negotiation processes—has now, judging by the *frequency* of empirical studies in major psychology research journals, fallen on hard times. Psychology, it might appear at first blush, no longer has much to contribute to the study and practice of negotiation.

The reasons for the decline in the volume of psychological research are not entirely obvious, although several factors appear to have played a part. First, experimental social psychology relied for many years on a relatively small number of experimental paradigms, notably the Prisoner's Dilemma game. As this paradigm lost favor, after being examined from every possible angle, with an eye to every possible independent and dependent variable, interest in the conflict and negotiation domain faded as well. Second, the study of conflict and negotiation has always had an applied flavor, and this emphasis runs counter to a prevailing interest among many research psychologists in more general, conceptual approaches. Third, and perhaps most important, many psychologists are, in fact, still hard at work looking at conflict and negotiation processes. But instead of publishing in the traditional research psychology journals, these scholars are increasingly finding their voice in the journals of other professions:

international diplomacy, community relations, environmental management, communications, business, and law, to name but a few.

As this chapter has attempted to document, psychology has, and will continue to have, a distinctive voice. Psychologists are well positioned to raise important questions about any negotiation. Whether they serve as advisers to policymakers, as researchers, as consultants, or as interested spectators, psychologists have an important role to play in the continuing study of international negotiation processes. The challenge is to find ways to coordinate psychological expertise with the expertise afforded through other disciplinary perspectives and to renew the role of psychology. Psychologists have an important opportunity before them. It is up to them, and to us, to take advantage of it in the months and years ahead.