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Uniqueness stability summary

notation

UCRS = Uniqueness in all economies with constant returns to scale technology

Desirability: $P_v = 0 \Rightarrow Z_v(P) > 0$

results

1. UCRS requires demand to be single valued.
2. UCRS requires Z to satisfy WARP: $PZ(P') \leq 0, P'Z(P) \leq 0 \Rightarrow Z(P) = Z(P')$
3. WARP + CRS imply convex equilibrium price set
4. WARP + CRS + local uniqueness imply uniqueness
5. WARP + local uniqueness of roots of Z imply WARP*

$Z(P^*) = 0, P^*Z(P) \leq 0 \Rightarrow P, P^*$ proportional

6. WARP* \Rightarrow unique equilibria in exchange economies
7. WARP is a property of individual excess demand
8. WARP does not aggregate (Hicks-Ohlin counterexample)
9. WARP* might fail (Scarf counterexample)
10. For each integer $K \geq 1$, there exist economies with K locally stable equilibria
11. Taxes and/or externalities might create multiple equilibria even in economies with a single consumer
12. WARP* + desirability \Rightarrow global stability in exchange economies.
13. There exist economies with a unique, locally unstable equilibrium (Scarf counterexample)

Definition uniqueness

Wednesday, January 16, 2019 12:04

Equilibrium conditions

$$\textcircled{1} \quad x_i \in D_i(p) \quad \forall i$$

$$\textcircled{2} \quad y_j \in S_j(p) \quad \forall j$$

$$\textcircled{3} \quad \sum x_i = \sum y_j + \sum w_i$$

An equilibrium is (p^*, x^*, y^*) that satisfies eq conditions

Equilibrium is unique if whenever (p^*, x^*, y^*) (p^{**}, x^{**}, y^{**})

satisfy $\textcircled{1}$ $\textcircled{2}$ $\textcircled{3}$ then

$$x^* = x^{**}, \quad y^* = y^{**}, \quad p^{**} = \lambda p^* \quad \text{for some } \lambda > 0$$

Consider an economy where each production set Y_j exhibits CRS, and each consumer is locally nonsatiated.

Let $Y = \sum_{j=1}^m Y_j$ be the aggregate production set. Then a vector $(p^*, x_1^*, \dots, x_n^*)$ is an equilibrium if and only if

(A) $x_i^* \in D_i(p^*) \quad \forall i$

(B) $p^* y \leq 0 \quad \forall y \in Y$

(C) $\sum_i x_i^* - w \in Y$

In particular, if each D_i is single valued and $z(p) = \sum_{i=1}^n D_i(p) - w$, p^* is an equilibrium if and only if

(B) $p^* y \leq 0 \quad \forall y \in Y$

(C') $z(p^*) \in Y$

Proof of necessity: Suppose $(p^*, x_1^*, \dots, x_n^*, y_1^*, \dots, y_m^*)$ is an equilibrium. Then

(1) $x_i^* \in D_i(p^*) \quad \forall i$

(2) $p^* y_j \leq p^* y_j^* = 0 \quad \forall y_j \in Y_j \quad \forall j$ (by CRS)

(3) $\sum x_i^* = w + \sum y_j^*$

Hence it suffices to show (1) + (2) + (3) imply (A) + (B) + (C)

(A) follows from (1)

(C) follows from (3)

To show (B), let $y \in Y$. Then $y = \sum y_j$ $y_j \in Y_j$

Then by (2) $p^* y = p^* y_1 + \dots + p^* y_m \leq 0 + \dots + 0 = 0$

Proof of sufficiency: Let $(p^*, x_1^*, \dots, x_n^*)$ satisfy (A) + (B) + (C)

Show that there exist $y_j^* \in Y_j \forall j$ such that

$(p^*, x_1^*, \dots, x_n^*, y_1^*, \dots, y_m^*)$ satisfies (1) + (2) + (3)

(1) follows from (A)

By (C) $\sum x_i^* - w \in Y = Y_1 + \dots + Y_m$ ie there exist $y_j^* \in Y_j$

$\sum x_i^* - w = \sum y_j^*$ ie (3) holds

By (A) and local non-satiation, $p x_i^* = p w_i \forall i$ ie

$p(\sum x_i^* - w) = 0$ ie $p^* \sum y_j^* = 0$ ie $\sum_j (p y_j^*) = 0$

Since $0 \in Y_j \forall j$, $y_j^* = 0 + y_j^* + 0 \in Y_j$ so

by (B) $p^* y_j^* \leq 0 \forall j$, hence $p^* y_j^* = 0 \forall j$

Hence for $y_j \in Y_j$, and given that $Y_j \subset Y \forall j$

$p^* y_j \leq 0$ by (B) ie (2) holds.

If each D_i is a function then $x_i^* = D_i(p^*)$ and

$\sum x_i^* - w = Z(p^*)$, hence (A) + (B) + (C) are equivalent to

(B) + (C')

Local uniqueness

p^* is locally unique equilibrium of (Z, Y) , Y CRS if

(1) $Z(p^*) \in Y$ and $p^* y \leq 0 \forall y \in Y$

(2) $\exists \delta > 0$ st

$$\begin{array}{l} |P - P^*| < \delta \\ z(p) \in Y \\ p_y \neq 0 \quad \forall y \in Y \end{array} \quad \Bigg| \Rightarrow \quad p, p^* \text{ proportional}$$

Uniqueness for all CRS production sets implies single valued demands

Monday, January 14, 2019 23:23

Consider n consumers, $(U_i, X_i, W_i), i=1 \dots n$. If, for each $Y \subset \mathbb{R}^L$, the economy $[(U_i, X_i, W_i)_{i=1}^n, Y]$ has at most one equilibrium, then the demand correspondence D_i of each consumer i is single-valued

Proof: Suppose, for contradiction, that for some price $p^* \gg 0$

$D_1(p^*)$ contains two distinct vectors $x_1^* \neq q_1^*$. Then

the aggregate demand $D(p^*) = D_1(p^*) + \dots + D_n(p^*)$

contains two distinct vectors $x^* = x_1^* + \sum_{j=2}^n x_j^*$, $x_j^* \in D_j(p^*)$

and $q^* = q_1^* + \sum_{j=2}^n x_j^*$. Define

$$p^1 = p^2 = p^3 = p^*$$

$$y^1 = x^* - w, \quad y^2 = q^* - w, \quad y^3 = 0$$

Then the set $\{(p^t, y^t) : t=1-3\}$ satisfies WAFM

because $p^t y^t = 0 \quad \forall t, t=1,2,3$, by Walras' law

Hence the set $Y = Y_0 = \{y \in \mathbb{R}^L : p^* y \leq 0\}$ exhibits CRS

and rationalizes $\{(p^t, y^t) : t=1,2,3\}$. Then

$(p^*, x_1^*, x_2^*, \dots, x_n^*)$ and $(p^*, q_1^*, x_2^*, \dots, x_n^*)$ are both

equilibria in the economy $[(U_i, X_i, W_i)_{i=1}^n, Y]$

because

-

$$\textcircled{A} \quad x_i^* \in D_j(p^*) \quad \forall i$$

$$\textcircled{A} \quad q_j^* \in D_2(p^*), \quad x_i^* \in D_i(p^*) \quad \forall i \rightarrow \mathcal{E}$$

$$\textcircled{B} \quad p^* y \leq 0 \quad \forall y \in Y \quad \text{and}$$

$$\textcircled{B} \quad p^* y \leq 0 \quad \forall y \in Y$$

$$\textcircled{C} \quad x^* - w \in Y$$

$$\textcircled{C} \quad q^* - w \in Y$$

Since $x_1^* \neq q_1^*$, we have two distinct equilibria, contradiction
hence each D_i has to be single-valued.

CRS and uniqueness imply WARP

Monday, January 14, 2019 23:59

Let $R^L_{++} \xrightarrow{Z} R^L$ be such that the economy (Z, Y) has a unique equilibrium for any production set $Y \subset R^L$ that exhibits CRS. Then Z must satisfy WARP, i.e.

$$pZ(p') \leq 0 \text{ and } p'Z(p) \leq 0 \Rightarrow Z(p) = Z(p')$$

Proof: Suppose, for contradiction, that Z fails WARP


Then there exist price vectors p, p' such that

$$pZ(p') \leq 0, p'Z(p) \leq 0, Z(p) \neq Z(p') \quad (1)$$

Note that $Z(p) \neq Z(p')$ implies p, p' are not proportional.

Define the production set Y by

$$Y = \{y \in R^L : py \leq 0 \text{ and } p'y \leq 0\} \quad (2)$$



Show that p, p' are equilibrium prices of (Z, Y)

By Walras Law, $pZ(p) = 0$. By (1) $p'Z(p) \leq 0$

hence by (2) $Z(p) \in Y$; by (2) again, $py \leq 0 \forall y \in Y$

Hence p is an equilibrium price of (z, y)
Similarly for p'

CRS and WARP imply convex equilibrium price set

Tuesday, January 22, 2019 13:26

Let $R_{++}^L \xrightarrow{z} R^L$ satisfy WARP, and let $Y \subset R^L$ exhibit CRS.

Then the equilibrium price set of the economy (z, Y) is convex.

If, in addition, equilibrium prices are locally unique, then (z, Y) has at most one equilibrium price.

Proof: Let p, p' be equilibrium prices of (z, Y) , and let

$p'' = \theta p + (1-\theta)p'$, $0 < \theta < 1$. Show that p'' is an equilibrium price of (z, Y) .

We know that

$$z(p), z(p') \in Y \quad (1)$$

$$py \leq 0, p'y \leq 0 \quad \forall y \in Y \quad (2)$$

$$pz(p) = p'z(p') = p''z(p'') = 0 \quad (3)$$

$$\text{Show } p''y \leq 0 \quad \forall y \in Y \quad (4)$$

$$p''y = (\theta p + (1-\theta)p')y = \theta py + (1-\theta)p'y \stackrel{(2)}{\leq} 0. \quad \text{OK.}$$

By (4) and (1)

$$p''z(p) \leq 0 \quad \text{and} \quad p''z(p') \leq 0 \quad (5)$$

$$\text{Show } z(p'') \in Y \quad (6)$$

By (3) $\theta pz(p'') + (1-\theta)p'z(p'') = 0$. Hence

$$pz(p'') \leq 0 \quad \text{or} \quad p'z(p'') \leq 0 \quad \text{or} \quad \text{both}$$

If $pZ(p'') \leq 0$ then (5) and WARP imply $Z(p'') = Z(p) \in Y$

If $p'Z(p'') \leq 0$ then (5) and WARP imply $Z(p'') = Z(p') \in Y$

By (4) and (6) p'' is an equilibrium price of (Z, Y)

Show local uniqueness imply uniqueness

Let p, p' be equilibrium prices. Then $\theta p + (1-\theta)p'$, $0 \leq \theta \leq 1$ are also equilibrium prices. By local uniqueness, for $\theta \approx 0$, $\theta > 0$

$\theta p + (1-\theta)p' = \lambda p$ for some $\lambda > 0$, i.e.

$$p' = \frac{\lambda - \theta}{1 - \theta} \cdot p \quad \text{“ } p, p' \text{ are proportional”}$$

Warp does not aggregate

Tuesday, January 15, 2019 19:08

$$v_A = A_3$$

$$v_B = B_4$$

$$w_A = [1, 0, 0, 0]$$

$$w_B = [0, 1, 0, 0]$$

$$A_3 = \frac{p_1}{p_3}$$

$$A_i = 0 \quad \forall i \neq 3$$

$$B_4 = \frac{p_2}{p_4}, \quad B_i = 0 \quad \forall i \neq 4$$

$$D = \begin{bmatrix} A_1 + B_1 \\ A_2 + B_2 \\ A_3 + B_3 \\ A_4 + B_4 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ A_3 \\ B_4 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$Z = D - w_A - w_B = \begin{bmatrix} -1 \\ -1 \\ A_3 \\ B_4 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -1 \\ -1 \\ p_1/p_3 \\ p_2/p_4 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$PZ(P) = -p_1 - p_2 + p_1 + p_2 = 0$$

$$PZ(P') = -p_1 - p_2 + p_3 \frac{p_1'}{p_3'} + p_4 \frac{p_2'}{p_4'}$$

$$P = [1 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1]$$

$$P' = [3 \ 1 \ 2 \ 2]$$

$$\rightarrow \dots \begin{bmatrix} -1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} -1 \\ -1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$z(p) = \begin{bmatrix} -1 \\ -1 \\ \vdots \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} \neq z(p') = \begin{bmatrix} -1 \\ -1 \\ 3/2 \\ 1/2 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$pz(p') = -1 - 1 + \frac{3}{2} + \frac{1}{2} = 0$$

$$p'z(p) = -p'_1 - p'_2 + 2 \frac{p_1}{p_3} + p'_4 \frac{p_2}{p_4} = -3 - 1 + 2 + 2 = 0$$

$$\text{for } \gamma = \{y \in \mathbb{R}^4 : py \leq 0, p'y \leq 0\}$$

$$= \{y \in \mathbb{R}^4 : y_1 + y_2 + y_3 + y_4 \leq 0, 3y_1 + y_2 + 2y_3 + 2y_4 \leq 0\}$$

Warp and isolation imply Warp* and uniqueness

Sunday, January 20, 2019 10:57

If $R^L_{++} \xrightarrow{Z} R^L$ satisfies WARP and if its roots are isolated, then Z satisfies WARP*, i.e.

$$Z(p^*) = 0 \text{ and } p^* Z(p) \leq 0 \Rightarrow p, p^* \text{ proportional}$$

In that case, the economy Z has at most one equilibrium

Proof = Let $Z(p^*) = 0, p^* Z(p) \leq 0$. Then WARP implies

$Z(p) = Z(p^*) = 0$, i.e. both p and p^* are equilibria in

the economy (Z, Y) with $Y = \{0\}$

Crs and warp imply convex equilibrium price set then implies p, p^* proportional

WARP* implies convergence of tatonnement

Sunday, January 20, 2019 09:55

If WARP* holds, i.e.

$Z(p^*) = 0$ and $p^* Z(p) \leq 0 \Rightarrow p, p^*$ proportional,

Then $\dot{p} = Z(p), p(0) = \bar{p}$ converges for any $\bar{p} \gg 0$
to an equilibrium (if one exists)

let p^* the unique equilibrium with $|p^*| = 1$ i.e. $\sum_i (p_i^*)^2 = 1$

$$f(p) = \frac{1}{2} |p - p^*|^2 = \frac{1}{2} \sum_i (p_i - p_i^*)^2 \quad |p| = 1$$

$$f(p) \geq 0 \quad \forall p \quad f(p) = 0 \iff p = p^*$$

$$f'(p) = \left[\frac{\partial f}{\partial p_1}, \frac{\partial f}{\partial p_2} \right] = [p_1 - p_1^*, \quad , \quad (p_2 - p_2^*)]$$

$$f'(p) = (p - p^*)$$

$$\begin{aligned} f(p) &= \frac{1}{2} \langle p - p^*, p - p^* \rangle = \frac{1}{2} (|p|^2 - 2 \langle p, p^* \rangle + |p^*|^2) \\ &= (1 - \langle p, p^* \rangle) \end{aligned}$$

$$f'(p) \cdot Z(p) = (p - p^*) Z(p) = - p^* Z(p) \quad \text{i.e.}$$

$$f'(p) \cdot Z(p) < 0 \quad \text{unless } p = p^*$$

i.e. f is a strict Lyapunov function

Normalization is preserved

$$Q(t) = |p(t)|^2$$

$$p'(t) = Z(p(t))$$

$$Q(t) = |P(t)|^2 \\ = \sum P_i^2(t)$$

$$P'(t) = z(P(t)) \\ P(t) = \bar{p} \gg 0$$

$$Q'(t) = 2 \sum P_i P_i' = \sum P_i z_i = P z(p) = 0 \quad \forall t$$

$$\text{" } Q(t) = Q(0) = 1$$

$$\text{" } \sum^{n+1} \xrightarrow{f} \sum^{n+1}$$

$$V(t) = f(P(t)) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^L (P_i(t) - P_i^*)^2$$

$$V'(t) = \sum (P_i - P_i^*) z_i = \sum P_i z_i - \sum P_i^* z_i \\ = P z(p) - P^* z(p) \\ = - P^* z(p)$$


If $P^* z(p) \leq 0$ then P, P^* proportional, i.e. $P = P^*$ i.e. $V'(t) = 0$

If $P^* z(p) > 0$ then P, P^* unproportional, $V'(t) < 0$

$$P \neq P^* \Leftrightarrow V'(t) < 0$$

$$P = P^* \Leftrightarrow V'(t) = 0$$

$$\text{Hence } \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} P(t) \rightarrow P^* \\ \forall \bar{p}$$



1.6 Stability and the Direct Method of Lyapunov

Let us consider a rest point x_0 for the autonomous differential equation

$$\dot{x} = f(x), \quad x \in \mathbb{R}^n. \quad (1.15)$$

A continuous function $V : U \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, where $U \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$ is an open set with $x_0 \in U$, is called a *Lyapunov function* for the differential equation (1.15) at x_0 provided that

- (i) $V(x_0) = 0$,
- (ii) $V(x) > 0$ for $x \in U - \{x_0\}$,
- (iii) the function $x \mapsto \text{grad } V(x)$ is continuous for $x \in U - \{x_0\}$, and, on this set, $\dot{V}(x) := \text{grad } V(x) \cdot f(x) \leq 0$.

If, in addition,

- (iv) $\dot{V}(x) < 0$ for $x \in U - \{x_0\}$,

then V is called a *strict Lyapunov function*.

Theorem 1.30 (Lyapunov's Stability Theorem). *If x_0 is a rest point for the differential equation (1.15) and V is a Lyapunov function for the system at x_0 , then x_0 is stable. If, in addition, V is a strict Lyapunov function, then x_0 is asymptotically stable.*

Scarf's counterexample

Consumers: A, B, C

Goods : $1, 2, 3$

Preferences :

$$u_A = \min\{A_1, A_2\}, u_B = \min\{B_2, B_3\}, u_C = \min\{C_1, C_3\}$$

Endowments

$$e_A = [1 \ 0 \ 0], e_B = [0 \ 1 \ 0], e_C = [0 \ 0 \ 1]$$

Computation of competitive equilibria

• Prices: P_1, P_2, P_3

• Incomes: $M_A = P_1, M_B = P_2, M_C = P_3$

• Demand functions

$$A_1 = A_2 = \frac{M_A}{P_1 + P_2}, \quad A_3 = 0$$

$$B_2 = B_3 = \frac{M_B}{P_2 + P_3}, \quad B_1 = 0$$

$$C_1 = C_3 = \frac{M_C}{0 + 0}, \quad C_2 = 0$$

Note that all goods are normal, i.e. demand is never decreasing in income. Own demands are

decreasing functions
of price, for
fixed M_A, M_B, M_C

- Equilibrium conditions

$$\begin{array}{l} A_1 + B_1 + C_1 = 1 \\ A_2 + B_2 + C_2 = 1 \\ A_3 + B_3 + C_3 = 1 \end{array} \quad \left| \quad \begin{array}{l} z_1 = A_1 + C_1 - 1 = 0 \\ z_2 = A_2 + B_2 - 1 = 0 \\ z_3 = B_3 + C_3 - 1 = 0 \end{array} \right.$$

The unique equilibrium is $P_1 = P_2 = P_3$

- Price adjustment $\dot{P}_i = z_i, i = 1, 2, 3$, ie

$$\dot{P}_1 = \frac{P_3}{P_1 + P_3} - \frac{P_2}{P_1 + P_2} = z_1$$

$$\dot{P}_2 = \frac{P_1}{P_1 + P_2} - \frac{P_3}{P_2 + P_3} = z_2 \quad (1)$$

$$\dot{P}_3 = \frac{P_2}{P_2 + P_3} - \frac{P_1}{P_1 + P_3} = z_3$$

Lemma 1 : Any solution of (1) satisfies

$$P_1^2(t) + P_2^2(t) + P_3^2(t) = \text{constant}$$

Proof: Let $V(t) = P_1^2(t) + P_2^2(t) + P_3^2(t)$. Then

$$V'(t) = 2(P_1(t)P_1'(t) + P_2(t)P_2'(t) + P_3(t)P_3'(t))$$

ie

$$V'(t) = 2(P_1 Z_1 + P_2 Z_2 + P_3 Z_3) = 0 \quad (\text{Walrus' law})$$

hence $V(t) = \text{independent of } t = \text{constant}$

Lemma 2 : Any solution of (1) satisfies

$$P_1(t)P_2(t)P_3(t) = \text{constant}$$

Proof: Let $V(t) = P_1(t)P_2(t)P_3(t)$. Then

$$V'(t) = \dot{P}_1 P_2 P_3 + \dot{P}_2 P_1 P_3 + \dot{P}_3 P_1 P_2$$

$$= Z_1 P_2 P_3 + Z_2 P_1 P_3 + Z_3 P_1 P_2$$

$$= \frac{P_2 (P_3^2 - P_1^2)}{P_3 + P_1} + \frac{P_3 (P_1^2 - P_2^2)}{P_1 + P_2} + \frac{P_1 (P_2^2 - P_3^2)}{P_2 + P_3}$$

$$= P_2(P_3 - P_1) + P_3(P_1 - P_2) + P_1(P_2 - P_3)$$

$$= \cancel{P_2 P_3} - \cancel{P_2 P_1} + \cancel{P_3 P_1} - \cancel{P_3 P_2} + \cancel{P_1 P_2} - \cancel{P_1 P_3}$$

$$= 0$$

Theorem: The system $\dot{p} = z(p)$ will **not converge** to equilibrium unless it starts with equilibrium, i.e. unless $p_1(0) = p_2(0) = p_3(0)$

Proof: Let α, β be defined by

$$p_1^2(0) + p_2^2(0) + p_3^2(0) = 3\alpha^2 \quad (2)$$

$$p_1(0)p_2(0)p_3(0) = \beta \quad (3)$$

By Lemma 1 and (2), equations (2) and (3) will continue to hold for all t i.e.

$$p_1^2(t) + p_2^2(t) + p_3^2(t) = 3\alpha^2 \quad \forall t \quad (2)$$

$$p_1(t)p_2(t)p_3(t) = \beta \quad (3)$$

Auxiliary max problem implies $\beta \leq \alpha^3$ with equality if and only if

$p_1(0) = p_2(0) = p_3(0) = \alpha$. Hence as long as $p(0)$

is not an equilibrium price vector, $\beta < \alpha^3$.

Suppose, for contradiction, that $P(t)$ converges to some equilibrium price vector (θ, θ, θ) , $\theta > 0$ starting from an nonequilibrium price vector $P(0)$, ie

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} p_i(t) = \theta \quad \forall i=1,2,3, \quad \beta < \alpha^3.$$

Then by (2) (3)

$$3\theta^2 = 3\alpha^2$$

$$\theta = \alpha$$

$$\theta^3 = \beta$$

ie

$$\beta = \alpha^3$$

Contradiction

Auxiliary max problem

$$\text{MAX } f = P_1 P_2 P_3$$

$$P_1^2 + P_2^2 + P_3^2 = 3\alpha^2$$

$$P_i > 0 \quad \forall i$$

$\alpha > 0$ parameter

\Leftrightarrow

$$\text{MAX } f = P_1 P_2 P_3$$

$$P_1^2 + P_2^2 + P_3^2 \leq 3\alpha^2$$

$$P_i \geq 0 \quad \forall i$$

Unique solution

$$P_i = \alpha \quad \forall i$$

\Leftrightarrow

$$f = \alpha^3$$

MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA

An example where the number of equilibria scales with the number of firms

Η οικονομία


Θεωρούμε οικονομία με

- δυο αγαθα, τα A, L
- Δυο καταναλωτες, τους 1 και 2
- Ο καταναλωτης 1 έχει συνάρτηση οφελους $u_1 = 2k\theta A_1 - \frac{1}{2}A_1^2 - \frac{\theta^2}{2}L_1^2$, και μοναδική περιουσία \bar{L} μοναδες του αγαθου L .
- Ο καταναλωτης 2 έχει συνάρτηση οφελους $u_2 = A_2$, και μοναδική περιουσία τα συνολικά κερδη Π
- m επιχειρησεις. Η επιχείρηση i έχει συνάρτηση παραγωγής της μορφής

$$\hat{A}_i = \begin{cases} \xi_i \hat{L}_i & \text{if } \hat{L}_i \leq 1 \\ \xi_i & \text{if } \hat{L}_i \geq 1 \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

Οι παραμετροι είναι όλες θετικές και ικανοποιούν τις σχέσεις

$\xi_1 < \xi_2 < \dots < \xi_m, \bar{L} > k > m, k\theta > \xi_1 + \xi_2 + \dots + \xi_m, m$ ακέραιος.



Θα αναζητήσουμε συνθήκες επί των παραμετρών τέτοιες ώστε το πλήθος των ισοροπιών να είναι $2m+1$

1.ονομαζουμε τις τιμες p για το αγαθο A , w για το αγαθο L . Τυποποιουμε θετοντας $p=1$


2.εισοδημα του καταναλωτη $M_1 = wL, M_2 = \Pi$

3.ο καταναλωτης 1 επιλεγει (A_1, L_1) ετσι ωστε να λυσει το προβλημα

$$\max u_1 = 2k\theta A_1 - \frac{1}{2}A_1^2 - \frac{\theta^2}{2}L_1^2 \text{ subject to } 0 \leq A_1 \leq wL_1, 0 \leq L_1 \leq \bar{L}$$

Η λυση ειναι

$$(A_1, L_1) = \left(\frac{2k\theta w^2}{w^2 + \theta^2}, \frac{2k\theta w}{w^2 + \theta^2} \right) \quad (2)$$



Για τον καταναλωτη 2 εχουμε $A_2 = \Pi$

4.η καθε επιχειρηση i επιλεγει (A_i, L_i) ετσι ωστε να μεγιστοποιησει τα κερδη

$\Pi_i = A_i - wL_i$, subject to (1). Η λυση ειναι


$$(L_i, \Pi_i) = \begin{cases} (1, \xi_i - w) & \text{if } w < \xi_i \\ ([0, 1], 0) & \text{if } w = \xi_i \\ (0, 0) & \text{if } w > \xi_i \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

5. συνθηκες ισορροπιας


$$\begin{aligned} L_1 &= \hat{L}_1 + \hat{L}_2 + \dots + \hat{L}_m \\ A_1 + A_2 &= \hat{A}_1 + \hat{A}_2 + \dots + \hat{A}_m \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

Η συνολικη ζητηση εργασιας ειναι

$$\sum_{i=1}^m \hat{L}_i = \begin{cases} m & \text{if } w < \xi_1 \\ [m-1, m] & \text{if } w = \xi_1 \\ m-1 & \text{if } \xi_1 < w < \xi_2 \\ [m-2, m-1] & \text{if } w = \xi_2 \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ m-i & \text{if } \xi_i < w < \xi_{i+1} \\ [m-i-1, m-i] & \text{if } w = \xi_{i+1} \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ m & \text{if } \xi_{m-1} < w < \xi_m \\ [0, m] & \text{if } w = \xi_m \\ 0 & \text{if } w > \xi_m \end{cases} \quad (5)$$



Θα αναζητησουμε συνθηκες επι των παραμετρων τετοιες ωστε οι συναρτησεις προφορας και ζητησης εργασιας να ειναι οπως στο ακολουθο διαγραμμα



Λυνοντας τις εξισωσεις $\frac{2k\theta w}{w^2 + \theta^2} = m - i, i = 1, 2, \dots, m - 1$, βρισκουμε οτι τα οριζοντια τμηματα της καμπυλης ζητησης εργασιας τεμνουν το φθινον μερος της καμπυλης προσφορας εργασιας στα σημεια $[\rho_i, m - i]$, οπου $\rho_i := \frac{(k + \sqrt{k^2 - m^2 + 2mi - i^2})\theta}{m - i}$

Θετουμε $\xi_i = \frac{\rho_{i-1} + \rho_i}{2}, i = 1, \dots, m - 1, \xi_m = \rho_{m-1} + 1$

Παρατηρουμε οτι unstable equilibria $\rho_0, \dots, \rho_{m-1}$, stable equilibria $\xi_1, \dots, \xi_m, \sigma$

Θεωρούμε οικονομία αποτελούμενη από δυο παίκτες, **a** και **b**, και δυο αγαθά, **1** και **2**.

Οι προτιμήσεις περιγράφονται από τις συναρτήσεις

$$u_a = a_1 - \frac{1}{2a_2^2}, u_b = b_2 - \frac{1}{2b_1^2}$$

Οι περιουσίες περιγράφονται από

$$e_a = (4, \frac{3}{16}), e_b = (0, \frac{45}{16})$$

(και οι δυο συναρτήσεις οφελους είναι αυξουσες και κοιλες όταν οι μεταβλητες είναι θετικες)

Computation of competitive equilibria

Normalize $p_1 = 1; p_2 = p$

Incomes $m_a = 4 + \frac{3p}{16}, m_b = \frac{45p}{16}$

Demand functions

$$(a_1, a_2) = \begin{cases} (m_a - p^{2/3}, p^{-1/3}) & \text{if } p \leq (m_a)^{3/2} \\ (0, m_a / p) & \text{if } p \geq (m_a)^{3/2} \end{cases}$$

$$(b_1, b_2) = \begin{cases} (p^{1/3}, \frac{m_b - p^{1/3}}{p}) & \text{if } p^{1/3} \leq m_b \\ (m_b, 0) & \text{if } p^{1/3} \geq m_b \end{cases}$$

Equilibrium conditions

$$a_1 + b_1 = 4, a_2 + b_2 = 3$$

Solutions


There are exactly three equilibria

1. $p = 3^{-3}, a = (\frac{187}{48}, 3), b = (\frac{5}{48}, 0)$

2. $p = 4^3, a = (0, \frac{1}{4}), b = (4, \frac{11}{4})$

3. $p = (\frac{4}{3})^3, a = (\frac{8}{3}, \frac{3}{4}), b = (\frac{4}{3}, \frac{9}{4})$

The excess demand for 2 is $a_2 + b_2 - 3$



Negative externalities and multiple equilibria

Consider the following economy

- One Consumer
- Two goods: X, Y.
- Two firms: 1 and 2.
- Firm 1 produces good Y out of good X with production function

$$Y_1 = X_1, X_1 \geq 0 \quad (1.1)$$

- Variable Y_1 represents the quantity of good Y produced by firm 1. Variable X_1 represents the quantity of good X employed by firm 1 as input.
- Firm 2 produces good Y out of good X with production function

$$Y_2 = \frac{2X_2}{1 + X_1}, X_2 \geq 0 \quad (1.2)$$

- Variable Y_2 represents the quantity of good Y produced by firm 2. Variable X_2 represents the quantity of good X employed by firm 2 as input. Note that (1.2) implies that the input X_1 of firm 1 imposes a negative externality on firm 2.
- Consumer Preferences

$$u(x, y) = xy \quad (1.3)$$

Variable x represents the quantity of good X consumed by this consumer

Variable y represents the quantity of good Y consumed by this consumer

- Consumer Endowment $e = \overbrace{[6, 0]}^{x, y}$. The firms are owned by the consumer.

Part 1: Compute all Pareto efficient points of this economy

Part 2: Compute all competitive equilibria of this economy.

Part 3: Compute the effect of imposing a minimum-wage type of restriction of the form

$$\frac{\text{price of X}}{\text{price of Y}} > 1 .$$

EFFICIENT POINTS

are the solutions of

$$\text{MAX } U = xy$$

$$y \leq y_1 + y_2, \quad x + x_1 + x_2 \leq 6, \quad y_2 = \frac{2x_2}{1+x_1}, \quad y_1 = x_1$$

$$x, y_i, x_i \geq 0, \quad \text{namely}$$

$$y_1 = x_1 = 0, \quad x = x_2 = 3, \quad y = 6$$
$$U = 18$$

EFFICIENT
POINTS

COMPUTATION OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA

① $p =$ price of y , $w =$ price of x

② CONSUMER INCOME $M = 6w + \pi_1 + \pi_2$

③ U_{MAX}

$$\text{MAX } U = xy$$

$$py + wx \leq M$$

$$x \geq 0, y \geq 0$$

DEMAND FUNCTIONS

$$y = \frac{M}{2p}, \quad x = \frac{M}{2w}$$

④ π_{MAX}

$$\text{MAX } \pi_1 = py_1 - wx_1$$

$$y_1 = x_1 \geq 0$$

$$y_1 = x_1 = \begin{cases} \infty & \text{if } \frac{w}{p} < 1 \\ \geq 0 & \text{if } \frac{w}{p} = 1 \\ 0 & \text{if } \frac{w}{p} > 1 \end{cases}$$

SUPPLY - INPUT DEMAND FUNCTIONS

$$\text{MAX } \pi_2 = py_2 - wx_2$$


$$y_2 = \frac{2x_2}{1+x_1}, \quad x_2 \geq 0, y_2 \geq 0$$

$$y_2 = \frac{2x_2}{1+x_1} = \begin{cases} \infty & \text{if } \frac{w}{p} < \frac{2}{1+x_1} \\ \geq 0 & \text{if } \frac{w}{p} = \frac{2}{1+x_1} \\ 0 & \text{if } \frac{w}{p} > \frac{2}{1+x_1} \end{cases}$$

⑤ EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Demand} = \text{Supply} \\ y = y_1 + y_2 \\ x + x_1 + x_2 = 6 \end{array} \quad \left| \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{In any equilibrium} \\ \frac{w}{p} \geq 1 \text{ and } \frac{w}{p} \geq \frac{2}{1+x_1} \end{array} \right.$$

SEARCH FOR EQUILIBRIUM PRICES



are exactly those with $w/p = 1$, hence with $x_2 = y_2 = 0 = \pi_2$, $\pi_1 = 0$, hence with $M = 6w$
 $x = y = 3 = x_1 = y_1$

INEFFICIENT EQUILIBRIUM

$$\frac{w}{p} = 1, \quad x_2 = y_2 = 0, \quad x = y = 3 = x_1 = y_1$$

$$\frac{w}{p} = 1, \quad x_2 = y_2 = 0, \quad x = y = 3 = x_1 = y_1$$

$$U = 9$$

Equilibria with $\frac{w}{p}$

are exactly those with $\frac{w}{p} = \frac{2}{1+x_1}$, $x_1 = y_1 = 0 = \pi_1 = \pi_2$
hence

$$\frac{w}{p} = 2, \quad M = 6w, \quad y = 6 = y_2, \quad x = x_2 = 3$$

EFFICIENT EQUILIBRIUM

$$\frac{w}{p} = 2, \quad x = x_2 = 3, \quad y = y_2 = 6$$

$$U = 18 \quad x_1 = y_1 = 0$$

EFFECT OF A MINIMUM WAGE POLICY $\frac{w}{p} > 1$

- If $1 < \frac{w}{p} \leq 2$ then this policy eliminates the inefficient equilibrium $\frac{w}{p} = 1, U = 9$.

The only remaining equilibrium is the efficient one $\frac{w}{p} = 2, U = 18$

- If $\frac{w}{p} > 2$ then $x_1 = y_1 = 0 = x_2 = y_2 = \pi_1 = \pi_2$
 $M = 6w, \quad x = 3, \quad y = 3\frac{w}{p} > 6$ (EXCESS DEMAND)

1. THE ECONOMY

- Three consumers: A, B, C
- Two goods: 1, 2
- Preferences

$$UA = \min\left(A_1, \frac{A_2}{4}\right), UB = \min(B_1, B_2), UC = \min(C_2, 2C_1)$$

- Endowments $EA = [6 - t, 16], EB = [1, 0], EC = [t, 6]$

The transfer parameter satisfies $0 < t < 3/2$

2. COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM

1. NAME THE PRICE OF EACH GOOD

$$p_1, p_2$$

2. NORMALIZE PRICES (OPTIONAL)

$$p_2 = 1, p_1 = q$$

3. DEFINE CONSUMER INCOMES

$$MA = 16 + q(6 - t), MB = q, MC = qt + 6 \quad (1)$$

4. SOLVE THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS OF CONSUMERS

$$\max UA = \min\left(A_1, \frac{A_2}{4}\right), \text{subject to}$$

$$qA_1 + A_2 \leq MA$$

$$A_1 \geq 0, A_2 \geq 0$$

yields

$$\left\{ A_1 = -\frac{qt - 6q - 16}{q + 4}, A_2 = -\frac{4(qt - 6q - 16)}{q + 4} \right\} \quad (2)$$

Similarly for consumers B, C we obtain

$$\left\{ B_1 = \frac{q}{q + 1}, B_2 = \frac{q}{q + 1} \right\} \quad (3)$$


$$\left\{ C_1 = \frac{qt + 6}{q + 2}, C_2 = \frac{2(qt + 6)}{q + 2} \right\} \quad (4)$$

5. SOLVE THE EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS

$$\begin{aligned} A_1 + B_1 + C_1 &= 7 \\ A_2 + B_2 + C_2 &= 22 \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

Solving the system(5),(2),(3),(4) we obtain


$$\left\{ q = \frac{2t}{3-2t}, A_1 = \frac{t}{3} + 4, A_2 = \frac{4t}{3} + 16, B_1 = \frac{2t}{3}, B_2 = \frac{2t}{3}, C_1 = 3-t, C_2 = 6-2t \right\} \quad (6)$$




Equilibrium utilities are then

$$V_A = \frac{t}{3} + 4, V_C = -2t + 6 \quad (7)$$

The transfer benefits the donor and hurts the recipient,



because the transfer t increases the relative price of good 1, namely the good that A sells and others buy.



COMPUTATION AND MULTIPLICITY OF EQUILIBRIA

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1. Introduction

In recent years the Walrasian general equilibrium model has become an important tool for applied work in such fields as development economics, international trade, macroeconomics and public finance [see, for example, Shoven and Whalley (1984) and Lucas (1987)]. Unfortunately, economic equilibria are usually solutions to fixed point problems rather than solutions to convex optimization problems. This leads to two difficulties that are closely related: first, equilibria may be difficult to compute; second, a model economy may have more than one equilibrium.

In this paper we explore these two issues for a number of stylized economies. We start with static exchange economies and then add a production technology. We later analyze economies with infinite numbers of goods, economies in which time and uncertainty play important roles. Studying economies of this sort is interesting not only for its own sake but because of the insights it provides into the properties of economies with large, but finite numbers of goods. Finally, we extend our analysis to economies that include distortionary taxes and externalities.

Although our emphasis is on computational issues, the approach is fairly theoretical. As Scarf (1973, 1982) has stressed, a precondition for developing computational methods for finding an equilibrium is to know that one exists. Furthermore, existence proofs often suggest algorithms for computing equilibria. Consequently, much of this paper deals with proofs of the existence of equilibria for a variety of economies. The paper is also filled with simple numerical examples, however, that illustrate the theory and could serve as test problems for algorithms. The reader who wishes to implement any of the algorithms suggested here on the computer should consult a good book on numerical methods, such as Acton (1970), who provides a wealth of practical advice, and Press, Flannery, Teukolsky and Vetterling (1986), who provide a large number of useful computer programs.

2. Static exchange economies

We begin by reviewing results for exchange economies with a finite number of consumers and a finite number of goods. We use two alternative specifications of such an economy, the first in terms of utility functions and endowment vectors, the second in terms of aggregate excess demand functions. Although the first specification is in some sense the more primitive, we alternate between the two as is convenient.

2.1. Existence of equilibrium

Consider an economy with m consumers and n goods. Each consumer has preferences given by a utility function $u_i : R_+^n \rightarrow R$ that is strictly concave and monotonically increasing. He is endowed with a vector $w^i = (w_1^i, \dots, w_n^i)$ that is strictly positive. An equilibrium of this economy is a price vector $\hat{p} \in R_+^n \setminus \{0\}$ and an allocation $(\hat{x}^1, \dots, \hat{x}^m)$, where $\hat{x}^i \in R_+^n$, such that

- $\hat{x}^i, i = 1, \dots, m$, solves $\max u_i(x)$ subject to $\hat{p}'x \leq \hat{p}'w^i, x \geq 0$,
- $\sum_{i=1}^m \hat{x}^i \leq \sum_{i=1}^m w^i$.

Alternatively, we could specify this economy in terms of an aggregate excess demand function $f : R_+^n \setminus \{0\} \rightarrow R^n$. We assume that f is continuous; that it is homogeneous of degree zero, $f(\theta p) \equiv f(p)$ for all $\theta > 0$ and all $p \in R_+^n \setminus \{0\}$; and that it obeys Walras's law, $p'f(p) \equiv 0$ for all $p \in R_+^n \setminus \{0\}$. An equilibrium is now a price vector $\hat{p} \in R_+^n \setminus \{0\}$ such that

- $f(\hat{p}) \leq 0$.

Notice that Walras's law implies that $f_i(\hat{p}) = 0$ if $\hat{p}_i > 0$.

To motivate our assumptions on f , we can think of f as being derived from the first specification of this economy. Let $x^i(p)$ be the solution to the consumer's utility maximization problem. Our assumptions on u_i and w^i imply that x^i is continuous, at least for all strictly positive price vectors; that is homogeneous of degree zero, $x^i(\theta p) \equiv x^i(p)$ for all $\theta > 0, p \in R_{++}^n$; and that it obeys the budget constraint, $p'x^i(p) \equiv p'w^i$. The aggregate excess demand function

$$f(p) = \sum_{i=1}^m (x^i(p) - w^i)$$

therefore, is continuous, at least at all strictly positive price vectors, is homogeneous of degree zero and obeys Walras's law.

Unfortunately, utility maximization does not imply that f is continuous on all $R_+^n \setminus \{0\}$. Rather, it implies that f is continuous and bounded below on all R_{++}^n . For some, but not necessarily all, $p^0 \in R_+^n \setminus \{0\}$ where $p_i^0 = 0$, some i , if $p^k \rightarrow p^0, p^k \in R_{++}^n$, then $\|f(p^k)\| \rightarrow \infty$. [See, for example, Arrow and Hahn (1971, Chap. 2)]. One way to handle the possibility that f becomes unbounded at price vectors that have some zero elements is to impose a constraint like $x \leq 2 \sum_{j=1}^m w^j$ in each consumer's utility maximization problem. With such a constraint $x^i(p)$, and therefore f , is continuous on all $R_+^n \setminus \{0\}$. Furthermore, such a constraint cannot bind in equilibrium. An alternative way to handle this possibility is to show that, for any $f : R_{++}^n \rightarrow R$ that satisfies the conditions implied by utility maximization, there is another function f^* that satisfies our assumptions, agrees with f on some open neighborhood of every equilibrium of f , and has no equilibria that are not equilibria of f [see, for example, Kehoe (1982)]. In any case, since the potential unboundedness of excess demand

when some prices are zero does not play a significant conceptual role in any of the issues discussed in this paper, we shall ignore it.

There is a close connection between equilibria of such economies and fixed points of continuous mappings of the simplex $S = \{p \in R_+^n \mid e'p = 1, p \geq 0\}$ into itself. (Here and subsequently, $e = (1, \dots, 1)$.) To prove the existence of equilibrium we employ Brouwer's fixed point theorem.

Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem. *Let $S \subset R^n$ be any non-empty, compact, convex set, and let $g : S \rightarrow S$ be continuous. Then g leaves some $\hat{x} \in S$ fixed, that is, $\hat{x} = g(\hat{x})$.*

Homogeneity allows us to restrict our attention in studying equilibria to the simplex: if $f(\hat{p}) \leq 0$ for $\hat{p} \in S$, then $f(\bar{p}) \leq 0$ for $\bar{p} = \hat{p}/(e'\hat{p})$. S is non-empty, compact and convex. Consider the function $g : S \rightarrow S$ that associates with any point $p \in S$ the point $g(p) \in S$ that is the closest point in S to $p + f(p)$ in terms of euclidean distance. In other words, $g(p)$ solves the problem

$$\min \frac{1}{2} (g - p - f(p))'(g - p - f(p)) \text{ subject to} \\ e'g = 1, \quad g \geq 0.$$

Since the objective function is strictly convex in g and continuous in p and the constraint set is convex, $g(p)$ is a continuous function.

Proposition 2.1. *\hat{p} is an equilibrium of f if and only if it is a fixed point of g , $\hat{p} = g(\hat{p})$.*

Proof. $g(p)$ solves the minimization problem that defines it if and only if there exists $\lambda \in R$ such that

$$g(p) - p - f(p) - \lambda e \geq 0,$$

$$g(p)'(g(p) - p - f(p) - \lambda e) = 0.$$

If $g(\hat{p}) = \hat{p}$, then the second, the complementary slackness, condition becomes

$$-\hat{p}'(f(\hat{p}) + \hat{\lambda}e) = \hat{\lambda}\hat{p}'e = \hat{\lambda} = 0.$$

The first condition then becomes $f(\hat{p}) \leq 0$.

Conversely, if \hat{p} is an equilibrium, we set $\lambda = 0$ and observe that \hat{p} satisfies the above conditions that define $g(p)$.

Remark. This result can easily be extended to economies where excess demand is a non-empty, bounded, upper-hemi-continuous, convex-valued cor-

respondence rather than a continuous, single-valued function. We need to alter g , however, because, as defined above, $g(p)$ is not necessarily convex-valued. Let D be the convex hull of the image of $p + f(p)$ for $p \in S$. Since f is bounded and upper-hemi-continuous and S is compact, D is compact. Let $q : D \rightarrow S$ be the function that associates any point $p \in D$ with the point $q(p) \in S$ that is closest to p . Now let $g : D \rightarrow D$ be the correspondence $g(p) = q(p) + f(q(p))$. In other words, instead of first adding excess demand and then projecting into the simplex, we first project into the simplex and then add excess demand. The advantage is that g is now convex-valued as well as being upper-hemi-continuous. By Kakutani's fixed point theorem, it has a fixed point $\hat{p} \in g(\hat{p})$. An easy argument, similar to that above, implies that \hat{p} is a fixed point if and only if it is an equilibrium. In practice, however, working with a domain like D is often more difficult than with one like S .

The above result is useful because it allows us to reduce the problems of computing equilibria and establishing the uniqueness of equilibrium to the analogous problems for fixed points. The question arises whether this is the easiest approach. In many circumstances it is. If the only assumptions that we make on f are those of continuity, homogeneity and Walras's law, then an argument due to Uzawa (1962) says that the study of equilibria is in a sense, equivalent to the study of fixed points. Suppose that $\gamma : S \rightarrow S$ is continuous. Consider the function $\phi : R_+^n \setminus \{0\} \rightarrow R^n$ defined by $\phi(p) = \gamma(p/(e'p)) - \lambda(p)p$, where $\lambda(p) = \gamma(p/(e'p))'p/(p'p)$. By construction, ϕ is continuous, is homogeneous of degree zero and obeys Walras's law.

Proposition 2.2 [Uzawa (1962)]. *\hat{p} is a fixed point of γ if and only if it is an equilibrium of ϕ , that is, $\phi(\hat{p}) \leq 0$ and $\hat{p} \in S$.*

Proof. If $\phi(\hat{p}) \leq 0$ and $\hat{p} \in S$, then

$$\gamma_i(\hat{p}) - \lambda(\hat{p})\hat{p}_i \leq 0, \quad i = 1, \dots, n.$$

Since Walras's law implies $\phi_i(\hat{p}) < 0$ only if $\hat{p}_i = 0$ and since $\gamma_i(\hat{p}) \geq 0$, this can be rewritten as

$$\lambda(\hat{p})\hat{p}_i = \gamma_i(\hat{p}), \quad i = 1, \dots, n.$$

Consequently, $e'\hat{p} = e'\gamma(\hat{p}) = 1$ implies $\hat{p} = \gamma(\hat{p})$. Conversely, if $\hat{p} = \gamma(\hat{p})$ then $\lambda(\hat{p}) = 1$ and $\phi(\hat{p}) = 0$.

Remark. Suppose that we are willing to impose no stronger conditions on u_i and w^i than those given previously and that $m \geq n$, in other words, that there are at least as many consumers as goods. Then a series of results due to Sonnenschein (1973), Mantel (1974), Debreu (1974), McFadden, Mas-Colell,

Mantel and Richter (1974) and Mas-Colell (1977) says that the only assumptions that we are justified in imposing on f are continuity, homogeneity and Walras's law; for any f that satisfies these assumptions there is an economy with n consumers whose excess demands aggregate to a function f^* whose equilibria coincide with those of f and that agrees with f on any compact set of prices where f is continuous [see Shafer and Sonnenschein (1982)]. Imposing stronger restrictions on u_i and w^i , however, can sometimes make the study of equilibria easier than the study of fixed points.

Interpretations of Uzawa's result are delicate. It is not surprising that we can show that the equilibrium existence theorem holds if and only if Brouwer's fixed point theorem does, since both are theorems given the axioms of modern mathematics. What is important is how easy and trivial the result is. Any theorem that proves the existence of a fixed point can be translated into a theorem that proves the existence of equilibrium by adding a few lines to the proof, and conversely. Any computer program that computes fixed points can be translated into a program that computes equilibria by adding a few lines to the code, and conversely. Any conditions that imply uniqueness of a fixed point can be easily translated into conditions that imply uniqueness of equilibrium, and conversely.

There is an important caveat to this interpretation of Uzawa's result. It relates fixed points to equilibria of economies specified in terms of aggregate excess demand functions. At this point it would seem that, to relate fixed points to equilibria of economies specified in terms of preferences and endowments of individual consumers, we would need to use some method, such as that of Geanakoplos (1984), that constructs an economy of n consumers for any arbitrary aggregate excess demand function. Thus, if we had an algorithm for computing equilibria of arbitrary economies specified in terms of preferences and endowments, using it to compute fixed points would be complicated. We would first use Uzawa's method to turn the mapping whose fixed points we wanted to compute into an excess demand function. We would then use Geanakoplos's method to turn this excess demand function into n pairs of utility functions and endowments vectors. Although the first step is trivial, the second is not. Rather than go into details, however, let us postpone discussion of this issue to Section 3, where we shall see that there is another connection between fixed points and equilibria of economies specified in terms of preferences and endowments.

2.2. Scarf's algorithm

Uzawa's result says that any algorithm that is guaranteed to compute equilibria of arbitrary economies specified in terms of aggregate excess demand functions

must be guaranteed to compute fixed points of arbitrary mapping of the simplex into itself. Scarf (1967, 1973, 1982) has developed such an algorithm. Numerous researchers have further improved algorithms of this type, known as simplicial algorithms; see, for example, Merrill (1971), Eaves (1972), Kuhn and Mackinnon (1975), Todd (1976a) and van der Lann and Talman (1980). This type of algorithm can also be used to compute fixed points of set-valued correspondences.

In R^n a k -dimensional simplex is the convex hull of $k + 1$ points, called vertices, v^1, \dots, v^{k+1} , that have the property that the k vectors $v^1 - v^{k+1}, \dots, v^k - v^{k+1}$ are linearly independent. The price simplex S , for example, has vertices $e^i, i = 1, \dots, n$, where $e_i^i = 1, e_j^i = 0, j \neq i$. A face of a simplex is a lower dimensional simplex whose vertices are vertices of the large simplex. In R^3 , for example, the point e^1 is a 0-dimensional face of S and the convex hull of e^1 and e^2 is a 1-dimensional face. A subdivision of S divides S into smaller simplices so that every point in S is an element of some subsimplex and the intersection of any two subsimplices is either empty or a face of both.

Scarf's approach to computation of equilibria is based on a constructive proof of a version of Sperner's lemma: Assign to every vertex of a simplicial subdivision of S a label, an integer from the set $\{1, \dots, n\}$, with the property that a vertex v on the boundary of S receives a label i for which $v_i = 0$. Then there exists a subsimplex whose vertices have all of the labels $1, \dots, n$.

Scarf's algorithm for finding this completely labeled subsimplex is to start in the corner of S where there is a subsimplex with boundary vertices with all of the labels $2, \dots, n$ (see Figure 38.1). If the additional vertex of this subsimplex




Figure 38.1

has the label 1, then the algorithm stops. Otherwise, it proceeds to a new subsimplex with all of the labels $2, \dots, n$. The original subsimplex has two faces that have all of these labels. One of them includes the interior vertex. The algorithm moves to the unique other subsimplex that shares this face. If the additional vertex of this subsimplex has the label 1, the algorithm stops. Otherwise, it proceeds, moving to the unique subsimplex that shares the new face and has the labels $2, \dots, n$. The algorithm cannot try to exit through a boundary face. (Think of what labels the vertices of such a face must have.) Nor can it cycle. (To cycle there must be some subsimplex that is the first that the algorithm encounters for the second time; but the algorithm must have previously encountered both of the subsimplices that share the two faces of this subsimplex with the labels $2, \dots, n$.) Since the subdivision consists of a finite number of subsimplices, the algorithm must terminate with a completely labeled subsimplex.

To see the connection of this algorithm with Brouwer's theorem, we assign a vertex v with a label i for which $g_i(v) \geq v_i$. Since $e'g(v) = e'v = 1$, there must be such an i . Notice that, since $g_i(v) \geq 0$, i can be chosen such that the labeling convention on the boundary is satisfied. A completely labeled subsimplex has vertices v^1, \dots, v^n such that $g_i(v^i) \geq v_i^i$, $i = 1, \dots, n$. To prove Brouwer's theorem, we consider a sequence of subdivisions whose mesh, the maximum distance between vertices in the same subsimplex, approaches zero. Associate each subdivision with a point in a completely labeled subsimplex. Since S is compact, this sequence of points has a convergent subsequence. Call the limit of this subsequence \hat{x} . Since g is continuous, we know $g_i(\hat{x}) \geq \hat{x}_i$, $i = 1, \dots, n$. Since $e'g(\hat{x}) = e'\hat{x} = 1$, $g(\hat{x}) = \hat{x}$.

Scarf does not consider an infinite sequence of subdivisions, which is the non-constructive aspect of this proof. Instead, he works with a subdivision with a small mesh. Any point in a completely labeled subsimplex serves as an approximate fixed point in the sense that $\|g(x) - x\| < \epsilon$ where ϵ depends on the mesh and the modulus of continuity of g .

2.3. The global Newton method

An alternative algorithm for computing fixed points has been developed by Smale (1976), the global Newton method. It is based on Hirsch's (1963) proof of Brouwer's theorem. A similar method has been developed by Kellogg, Li and Yorke (1976). Let S now be the disk $\{x \in R^n \mid x'x \leq 1\}$; like the simplex it is a non-empty, compact, convex set. Smale starts with an algorithm for computing fixed points of a continuously differentiable map $g : S \rightarrow S$ that has the property that $g(x) = 0$ for every x on the boundary of S , the sphere $\partial S = \{x \in R^n \mid x'x = 1\}$. Smale (1976) and Varian (1977) show how to extend

this algorithm to situations where g is an arbitrary continuous map and S is again the simplex.

If S has no fixed points, we could define a map

$$h(x) = \lambda(x)(x - g(x))$$

where $\lambda(x) = ((x - g(x))'(x - g(x)))^{-1/2}$. This map would be a retraction of S into its boundary: it would continuously map S into ∂S and be the identity on ∂S . Hirsch proves that no such map could exist, thereby proving Brouwer's theorem. Smale proposes starting with a regular value of $x - g(x)$, a point $\bar{x} \in \partial S$ such that $I - Dg(\bar{x})$ is non-singular. Sard's theorem says that the set of regular values has full measure and, in particular, that there exists such a point \bar{x} . The algorithm then follows the solution to

$$\lambda(x(t))(x(t) - g(x(t))) = \bar{x} .$$

Since the path $x(t)$ cannot return to any other boundary point, and since it cannot return to \bar{x} because it is a regular value, it must terminate at a fixed point (see Figure 38.2).

Differentiating the above equation with respect to t , we obtain

$$\lambda(x)(I - Dg(x))\dot{x} + \dot{\lambda}(x - g(x)) = 0 .$$

Smale shows that $x(t)$ can be chosen as the solution to the differential equation

$$(I - Dg(x))\dot{x} = \mu(x)(g(x) - x)$$

where $\mu(x)$ has the same sign as $\det[I - Dg(x)]$ and is scaled so that \dot{x} has constant velocity. Except for the factor μ this is a continuous version of




Figure 38.2

Newton's method for solving $x - g(x) = 0$:

$$x_{i+1} = x_i - (I - Dg(x_i))^{-1}(x_i - g(x_i)).$$

2.4. Regularity and the index theorem

Merely establishing the existence of equilibria and developing methods for computing them leaves important questions unanswered. Are equilibria unique? If not, are they locally unique? Do they vary continuously with the parameters of the economy? In recent years, economists have used the tools of differential topology to investigate these questions. Debreu (1970) has investigated the questions of local uniqueness and continuity with continuously differentiable excess demand functions. See Dierker (1982) and Mas-Colell (1985) for surveys of this and subsequent work. Analogous results to those derived in the differentiable framework can be obtained in a piecewise-linear framework applicable to Scarf's approach to computing equilibria. See, for example, Eaves and Scarf (1976) and Eaves (1976).

Debreu (1970) defines a regular economy to be one that satisfies conditions sufficient for there to be a finite number of equilibria. Dierker and Dierker (1972) simplify these conditions to the requirement that the Jacobian matrix of excess demands $Df(\hat{p})$ with the first row and column deleted, the $(n-1) \times (n-1)$ matrix \bar{J} , is non-singular at every equilibrium. The first row is deleted because of Walras's law, the first column because of homogeneity. We are left with a square matrix because, as Walras (1874, Lesson 12) pointed out, the number of equations equals the number of unknowns in the equilibrium conditions. The inverse function theorem implies that every equilibrium of a regular economy is locally unique. Since the set S is compact and the equilibrium conditions involve continuous functions, this implies that a regular economy has a finite number of equilibria.

Let us rewrite the equilibrium conditions as $f(p, b) = 0$ where $b \in B$ and B is a topological space of parameters. If f and its partial derivatives with respect to p are continuous in both p and b , then the implicit function theorem implies that equilibria vary continuously at regular economies. Furthermore, in the case where B is the set of possible endowment vectors w^i , Debreu uses Sard's theorem to prove that, for every b in an open set of full measure in B , $f(\cdot, b)$ is a regular economy. When B is the function space of excess demand functions with the uniform C^1 topology, an open dense set of B consists of regular economies. Consequently, if we are willing to restrict attention to continuously differentiable excess demand functions, a restriction that Debreu (1972) and Mas-Colell (1974) have shown in fairly innocuous, almost all economies, in a very precise mathematical sense, are regular.

Dierker (1972) has noticed that a fixed point index theorem could be used to count the number of equilibria of a regular economy. Let us define the fixed point index of a regular equilibrium \hat{p} as $\text{sgn}[\det(I - Dg(\hat{p}))]$ whenever this expression is non-zero. Dierker shows that the index can also be written as $\text{sgn}(\det[-\bar{J}])$. The index theorem says that $\sum \text{index}(\hat{p}) = +1$ where the sum is over equilibria of a regular economy. This result is depicted in Figure 38.3 where $n = 2$, $p_1 = 1 - p_2$, and $g_1(p_1, p_2) = 1 - g_2(p_1, p_2)$. Here $\text{index}(\hat{p}) = \text{sgn}(1 - \partial g_2 / \partial p_2)$ and a regular economy is one where the graph of g does not become tangent to the diagonal.

Mas-Colell (1977) shows that any compact subset of S can be the equilibrium of some economy f . If we restrict ourselves to regular economies and $n \geq 3$, then the only restrictions placed on the number of equilibria are those given by the index theorem. (If $n = 2$, an equilibrium with index -1 must lie between two with index $+1$.) This implies that the number of equilibria is odd and that there is a unique equilibrium if and only if $\text{index}(\hat{p}) = +1$ at every equilibrium.

It is easy to see that there are an odd number of solutions to Scarf's algorithm and to Smale's global Newton method. To see this in the case of Scarf's algorithm, let us argue that there are an odd number of completely labeled subsimplices. The path followed from the corner missing the label 1 leads to a unique subsimplex. Suppose there is an additional completely labeled subsimplex. Then it shares the face with labels $2, \dots, n$ with a unique other subsimplex. Restart Scarf's algorithm at this subsimplex. Either the additional vertex to this subsimplex has the label 1, in which case it is completely labeled, or it does not, in which case it has another face with all of the labels $2, \dots, n$. Move to the unique other subsimplex that shares this face and continue as before. The algorithm cannot encounter any subsimplex in the




Figure 38.3

path from the corner to the original subsimplex. (To do so there must be some subsimplex in the path that is the first that it encounters; but it must have previously encountered both of the subsimplices that share the two faces of this subsimplex with the labels $2, \dots, n$.) The algorithm must therefore terminate in yet another completely labeled subsimplex. Consequently, all completely labeled subsimplices, except the original one located by the algorithm starting in the corner, come in pairs. There is a definition of index of a completely labeled subsimplex that agrees with that of a fixed point \hat{p} in the case where the mesh of the subdivision is sufficiently small and f is regular [see Eaves and Scarf (1976) and Todd (1976b)]. The original subsimplex located by the algorithm starting in the corner has index $+1$. All other completely labeled subsimplices come in pairs as described above, one with index $+1$ and one with index -1 .

Likewise, it can be shown that the global Newton method has an odd number of solutions. Starting at \bar{x} on the boundary the algorithm locates one, which has index $+1$. All other solutions are matched up in pairs, one with index $+1$ and one with index -1 . Indeed, it is a general feature of these and related algorithms that, unless they are restarted at a fixed point different from the one originally computed by the algorithm, they always lead to fixed points with index $+1$. This, combined with Mas-Colell's (1977) result about the arbitrariness of the number of fixed points, suggests that, unless for some reason we know that $\text{index}(\hat{p}) = +1$ at every fixed point, there can be no method except for an exhaustive search that locates all fixed points. There is an important possible exception to this remark involving the all-solutions algorithm of Drexler (1978) and Garcia and Zangwill (1979, 1981). This method, which depends on being able to globally bound g using complex polynomial functions, is further discussed in the next section.

2.5. Path following methods

Much recent work on the computation of fixed points has been based on the idea of path following. The idea is to follow the path of solutions to $H(x, \theta) = 0$ where $H : S \times [0, 1] \rightarrow R^n$ is chosen so that $H(x, 0) = 0$ is trivial to solve and $H(x, 1) = x - g(x)$, which means a solution to $H(x, 1) = 0$ is a fixed point. The function H is called a homotopy [see Garcia and Zangwill (1981) for a survey and references].

Suppose that $g : S \rightarrow S$ is twice continuously differentiable. Define

$$H(x, \theta) = x - (1 - \theta)\bar{x} - \theta g(x)$$

where \bar{x} is an interior point of S . Notice that, for any $1 > \theta \geq 0$ and $x \in S$,

$(1 - \theta)\bar{x} + \theta g(x)$ is also interior to S . We start at the trivial solution $H(\bar{x}, 0) = 0$ and follow the solution path until we reach the boundary where $\theta = 1$ and $H(x, 1) = x - g(x) = 0$. We require that 0 be a regular value of $H(x, \theta)$ in the sense that the $n \times (n + 1)$ matrix $DH(x, \theta)$ has rank n whenever $H(x, \theta) = 0$. Sard's theorem says that we can always choose \bar{x} so that this condition is satisfied and, indeed, that it is satisfied for almost all \bar{x} . (It is here that second differentiability is important.) The implicit function theorem then implies that solutions to $H(x, \theta) = 0$ form a compact one-dimensional manifold with boundary, a finite number of paths and loops, and that the boundary points of this manifold are also boundary points of $S \times [0, 1]$. By construction, H is such that $(\bar{x}, 0)$ is the only possible boundary solution except for points where $\theta = 1$, where solutions are fixed points of g (see Figure 38.4).

Although the path that starts at $(\bar{x}, 0)$ cannot return to the boundary where $\theta = 0$, it need not be monotonic in θ . Consequently, we do not want to think of the path in terms of x as a function of θ . Rather, let us write $y(t) = (x(t), \theta(t))$. Differentiating $H(y(t)) = 0$ with respect to t , we obtain

$$DH(y)\dot{y} = 0.$$

This is a system of n linear equations in $n + 1$ unknowns that has an infinite




Figure 38.4

number of solutions. One is

$$\dot{y}_i = (-1)^{n-i+1} \det DH(y)_{-i}.$$

Here $DH(y)_{-i}$ is the $n \times n$ matrix formed by deleting column i from $DH(y)$. That 0 is a regular value of H implies that at every point y along the path some matrix $DH(y)_{-i}$ is non-singular. To see that the above differential equation does indeed follow the solution path to $H(y) = 0$, we suppose that $DH(y)_{-1}$ is non-singular and rewrite $DH\dot{y} = 0$ as

$$\sum_{i=2}^{n+1} D_i H \dot{y}_i = -D_1 H \dot{y}_1$$

where $D_i H$ is column i of DH . We choose $\dot{y}_1 = (-1)^n \det DH_{-1}$ and solve for $\dot{y}_2, \dots, \dot{y}_{n+1}$ using Cramer's rule:

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{y} &= \det[D_2 H \cdots D_{i-1} H (-1)^{n+1} (\det DH_{-1}) D_1 H D_{i+1} H \cdots D_{n+1} H] \\ &\quad \div \det DH_{-1} \\ &= (-1)^{n-i+1} \det DH_{-i}. \end{aligned}$$

As with the global Newton method, we have reduced the problem of computing fixed points to that of solving a system of ordinary differential equations. To solve such equations, we can use a variety of methods, such as the Runge–Kutta method or the Bulirsch–Stoer method [see, for example, Gear (1971) and Stoer and Bulirsch (1980, Chap. 7)]. The homotopy approach can also be applied to piecewise-linear problems [see, for example, Merrill (1971), Eaves (1972), Kuhn and MacKinnon (1975), Eaves (1976) and Eaves and Scarf (1976)].

The homotopy approach yields a very simple proof of the index theorem. Notice that at $(\bar{x}, 0)$

$$\dot{\theta} = \det[DH(\bar{x}, 0)_{-(n+1)}] = \det I = 1 > 0.$$

Following the path of solutions to $H(x(t), \theta(t)) = 0$, $\dot{\theta}$ may change signs, but when $\theta = 1$

$$\dot{\theta} = \det[DH(x, 1)_{-(n+1)}] = \det[I - Dg(x)]$$

must be non-negative. (Take another look at Figure 38.4.) If 0 is a regular value of $x - g(x)$, if the economy is regular, then $\det[I - Dg(x)] > 0$. Other fixed points come in pairs, with each one the endpoint of a path that starts and ends on the boundary where $\theta = 1$. At one endpoint $\dot{\theta} \leq 0$ and at the other $\dot{\theta} \geq 0$. In the regular case we define $\text{index}(\hat{x}) = \text{sgn}(\det[I - Dg(\hat{x})])$. Summing

over all fixed points, all solutions to $H(x, 1) = 0$, yields $+1$. This proof of the index theorem is easily extended to maps that are continuously differentiable only of first, rather than second, order [see Garcia and Zangwill (1981, Chap. 22)].

A fascinating possibility presented by the path following idea is that of being able to compute all of the fixed points of a function $g : S \rightarrow S$. The all-solutions algorithm of Drexler (1978) and Garcia and Zangwill (1979) is easiest understood in terms of computing zeros of polynomials. We first approximate $g(x) - x$ by a finite order polynomial $f : S \rightarrow R^n$ and then extend f to a function $f : R^n \rightarrow R^n$. Weierstrass's approximation theorem says that we can choose f to approximate $g(x) - x$ arbitrary closely on S [see, for example, Lang (1983, pp. 49–53)]. We then convert f into a complex function by allowing both its domain and range to be C^n , the space of complex n vectors. We can expand the vector $z \in C^n$ into a vector $z^* \in R^{2n}$ by writing $z = (z_1^* + z_2^*i, \dots, z_{2n-1}^* + z_{2n}^*i)$. Consequently, we can expand f into $f^* : R^{2n} \rightarrow R^{2n}$ by writing $f(z) = (f_1^*(z^*) + f_2^*(z^*)i, \dots, f_{2n-1}^*(z^*) + f_{2n}^*(z^*)i)$. We now discuss a method that can compute all the zeros of f^* . Notice that not all of the zeros of f^* are approximate fixed points of g ; some may be complex and some may lie outside of S .

Letting m_j be the highest order of the polynomial $f_j(z)$, we consider the homotopy $H : C^n \times [0, 1] \rightarrow C^n$ defined by the rule

$$H_j(z, \theta) = (1 - \theta)(z_j^{(m_j+1)} - 1) + \theta f_j(z), \quad j = 1, \dots, n.$$

At $\theta = 1$, solutions to $H(z, \theta) = 0$ are zeros of f . At $\theta = 0$, $H_j(z, \theta) = 0$ has $m_j + 1$ solutions

$$z_j = \cos(2\pi a / (m_j + 1)) + i \sin(2\pi a / (m_j + 1)), \quad a = 0, 1, \dots, m_j.$$

Consequently, there are $\prod_{j=1}^n (m_j + 1)$ solutions to $H(z, 0) = 0$. We can expand H into $H^* : R^{2n} \times [0, 1] \rightarrow R^{2n}$. The crucial insight involved in the all-solutions algorithm is that any solution path to $H^*(z^*, \theta) = 0$ is monotonic in θ ,

$$\dot{\theta} = \det[DH^*(z^*, \theta)_{-(2n+1)}] \geq 0.$$

The proof is simple: $DH^*(z^*, \theta)_{-(2n+1)}$ consists of 2×2 blocks of the form

$$\begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial H_i^r}{\partial z_j^r} & \frac{\partial H_i^r}{\partial z_j^i} \\ \frac{\partial H_i^i}{\partial z_j^r} & \frac{\partial H_i^i}{\partial z_j^i} \end{bmatrix}.$$

Here $z_j^r = z_{2j-1}^*$ is the real part of z_j , $z_j^i = z_{2j}^*$ is the imaginary part, and H_i^r and H_i^i are the real and imaginary parts of H_i . The Cauchy–Riemann equations, which follow easily from the chain rule, say that

$$\frac{\partial H_i^r}{\partial z_j^r} = \frac{\partial H_i^i}{\partial z_j^i}, \quad \frac{\partial H_i^r}{\partial z_j^i} = -\frac{\partial H_i^i}{\partial z_j^r}.$$

Consequently, the 2×2 blocks that make up $DH^*(z^*, \theta)_{-(2n+1)}$ all have the special form

$$\begin{bmatrix} a_{ij} & b_{ij} \\ -b_{ij} & a_{ij} \end{bmatrix}.$$

These matrices have important properties: their special form is preserved when such a matrix is multiplied by a scalar or inverted; it is also preserved when two such matrices are added or multiplied together. Consequently, performing Gaussian elimination on these 2×2 blocks, we can reduce the $2n \times 2n$ matrix $DH^*(z^*, \theta)_{-(2n+1)}$ to a lower block triangular matrix with n such 2×2 blocks on the diagonal. The determinant is the product of the determinants of these blocks, each of which is non-negative.

Since θ is monotonic along any path, there can be no paths that both start and end at $\theta = 0$ or at $\theta = 1$. To guarantee that every solution at $\theta = 1$ is the endpoint of a path that starts with $\theta = 0$, we need to rule out paths diverging to infinity for $0 \leq \theta < 1$. It is here that the polynomials $(z_j^{(m_j+1)} - 1)$ play their role. Suppose that $\|z\| \rightarrow \infty$. Then, for at least one i , $f_i(z)/(z_j^{(m_j+1)} - 1) \rightarrow 0$, which implies that $H_j(z, \theta)/(z_j^{(m_j+1)} - 1) \rightarrow (1 - \theta)$. Consequently, $H_j(z, \theta) = 0$ cannot hold for any path along which $\|z\| \rightarrow \infty$ and $0 \leq \theta < 1$. Following each of the paths that starts at $\theta = 0$ either leads to a zero of f or diverges to infinity at $\theta = 1$. No path can start at $\theta = 1$ and diverge to infinity going backwards, however, so this method necessarily locates all of the zeros of f [see Garcia and Zangwill (1981, Chap. 18) for further discussion].

This method can easily be applied to functions other than polynomials. What we need is a function $f : R^n \rightarrow R^n$ than can be extended to C^n and polynomials $(z_i^{q_i} - 1)$ such that some $f_i(z)/(z_i^{q_i} - 1) \rightarrow 0$ as $\|z\| \rightarrow \infty$. The all-solutions algorithm is obviously a promising direction for future research.

2.6. Multiplicity of equilibria

By constructing an example of an economy with an equilibrium with index -1 , we can easily construct an example of multiplicity of equilibria.

Example 2.1. Consider a static exchange economy with two consumers and two goods. Consumer i , $i = 1, 2$, has a utility function of the form

$$u_i(x_1, x_2) = \sum_{j=1}^2 a_j^i (x_j^{b_i} - 1) / b_i$$

where $a_j^i \geq 0$ and $b_i < 1$. This is, of course, the familiar constant-elasticity-of-substitution utility function with elasticity of substitution $\eta_i = 1/(1 - b_i)$. Given an endowment vector (w_1^i, w_2^i) , consumer i maximizes this utility subject to his budget constraint. His demand functions are

$$x_j^i(p_1, p_2) = \frac{\gamma_j^i \sum_{k=1}^2 p_k w_k^i}{p_j^{\eta_i} \sum_{k=1}^2 \gamma_k^i p_k^{1-\eta_i}}, \quad i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2.$$

Here $\gamma_j^i = (a_j^i)^{\eta_i}$. The two consumers have the (symmetric) parameters given below.

Consumer	a_j^i	
	Commodity 1	Commodity 2
1	1024	1
2	1	1024

$$b_1 = b_2 = -4,$$

Consumer	w_j^i	
	Commodity 1	Commodity 2
1	12	1
2	1	12

Of course $\eta_1 = \eta_2 = 1/5$, $\gamma_1^1 = \gamma_2^2 = 4$ and $\gamma_2^1 = \gamma_1^2 = 1$.

This economy has three equilibria, which are listed below.

Equilibrium 1: $p^1 = (0.5000, 0.5000)$

Consumer	Commodity		u_i
	1	2	
1	10.400	2.600	-0.02735
2	2.600	10.400	-0.02735

Equilibrium 2: $p^2 = (0.1129, 0.8871)$			
	Commodity		
Consumer	1	2	u_i
1	8.631	1.429	-0.10611
2	4.369	11.571	-0.01497

Equilibrium 3: $p^3 = (0.8871, 0.1129)$			
	Commodity		
Consumer	1	2	u_i
1	11.571	4.369	-0.01497
2	1.429	8.631	-0.10611

This example has been constructed by making $p^1 = (0.5, 0.5)$ an equilibrium with index -1

$$Df(p^1) = \begin{bmatrix} 3.2 & -3.2 \\ -3.2 & 3.2 \end{bmatrix},$$

$$\text{index}(p^1) = \text{sgn}(-3.2) = -1.$$

Remark. A similar example has been constructed in an Edgeworth box diagram by Shapley and Shubik (1977).

Two assumptions have played significant roles in discussions of uniqueness of equilibria since the time of Wald (1936). They are gross substitutability and the weak axiom of revealed preference. Gross substitutability says that, if $p \geq q$ and $p_i = q_i$ for some i , then $f_i(p) \geq f_i(q)$ and, if $f(p) = f(q)$, then $p = q$. (This actually combines the two conditions often known as weak gross substitutability and indecomposability.) The weak axiom of revealed preference says that if $p'f(q) \leq 0$ and $q'f(p) \leq 0$, then $f(q) = f(p)$.

The argument that gross substitutability implies uniqueness is easy: Suppose that there are two vectors p, q , such that $f(p) = f(q) \leq 0$. It must be the case that $p, q > 0$. Otherwise, for example, $p_i = 0$ and $2p \geq p$ would imply $f_i(2p) > f_i(p)$, which would contradict homogeneity. Let $\gamma = \max q_j/p_j$. Then γp satisfies $\gamma p \geq q$, $\gamma p_i = q_i$ some i . Consequently, $f(\gamma p) = f(p) = f(q) = 0$ implies $\gamma p = q$. It is also easy to show that, when f is continuously differentiable, gross substitutability implies that $\text{index}(\hat{p}) = +1$, since $\partial f_i(\hat{p})/\partial p_j \geq 0$, $i \neq j$ implies, in general, that $-J$ is a P matrix, a matrix with all of its leading minors positive [see Hahn (1958) and Kehoe (1985b)].

The weak axiom implies that the set of equilibria is convex. If f is regular, this implies that it has a unique equilibrium. Suppose that there are two vectors p, q such that $f(p) = f(q) \leq 0$. Then $p(\theta) = \theta p + (1 - \theta)q$, $0 \leq \theta \leq 1$,

satisfies $p(\theta)'f(p) \leq 0$ and $p(\theta)'f(q) \leq 0$. Walras's law implies that $(\theta p + (1 - \theta)q)'f(p(\theta)) = 0$. Consequently, it cannot be the case that $p'f(p(\theta)) > 0$, otherwise $q'f(p(\theta)) < 0$, which contradicts the weak axiom. Consequently, $p'f(p(\theta)) \leq 0$, which implies $f(p(\theta)) = f(p) \leq 0$. In the case where f is differentiable, the weak axiom implies that $Df(p)$ satisfies $x'Df(p)x \leq 0$ for all x such that $x'f(p) = 0$ [see Kihlstrom, Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein (1976), Kehoe (1985c) and Freixas and Mas-Colell (1987)]. This implies that $\det[-J] > 0$ if \hat{p} is a regular equilibrium.

One problem with the weak axiom is that, in contrast to gross substitutability, it does not aggregate: the two functions in Example 2.1, for example, satisfy the weak axiom because they come from utility maximization; their sum obviously does not. Mas-Colell (1989) discusses a condition called monotonicity that both implies the weak axiom and aggregates: f is monotone with respect to the normalizing vector $a \in R_+^n$ if $p'a = q'a = 1$ and $p \neq q$ imply $(p - q)'(f(p) - f(q)) < 0$. Unfortunately, monotonicity is not implied by utility maximization. Mas-Colell (1989), however, presents sufficient conditions on utility functions and endowments for monotonicity to hold.

2.7. Other computational methods

Despite not being guaranteed to converge for arbitrary economies, methods for computing equilibria other than fixed point algorithms are popular in practice. Let us briefly consider three such methods, tâtonnement, a non-linear Gauss-Seidel method and Newton's method.

Samuelson (1941) has formalized Walras's (1874) concept of tâtonnement, or groping to equilibrium, as the system of differentiable equations

$$\dot{p} = f(p).$$

Notice that $\|p\|$ stays constant under this adjustment process:

$$\frac{d(p'p)}{dt} = 2p'\dot{p} = 2p'f(p) = 0.$$

In other words, if $\|p(0)\| = 1$, then $\|p(t)\| = 1$; the path followed by tâtonnement always remains on the intersection of the sphere and the positive orthant.

This process converges to the set of equilibria if f satisfies the weak axiom, as shown by Arrow and Hurwicz (1958), who use the Liapunov function $L(p) = \frac{1}{2}(p - \hat{p})'(p - \hat{p})$. Notice that $L(p) > 0$ unless $p = \hat{p}$ and that

$$\dot{L}(p) = (p - \hat{p})'\dot{p} = -\hat{p}'f(p).$$

Unless p is an equilibrium, $f(\hat{p}) = 0$ and the weak axiom imply that $\dot{L}(p) < 0$. Arrow, Block and Hurwicz (1959) further argue that gross substitutability implies that the weak axiom holds in comparisons with an equilibrium vector of an exchange model; that $f(\hat{p}) = 0$ implies $\hat{p}'f(p) > 0$ unless $f(p) = f(\hat{p})$. Consequently, tâtonnement is also globally asymptotically stable if f satisfies gross substitutability.

If, however, f does not satisfy the weak axiom or gross substitutability, the tâtonnement process may not converge to an equilibrium. In fact, Scarf (1960) constructs a simple example with unique equilibria in which, unless $p(0) = \hat{p}$, the process converges to a limit cycle. Indeed, the Sonnenschein–Mantel–Debreu result on the arbitrary nature of aggregate excess demand implies that the behavior of tâtonnement is also arbitrary. See Hahn (1982) for a survey of results related to tâtonnement. From our point of view there are two points worth noting. First, the process can be generalized to allow different adjustment speeds

$$\dot{p}_i = \theta_i f_i(p), \quad i = 1, \dots, n.$$

For any $\theta_i > 0$, $i = 1, \dots, n$, the process remains globally stable if f satisfies the weak axiom or gross substitutability. In general, however, changing the weights θ_i can greatly affect the stability properties of tâtonnement. Second, if we want to avoid problems with negative prices we have to alter the process to something like

$$\dot{p}_i = \begin{cases} f_i(p) & \text{if } p_i > 0 \text{ or } f_i(p) > 0, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Although \dot{p} can be discontinuous at a point where $p_i = 0$, it can be shown, as done for example by Henry (1972, 1973), that the path $p(t)$ is continuous.

Van der Laan and Talman (1987) have developed a tâtonnement-like algorithm that is guaranteed to converge under weak regularity assumptions: start with an initial price vector \bar{p} interior to the simplex. The algorithm sets

$$p_j/\bar{p}_j = \min[p_1/\bar{p}_1, \dots, p_n/\bar{p}_n] \quad \text{if } f_j(p) < 0,$$

$$p_j/\bar{p}_j = \max[p_1/\bar{p}_1, \dots, p_n/\bar{p}_n] \quad \text{if } f_j(p) > 0.$$

When $f_j(p) = 0$, p_j is allowed to vary to keep market j in equilibrium. The set of points that satisfy these conditions generically form a collection of loops and paths in S . The algorithm operates like the global Newton method and the path following methods described earlier, following the path that starts at \bar{p} until another endpoint is reached. This endpoint is an equilibrium.

Walras (1874, Lessons 12 and 24) originally conceived of tâtonnement as clearing one market at a time. With linear equations the analogous process is called the Gauss–Seidel method. The idea is to update a guess at a solution to the equations

$$f_j(1, p_2, p_3, \dots, p_n) = 0, \quad j = 2, \dots, n$$

one equation at a time: Given the guess p_2^k, \dots, p_n^k , we let p_i^{k+1} be the solution $g_i(p^k)$ to

$$f_i(1, g_2(p^k), \dots, g_i(p^k), p_{i+1}^k, \dots, p_n^k) = 0, \quad i = 2, \dots, n.$$

In the case where f is linear, this method converges if there exists some $\theta_j > 0$, $j = 2, \dots, n$, such that

$$\theta_i \left| \frac{\partial f_i}{\partial p_i} \right| \geq \sum_{j \neq i} \theta_j \left| \frac{\partial f_i}{\partial p_j} \right|, \quad i, j = 2, \dots, n,$$

with strict inequality some i [see Young (1971) for a collection of conditions that guarantee convergence of this method]. This, however, is the familiar diagonal dominance condition satisfied by the Jacobian matrix of an excess demand function that exhibits gross substitutability. Consequently, it is possible to show that, if $Df(\hat{p})$ satisfies gross substitutability at some equilibrium \hat{p} , there is some open neighborhood N of \hat{p} such that if $p^0 \in N$, the non-linear analog of this algorithm converges to \hat{p} . The weak axiom does not guarantee diagonal dominance, and it is easy to construct examples that satisfy the weak axiom but for which this method is unstable.

Perhaps the most popular method for solving systems of equations such as $g(p) = p$ is Newton's method,

$$p^k = p^{k-1} - \lambda_k (I - Dg(p^{k-1}))^{-1} (p^{k-1} - g(p^{k-1})).$$

Frequently, the scalar $\lambda_k > 0$ is chosen by a line search to make $\|p^k - g(p^k)\|$ as small as possible. Furthermore, the elements of Dg are usually approximated numerically rather than calculated analytically. In many versions of this algorithm $I - Dg$ is never explicitly inverted. Rather, an approximation to its inverse is successively updated; these are called quasi-Newton methods. See Ortega and Rheinboldt (1970) and Jacobs (1977) for surveys of these methods. An important warning is in order here: Most work in the mathematical programming literature on Newton-type methods relates to minimizing a convex function $h: R^n \rightarrow R$,

$$x^k = x^{k-1} - \lambda_k D^2 h(x^{k-1}) Dh(x^{k-1})' .$$

Although this does amount to solving the system of equations $Dh(x) = 0$, this system has two special properties. First, $D^2 h$ is symmetric and positive semi-definite. Second, λ_k can always be chosen small enough so that $h(x^k)$ decreases at every iteration. Unless $I - Dg$ satisfies strong integrability conditions, these sorts of properties do not carry over to solving for equilibria.

Arrow and Hahn (1971, Chapter 12) have shown that a continuous version of Newton's method

$$\dot{p} = -(I - Dg(p))^{-1}(p - g(p))$$

is globally stable if $\det(I - Dg(p))$ never vanishes. (We ignore the minor technical problem caused by the potential discontinuity of Dg ; as in the case of tâtonnement where some price is zero, $p(t)$ can be shown to follow a continuous path.) In this case, the index theorem implies that there is a unique fixed point $\hat{p} = g(\hat{p})$. $L(p) = \frac{1}{2}(p - g(p))'(p - g(p))$ provides a Liapunov function: $L(p) > 0$ unless $p = g(p)$, and

$$\dot{L}(p) = (p - g(p))'(I - Dg(p))\dot{p} = -(p - g(p))'(p - g(p)) .$$

Consequently, $\dot{L}(p) < 0$ unless $p = \hat{p}$.

Although this method may cycle if $(I - Dg(p))$ is singular for some p , $L(p)$ always serves as a local Liapunov function near a regular equilibrium \hat{p} . That is, every regular equilibrium \hat{p} has some open neighborhood N such that, if $p(0) \in N$, this method converges to \hat{p} . This suggests a stochastic method for computing equilibria, which is frequently used in practice: Guess a value for $p(0)$. Apply Newton's method. If it does not converge, guess a new value for $p(0)$. Continue until an equilibrium is located. Since every open neighborhood of an equilibrium occupies a positive fraction of the volume of the price simplex, this method must eventually work.

Newton's method is in some sense the simplest algorithm that has this local convergence property for any regular equilibrium. Saari and Simon (1978) and Traub and Wozniakowski (1976) show that, in a precise sense, any locally convergent method must use all of the information in $g(p)$ and $Dg(p)$. Furthermore, Saari (1985) shows that for any step size $\lambda_k \geq \lambda > 0$, there are examples such that a discrete version of Newton's method is not even locally convergent. Since we cannot always choose λ_k so that $\|p - g(p)\|$ is decreasing, we have to bound λ_k from below so the method does not get stuck away from an equilibrium. Saari shows that this may result in the method overshooting the equilibrium.

Notice that the global Newton method has a global convergence property. It uses global information, however, because it is only guaranteed to work if started on the boundary or at an equilibrium with index -1 . Otherwise, it may cycle [see Keenan (1981)]. Notice too that the global Newton method diverges from any equilibrium with $\det[I - Dg(\hat{p})] < 0$. Because the scale factor $\mu(p) < 0$ in some open neighborhood of \hat{p} , $L(p)$ is actually increasing in that neighborhood.

3. Equilibrium and optimization

The problem of computing an equilibrium of an economy can sometimes be simplified by transforming it into a problem of maximizing a concave function on a convex constraint set. Such transformations typically exploit the Pareto efficiency of the equilibrium allocation: Pareto (1909) first realized that the allocation $(\hat{x}^1, \dots, \hat{x}^m)$ associated with an equilibrium \hat{p} has the property that there is no alternative allocation $(\bar{x}^1, \dots, \bar{x}^m)$ that is superior in the sense that it is feasible, $\sum_{i=1}^m \bar{x}^i \leq \sum_{i=1}^m w^i$ and $u_i(\bar{x}^i) \geq u_i(\hat{x}^i)$, $i = 1, \dots, m$, with strict inequality for some i .

3.1. Welfare theory and existence of equilibrium

That every competitive allocation is Pareto efficient is the first theorem of welfare economics. The second welfare theorem says that for any Pareto efficient allocation $(\hat{x}^1, \dots, \hat{x}^m)$ there exists a vector of prices \hat{p} such that $(\hat{p}, \hat{x}^1, \dots, \hat{x}^m)$ is an equilibrium with transfer payments $t_i = \hat{p}'(\hat{x}^i - w^i)$. In other words, each consumer solves the problem of maximizing utility subject to the budget constraint $\hat{p}'x \leq \hat{p}'w^i + t_i$ rather than his usual problem [see Arrow (1951), Debreu (1954) and Koopmans (1957)].

For every Pareto allocation $(\hat{x}^1, \dots, \hat{x}^m)$ there exists a vector of non-negative welfare weights $(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_m)$ such that $(\hat{x}^1, \dots, \hat{x}^m)$ solves the Pareto problem

$$\max \sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i u_i(x^i) \text{ subject to}$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^m x^i \leq \sum_{i=1}^m w^i, \quad x^i \geq 0.$$

If $\alpha > 0$, then any solution to this problem is Pareto efficient. The Kuhn-Tucker theorem says that the allocation $(x^1(\alpha), \dots, x^m(\alpha))$ solves this problem if and only if there exists a non-negative vector $p(\alpha)$ such that

$$\begin{aligned} & \sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i u_i(x^i(\alpha)) + p' \sum_{i=1}^m (w^i - x^i(\alpha)) \\ & \geq \sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i u_i(x^i(\alpha)) + p(\alpha)' \sum_{i=1}^m (w^i - x^i(\alpha)) \\ & \geq \sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i u_i(x^i) + p(\alpha)' \sum_{i=1}^m (w^i - x^i) \end{aligned}$$

for all $p \geq 0$ and $(x^1, \dots, x^m) \geq 0$.

Similarly, each consumer solves his utility maximization problem in equilibrium if and only if there exists $\hat{\lambda}_i \geq 0$ such that

$$u_i(\hat{x}^i) + \lambda_i \hat{p}'(w^i - \hat{x}^i) \geq u_i(\hat{x}^i) + \hat{\lambda}_i \hat{p}'(w^i - \hat{x}^i) \geq u_i(x^i) + \hat{\lambda}_i \hat{p}'(w^i - x^i)$$

for all $\lambda_i \geq 0$ and $x^i \geq 0$. Notice that the strict monotonicity of u_i implies that $\hat{\lambda}_i > 0$, otherwise we would violate the second inequality simply by increasing x^i . Dividing the second inequality through by $\hat{\lambda}_i$ and summing over $i = 1, \dots, m$ produces

$$\sum_{i=1}^m (1/\hat{\lambda}_i) u_i(\hat{x}^i) + \hat{p}' \sum_{i=1}^m (w^i - \hat{x}^i) \geq \sum_{i=1}^m (1/\hat{\lambda}_i) u_i(x^i) + \hat{p}' \sum_{i=1}^m (w^i - x^i)$$

for all $(x^1, \dots, x^m) \geq 0$. Moreover, since $\hat{p}' \sum_{i=1}^m (w^i - \hat{x}^i) = 0$ because of strict monotonicity and $\sum_{i=1}^m (w^i - \hat{x}^i) \geq 0$ because of feasibility,

$$\sum_{i=1}^m (1/\hat{\lambda}_i) u_i(\hat{x}^i) + p' \sum_{i=1}^m (w^i - \hat{x}^i) \geq \sum_{i=1}^m (1/\hat{\lambda}_i) u_i(\hat{x}^i) + \hat{p}' \sum_{i=1}^m (w^i - \hat{x}^i)$$

for all $p \geq 0$. Consequently, every competitive equilibrium solves the above Pareto problem where $\alpha_i = 1/\hat{\lambda}_i$, $i = 1, \dots, m$ and $p(\alpha) = \hat{p}$. This can be viewed as a proof of the first welfare theorem.

Notice, too, that, if $(x^1(\alpha), \dots, x^m(\alpha))$ is a solution to the Pareto problem for arbitrary non-negative welfare weights α , it must be the case that

$$\alpha_i u_i(x^i(\alpha)) + p(\alpha)'(x^i(\alpha) - x^i(\alpha)) \geq \alpha_i u_i(x^i) + p(\alpha)'(x^i(\alpha) - x^i)$$

for all $x^i \geq 0$. Otherwise the allocation that replaces $x^i(\alpha)$ with the x^i that violates this inequality but leaves $x^j(\alpha)$, $j \neq i$, unchanged would violate the conditions required for $(x^1(\alpha), \dots, x^m(\alpha))$ to solve the Pareto problem. Since $p'(x^i(\alpha) - x^i(\alpha)) = 0$ for all p , this implies that any solution to the Pareto problem is such that, if $\alpha_i > 0$, $x^i(\alpha)$ maximizes $u_i(x)$ subject to $p(\alpha)'x \leq p(\alpha)'x^i(\alpha)$. Ignoring for a moment the possibility that $\alpha_i = 0$, some i , we can compute the transfer payments needed to decentralize the allocation

$(x^1(\alpha), \dots, x^m(\alpha))$ as an equilibrium with transfer payments $t_i(\alpha) = p(\alpha)'(x^i(\alpha) - w^i)$, $i = 1, \dots, m$.

Suppose now that $\alpha_i = 0$, some i . Then our earlier argument implies $0 \geq p(\alpha)'(x^i(\alpha) - x^i)$ for all $x^i \geq 0$. Combined with $p(\alpha) \geq 0$, this implies that $p(\alpha)'x^i(\alpha) = 0$, that consumers with zero weight in the welfare function receive nothing of value at a solution to the Pareto problem. Since the strict monotonicity of u_i implies $p(\alpha) \neq 0$ and since $w^i > 0$, we know that $t_i(\alpha) > 0$ if $\alpha_i = 0$.

Our arguments have produced the following characterization of equilibria.

Proposition 3.1. *A price-allocation pair $(\hat{p}, \hat{x}^1, \dots, \hat{x}^m)$ is an equilibrium if and only if there exists a strictly positive vector of welfare weights $(\hat{\alpha}_1, \dots, \hat{\alpha}_m)$ such that $(\hat{x}^1, \dots, \hat{x}^m)$ solves the Pareto problem with these welfare weights, that \hat{p} is the corresponding vector of Lagrange multipliers, and that $\hat{p}'(\hat{x}^i - w^i) = 0$, $i = 1, \dots, m$.*

Remark. The assumption that w^i is strictly positive serves to ensure that the consumer has strictly positive income in any equilibrium and, hence, has a strictly positive welfare weight. Weaker conditions such as McKenzie's (1959, 1961) irreducibility condition ensure the same thing. Unless there is some way to ensure that the consumer has positive income, or, with more general consumption sets, can afford a consumption bundle interior to his consumption set, we may have to settle for existence of a quasi-equilibrium rather than an equilibrium. In a quasi-equilibrium each consumer minimizes expenditure subject to a utility constraint rather than maximizing utility subject to a budget constraint.

Unless we are willing to assume that u_i , $i = 1, \dots, m$, is continuously differentiable, there may be more than one price vector $p(\alpha)$ that supports a solution to the Pareto problem because of kinks in u_i . This makes $t(\alpha)$ a point-to-set correspondence. Nevertheless, it is still easy to prove the existence of equilibrium using an approach due originally to Negishi (1960).

Proposition 3.2 [Negishi (1960)]. *There exists a strictly positive vector of utility weights $(\hat{\alpha}_1, \dots, \hat{\alpha}_m)$ such that $0 \in t(\hat{\alpha})$.*

Proof. The strict concavity of each u_i , $i = 1, \dots, m$, and continuity of $\sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i u_i(x^i)$ in α implies that $x^i : R_+^m \setminus \{0\} \rightarrow R^n$ is a continuous function. Furthermore, $p : R_+^m \setminus \{0\} \rightarrow R^n$ is a non-empty, bounded, upper-hemi-continuous, convex-valued correspondence. Consequently, the correspondence $t : R_+^m \setminus \{0\} \rightarrow R^m$ defined by the rule

$$t_i(\alpha) = p(\alpha)'(x^i(\alpha) - w^i)$$

is also non-empty, bounded, upper-hemi-continuous and convex-valued. It is homogeneous of degree one since $x^i(\alpha)$ is homogeneous of degree zero and $p(\alpha)$ is homogeneous of degree one. It also obeys the identity

$$\sum_{i=1}^m t_i(\alpha) \equiv p(\alpha)' \sum_{i=1}^m (x^i(\alpha) - w^i) \equiv 0.$$

Let $S \subset R^m$ now be the simplex of utility weights. Since S is compact, t is bounded and upper-hemi-continuous and $t_i(\alpha) < 0$ if $\alpha \in S$ with $\alpha_i = 0$, there exists $\theta > 0$ such that

$$g(\alpha) = \alpha - \theta t(\alpha)$$

defines a non-empty, upper-hemi-continuous, convex-valued correspondence $g: S \rightarrow S$. By Kakutani's fixed point theorem there exists $\hat{\alpha} \in g(\hat{\alpha})$. This implies that $0 \in t(\hat{\alpha})$.

Remark. The correspondence $f: R_+^m \setminus \{0\} \rightarrow R^m$ defined by the rule $f_i(\alpha) = -t_i(\alpha)/\alpha_i$ has all of the properties of the excess demand correspondence of an exchange economy with m goods.

3.2. Computation and multiplicity of equilibria

Negishi's approach provides an alternative system of equations $\alpha = g(\alpha)$, that can be solved to find equilibria. Mantel (1971), for example, proposes a tâtonnement procedure $\dot{\alpha} = -t(\alpha)$ for computing equilibria. Similarly, we could apply Scarf's algorithm, the global Newton method, a path following method, the non-linear Gauss-Seidel method, or Newton's method to compute the equilibrium values of α .

We have reduced the problem of computing equilibria of an economy specified in terms of preferences and endowments to yet another fixed point problem. The obvious question, in analogy to Uzawa's (1962) result, is whether any arbitrary $g: S \rightarrow S$, $S \subset R^m$ can be converted into a transfer function $t(\alpha)$. The answer is obviously yes if the only properties that t needs to satisfy are continuity, homogeneity of degree one and summation to zero. Bewley (1980), in fact, proves the analog of the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem is the case where t is twice continuously differentiable and $n \geq 2m$: for any such transfer function t there is an economy with m consumers and n goods that generates it. In closer analogy with the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem, however, it is natural to conjecture that this result holds for t continuous and $n \geq m$.

Example 3.1 (2.1 revisited). The Pareto problem for the exchange economy with two goods in Example 2.1 is

$$\begin{aligned} \max \alpha_1 \sum_{j=1}^2 a_j^1((x_j^1)^b - 1)/b + \alpha_2 \sum_{j=1}^2 a_j^2((x_j^2)^b - 1)/b \text{ subject to} \\ x_j^1 + x_j^2 \leq w_j^1 + w_j^2, \quad j = 1, 2, \\ x_j^i \geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

(It is only in the case $b_1 = b_2$ that we can obtain an analytical expression for the transfer functions.) The first-order conditions for this problem are

$$\alpha_i a_j^i (x_j^i)^{b-1} - p_j = 0, \quad i = 1, 2, \quad j = 1, 2.$$

These are, of course, the same as those of the consumers utility maximization problem when we set $\alpha_i = 1/\lambda_i$. The difference is that here the feasibility conditions are imposed as constraints, and we want to find values of α_i so that the budget constraints are satisfied. In the previous section the budget constraints were imposed as constraints, and we wanted to find values of p_j so that the feasibility constraints were satisfied.

The solution to the Pareto problem is

$$x_j^i(\alpha) = \frac{(\alpha_i a_j^i)^\eta \sum_{k=1}^2 w_j^k}{\sum_{k=1}^2 (\alpha_k a_j^k)^\eta}, \quad i = 1, 2, \quad j = 1, 2.$$

Here, once again, $\eta = 1/(1 - b)$. The associated Lagrange multipliers are

$$p_j(\alpha) = \frac{\left(\sum_{k=1}^2 (\alpha_k a_j^k)^\eta \right)^{1/\eta}}{\left(\sum_{k=1}^2 w_j^k \right)^{1/\eta}}.$$

Equilibria are now solutions to the equation

$$t_i(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) = p(\alpha)'(x^i(\alpha) - w^i) = 0, \quad i = 1, 2.$$

Since $t_1(\alpha) + t_2(\alpha) \equiv 0$, we need only consider the first equation. Since t_1 is homogeneous of degree one, we can normalize $\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 = 1$. There are three

solutions, each of which corresponds to an equilibrium of Example 2.1. They are $\alpha^1 = (0.5000, 0.50000)$, $\alpha^2 = (0.0286, 0.9714)$ and $\alpha^3 = (0.9714, 0.0286)$.

In some cases equilibria solve optimization problems that do not involve additional constraints like $t_i(\alpha) = 0$. Two notable cases are (1) where utility functions are homothetic and identical but endowments arbitrary and (2) where utility functions are homothetic but possibly different and endowment vectors are proportional. In the first case, considered by Antonelli (1886), Gorman (1953) and Nataf (1953), the equilibrium allocation $(\hat{x}^1, \dots, \hat{x}^m)$ maximizes $u(\sum_{i=1}^m x^i)$ subject to feasibility conditions; here u is the common utility function. In the second case, considered by Eisenberg (1961) and Chipman (1974), the equilibrium allocation maximizes $\sum_{i=1}^m \theta_i \log u_i(x^i)$; here u_i is the homogeneous-of-degree-one representation of the utility function and θ_i is the proportionality factor such that $w^i = \theta_i \sum_{j=1}^m w^j$.

The characterization of equilibria as solutions to optimization problems is useful to the extent to which it is easy to find the optimization problem that an equilibrium solves. The Negishi approach is useful in situations in which the number of consumers is less than the number of goods and the Pareto problem is relatively easy to solve.

It is worth noting that there is always a trivial optimization problem that an equilibrium (\hat{x}, \hat{p}) solves:

$$\min(\|x - \hat{x}\|^2 + \|p - \hat{p}\|^2).$$

The only way that we can find this problem, however, is to compute the equilibrium by some other means. Another point worth noting is that the Pareto problems that we have considered are convex problems, which have unique solutions that are easy to verify as solutions and relatively easy to compute. Any fixed point problem, and hence any equilibrium problem, can be recast as an optimization problem,

$$\min\|p - g(p)\|^2.$$

Because the objective function is not convex, however, it is relatively difficult to compute equilibria using this formulation. Nevertheless, this problem does have one aspect that makes the solution easier than that of other non-convex optimization problems: Although we may possibly get stuck at a local minimum, at least we know what the value of the objective function is at the global minimum, $\|\hat{p} - g(\hat{p})\|^2 = 0$.

A recent development that may allow efficient solution to non-convex optimization problems is the simulated annealing algorithm. This algorithm, developed by Kirkpatrick, Gelatt and Vecchi (1983), is based on the analogy

between the simulation of the annealing of solids and the solution of combinatorial optimization problems [see van Laarhoven and Aarts (1988) for a survey and references]. Although this method has been applied principally to combinatorial problems, which involve discrete variables, there have been some applications to continuous optimization problems (see, for example, Vanderbilt and Louie (1984) and Szu and Hartley (1987)]. So far, this method has not been applied to solve economic problems, however, and it remains an intriguing direction for future research.

4. Static production economies

We can add a production technology to our model in a variety of ways. Perhaps the easiest, and in many ways the most general, is to specify the production technology as a closed, convex cone $Y \subset R^n$. If $y \in Y$, then y is a feasible production plane with negative components corresponding to inputs and positive components to outputs. We assume that $-R_+^n \subset Y$, which means that any good can be freely disposed, and that $Y \cap R_+^n = \{0\}$, which means that no outputs can be produced without inputs.

The production cone specification assumes constant returns to scale. With the introduction of fixed factors, it can also account for decreasing returns. It cannot account for increasing returns, however, which are not compatible with the competitive framework that we employ here. See Chapter 36 for a survey of results for economies with increasing returns.

4.1. Existence of equilibrium

In an economy in which consumers are specified in terms of utility functions and endowment vectors, an equilibrium is now a price vector $\hat{p} \in R_+^n \setminus \{0\}$, an allocation $(\hat{x}^1, \dots, \hat{x}^m)$, where $\hat{x}^i \in R_+^n$, and a production plan $\hat{y} \in Y$ such that

- $\hat{x}^i, i = 1, \dots, m$, solves

$$\max u_i(x) \text{ subject to } \hat{p}'x \leq \hat{p}'w^i, x \geq 0,$$

- $\hat{p}'\hat{y} = 0$ and $\hat{p}'y \leq 0$ for all $y \in Y$,
- $\sum_{i=1}^m \hat{x}^i \leq \hat{y} + \sum_{i=1}^m w^i$.

The second condition is the familiar profit maximization condition for a constant-returns technology.

In an economy in which consumers are specified in terms of an aggregate excess demand function, an equilibrium is now a price vector $\hat{p} \in R_+^n \setminus \{0\}$ such that

- $\hat{p}'y \leq 0$ for all $y \in Y$,
- $f(\hat{p}) \in Y$.

Notice that Walras's law implies that $\hat{y} = f(\hat{p})$ is such that $\hat{p}'\hat{y} = 0$.

Specifying the production technology as a cone is often too abstract an approach for many applications. Alternatively, it may be specified by an $n \times k$ activity analysis matrix A , where each column of A represents a feasible production plan. [See, for example, Koopmans (1951).] In this case

$$Y = \{x \in R^n \mid x = Ay, \text{ some } y \in R_+^k\},$$

and Y is the polyhedral cone spanned by k columns of A . Another alternative is to specify production in terms of a finite number of concave, homogeneous-of-degree-one production functions $h_j : R^n \rightarrow R, j = 1, \dots, k$. In this case

$$Y = \left\{ x \in R^n \mid x = \sum_{j=1}^k z^j, h_j(z^j) \geq 0, j = 1, \dots, k \right\}.$$

For example, $h(z_1, z_2, z_3) = \eta(-z_1)^\theta(-z_2)^{1-\theta} - z_3$ is the familiar Cobb-Douglas production function. (Of course, the activity analysis specification is a special case of this one since, for example, $h(z_1, z_2, z_3) = \min[-z_1/a_{1j}, -z_2/a_{2j}] - z_3/a_{3j}$ is a concave production function.)

Another alternative is to allow decreasing returns to scale, where the production function h_j is strictly concave. In this case, the problem of maximizing $p'z$ subject to $h_j(z) \geq 0$ has a unique solution $z^j(p)$. Unless $z^j(p) = 0$ there are positive profits $\pi_j(p) = p'z^j(p)$ that must be spent. Letting $\theta_i^j \geq 0, \sum_{i=1}^m \theta_i^j = 1, j = 1, \dots, k$, be profit shares, we change the budget constraint of consumer i to $p'x \leq p'w^i + \sum_{j=1}^k \theta_i^j \pi_j(p)$. We could define the excess demand function to include production responses,

$$f(p) = \sum_{i=1}^m (x^i(p) - w^i) - \sum_{j=1}^k z^j(p).$$

Although we have to restrict ourselves to the convex set of prices for which $\pi_j(p) < \infty, j = 1, \dots, k$, this approach is frequently very convenient for computation. From a theoretical viewpoint, however, it is easier to view even this as a special case of constant returns, defining a new good, an inelastically supplied factor of production, to account for each industry's profits and endowing consumers with this factor in the proportions θ_i^j [see, for example, McKenzie (1959)].

A simple extension of our previous argument demonstrates the existence of equilibrium in a production technology and suggests algorithms for computing equilibria. Again we use homogeneity to normalize prices so that $e'p = 1$.

Consider the set

$$S_Y = \{p \in R^n \mid e'p = 1, p'y \leq 0, \text{ all } y \in Y\}.$$

S_Y is obviously closed and convex. Since $-R_+^n \subset Y$ implies that $S_Y \subset S$, it is compact. Since $Y \cap R_+^n = \{0\}$, the separating hyperplane theorem implies that there exists $\bar{p} \neq 0$ such that $\bar{p}'y \leq 0$ for all $y \in Y$. This implies that S_Y is non-empty. Now let $g : S_Y \rightarrow S_Y$ be the function that associates any point $p \in S_Y$ with the point $g(p)$ that is the closest point in S_Y to $p + f(p)$ in terms of euclidean distance. In other words, $g(p)$ solves the problem

$$\min \frac{1}{2}(g - p - f(p))'(g - p - f(p)) \text{ subject to } g \in S_Y.$$

Once again, since the objective function is strictly convex in g and continuous in p and the constraint set is convex, $g(p)$ is a continuous function. (See Figure 38.5.)

Proposition 4.1 [Eaves (1971) and Todd (1979)]. *\hat{p} is an equilibrium if and only if it is a fixed point of g , $\hat{p} = g(\hat{p})$.*

Proof. $g(p)$ solves the minimization problem that defines it if and only if

$$(g(p) - p - f(p))'g(p) \leq (g(p) - p - f(p))'q$$

for all $q \in S_Y$. If $(p + f(p)) \notin S_Y$, then this inequality says that the hyperplane




Figure 38.5

passing through g with normals $(g(p) - p - f(p))$ separates $g(p)$ from S_Y . If $(p + f(p)) \in S_Y$, then $g(p) = p + f(p)$ and the inequality is trivial.

Suppose that $\hat{p} = g(\hat{p})$. Then the above inequality becomes $q'f(\hat{p}) \leq \hat{p}'f(\hat{p}) = 0$ for all $p \in S_Y$. Since we can multiply this inequality by any positive constant without changing it, we obtain $q'f(\hat{p}) \leq 0$ for all $q \in Y^*$, where $Y^* = \{q \in R^n \mid q'y \leq 0, \text{ all } y \in Y\}$ is the dual cone of Y . This says that $f(\hat{p})$ is an element of the dual cone of Y^* , $Y^{**} = \{y \in R^n \mid y'q \leq 0, \text{ all } q \in Y^*\}$. Since Y is convex, $Y^{**} = Y$. Consequently, \hat{p} is an equilibrium.

Conversely, if \hat{p} is an equilibrium, then $q'f(\hat{p}) \leq 0$ for all $q \in S_Y$, which implies that $g(\hat{p}) = \hat{p}$.

Remark. Once again, this approach can be used to deal with demand correspondences rather than functions. Again letting D be the convex hull of the image of $p + f(p)$ for $p \in S_Y$, we define $q : D \rightarrow S_Y$ as the least-squares projection onto S_Y . As in the exchange case, the correspondence $g : D \rightarrow D$ defined by the rule $g(p) = q(p) + f(q(p))$ satisfies the conditions required by Kakutani's fixed point theorem to have a fixed point $\hat{p} \in g(\hat{p})$, and \hat{p} is a fixed point if and only if it is equilibrium.

Computing equilibria by computing fixed points of the function g is easiest when the production technology is specified by an activity analysis matrix. In that case, $g(p)$ can be calculated by solving the quadratic programming problem

$$\min \frac{1}{2}(g - p - f(p))'(g - p - f(p)) \text{ subject to}$$

$$A'g \leq 0, e'g = 1.$$

Let B be the $n \times l$ matrix of columns of A associated with strictly positive Lagrange multipliers y_j in the first-order conditions

$$g - p - f(p) + Ay + \lambda e = 0.$$

Let C be the $n \times (l + 1)$ matrix $[B \ e]$, and let e^{l+1} be the $(l + 1) \times 1$ vector with $e_{l+1}^{l+1} = 1$ and $e_j^{l+1} = 0, j \neq l + 1$. Then elementary matrix manipulation yields an explicit formula for $g(p)$:

$$g(p) = (I - C(C'C)^{-1}C')(p + f(p)) + C(C'C)^{-1}e^{l+1}.$$

Furthermore, the matrix C changes only when a Lagrange multiplier y_j that has been previously positive becomes zero or one that has been previously zero becomes positive.

Suppose that the production technology specified by k concave production

functions. Let $a_j(p)$ be the restricted profit corresponding to the production function $h_j(z)$, the value of the objective function at the solution to

$$\max p'z \text{ subject to } h_j(z) \geq 0, \|z\| = 1.$$

(For production functions with only one output i a restriction like $z^i = 1$ is more natural than $\|z\| = 1$.) If this problem has a unique solution $z^j(p)$, then $a_j(p)$ is continuously differentiable and, by Hotelling's lemma, $Da_j(p) = z^j(p)'$ [see, for example, Diewert (1982)]. In this case $g(p)$ is found by solving

$$\min \frac{1}{2}(g - p - f(p))'(g - p - f(p)) \text{ subject to}$$

$$a_j(g) \leq 0, \quad j = 1, \dots, k,$$

$$e'g = 1.$$

Because the constraints are non-linear, however, solving this problem is more difficult than it is in the activity analysis case.

4.2. The index theorem and multiplicity of equilibria

Mas-Colell (1975, 1985) and Kehoe (1980, 1983) have extended the concepts of regularity and fixed point index to production economies. They prove that regular production economies have the same desirable properties as regular exchange economies and that, in a precise sense, almost all economies are regular. Kehoe (1980) further calculates the index of a regular equilibrium of an economy with an activity analysis production technology as

$$\text{index}(\hat{p}) = \text{sgn} \left(\det \begin{bmatrix} -\bar{J} & \bar{B} \\ -\bar{B}' & 0 \end{bmatrix} \right).$$

Here \bar{B} is the $(n-1) \times l$ matrix formed by deleting the first row from the matrix of activities used at equilibrium \hat{p} . In the case of more general profit functions, let $H(\hat{p})$ be the $n \times n$ weighted sum of the Hessian matrices of profit functions used at \hat{p} , $H(\hat{p}) = \sum_{j=1}^k \hat{y}_j D^2 a_j(\hat{p})$; the weights \hat{y}_j are the appropriate activity levels. In this case, Kehoe (1983) calculates

$$\text{index}(\hat{p}) = \text{sgn} \left(\det \begin{bmatrix} -\bar{J} + \bar{H} & \bar{B} \\ -\bar{B}' & 0 \end{bmatrix} \right)$$

where \bar{H} is the $(n-1) \times (n-1)$ matrix formed by deleting the first row and column from $H(\hat{p})$.

Once again, if f satisfies the weak axiom, the set of equilibria is convex, and in the regular case there is a unique equilibrium. Unfortunately, even if f exhibits gross substitutability, the economy need not have a unique equilibrium, as the following example illustrates.

Example 4.1. Consider a static production economy with two consumers and four goods. Consumer i , $i = 1, 2$ has a utility function of the form

$$u_i(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4) = \sum_{j=1}^4 a_j^i \log x_j$$

where $a_j^i \geq 0$. Given an endowment vector $(w_1^i, w_2^i, w_3^i, w_4^i)$, consumer i maximizes this utility function subject to his budget constraint. The aggregate excess demand function is

$$f_j(p_1, p_2, p_3, p_4) = \sum_{i=1}^2 \left(\frac{a_j^i \sum_{k=1}^4 p_k w_k^i}{p_j \sum_{k=1}^4 a_k^i} \right), \quad j = 1, 2, 3, 4.$$

The consumers have the parameters given below.

a_j^i	Commodity			
	1	2	3	4
Consumer				
1	0.8	0.2	0	0
2	0.1	0.9	0	0

w_j^i	Commodity			
	1	2	3	4
Consumer				
1	0	0	10	0
2	0	0	0	20

The production technology is specified by a 4×8 activity analysis matrix

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} -1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 3 & 5 & -1 & -1 \\ 0 & -1 & 0 & 0 & -1 & -1 & 5 & 5 \\ 0 & 0 & -1 & 0 & -1 & -1 & -1 & -4 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & -1 & -1 & -4 & -3 & -1 \end{bmatrix}.$$

(The first four columns are disposal activities.)

This economy has three equilibria, which are listed below together with the welfare weights for which the corresponding Pareto problem yields the same equilibrium.

Equilibrium 1:

$$\begin{aligned} p^1 &= (0.2500, 0.2500, 0.2500, 0.2500), \\ y^1 &= (0, 0, 0, 0, 5.00000, 0, 5.0000, 0), \\ \alpha^1 &= (0.3333, 0.6667). \end{aligned}$$

Consumer	Commodity				u_i
	1	2	3	4	
1	8.000	2.000	0	0	1.8022
2	2.000	18.000	0	0	2.6706

Equilibrium 2:

$$\begin{aligned} p^2 &= (0.2500, 0.2222, 0.3611, 0.1667), \\ y^2 &= (0, 0, 0, 0, 5.1806, 0.3611, 4.4583, 0), \\ \alpha^2 &= (0.5200, 0.4800). \end{aligned}$$

Consumer	Commodity				u_i
	1	2	3	4	
1	11.555	3.250	0	0	2.1935
2	1.333	13.500	0	0	2.3719

Equilibrium 3:

$$\begin{aligned} p^3 &= (0.2500, 0.2708, 0.1667, 0.3125), \\ y^3 &= (0, 0, 0, 0, 4.3690, 0, 5.1548, 0.1190), \\ \alpha^3 &= (0.2105, 0.7895). \end{aligned}$$

Consumer	Commodity				u_i
	1	2	3	4	
1	5.333	1.231	0	0	1.3807
2	2.500	20.769	0	0	2.8217

This example has been constructed by making $p^1 = (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25)$ be an equilibrium with index $(p^1) = -1$.

$$Df(p^1) = \begin{bmatrix} -40 & 0 & 32 & 8 \\ 0 & -80 & 8 & 72 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\text{index}(p^1) = \text{sgn} \left(\det \begin{bmatrix} 80 & -8 & 72 & -1 & 5 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & -1 & -1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & -1 & -3 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ -5 & 0 & 3 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \right)$$

$$\text{index}(p^1) = \text{sgn}(-416) = -1.$$

That this example has multiple equilibria means that gross substitutability does not imply the weak axiom. Kehoe and Mas-Colell (1984) prove that gross substitutability does indeed imply the weak axiom if $n \leq 3$, so at least four goods are needed for this example. Kehoe (1985b) presents an example with multiple equilibria in which the f exhibits strong gross substitutability, $\partial f_i / \partial p_j > 0$. The simple form of a Jacobian matrix in this example, which satisfies gross substitutability but implies a violation of the weak axiom is due to Mas-Colell (1986) [see also Hildenbrand (1989) and Kehoe (1986)].

Unfortunately, as Herbert Scarf has demonstrated to the author, the weak axiom is the weakest condition on f that guarantees that a production economy has a unique equilibrium. Suppose that there are two distinct price vectors p and q such that $p'f(q) \leq 0$ and $q'f(p) \leq 0$. Let

$$Y = \{x \in R^n \mid x \leq f(p)y_1 + f(q)y_2, y_j \geq 0\}.$$

Then both p and q are equilibria of (f, Y) . Aggregation conditions like those of Antonelli–Gorman–Nataf and Eisenberg–Chipman guarantee that f satisfies the strong axiom of revealed preference, a much stronger condition than the weak axiom. To make further progress on developing economically meaningful conditions that guarantee uniqueness of equilibrium, we need to develop economically meaningful conditions that imply that the weak axiom holds in the aggregate. A step in this direction has been taken by Hildenbrand (1983), who places restrictions on income distribution in an economy with a continuum of agents that imply the weak axiom. See Jerison (1984) for more results in this same direction.

4.3. A tâtonnement method

The function g whose fixed points are equilibria suggests a tâtonnement process for computing equilibria in production economies. Let $\tilde{B}(p)$ be the $n \times \tilde{l}$ matrix whose columns are those vectors $Da_j(p)$ such that $a_j(p) = 0$. Let \hat{p} be the vector q that solves

$$\min \frac{1}{2}(q - f(p))'(q - f(p)) \text{ subject to } \tilde{B}'(p)q \leq 0.$$

Suppose that we start this process at $p(0) \in R^n$ such that $a_j(p(0)) \leq 0, j = 1, \dots, k$. Unfortunately, \hat{p} is discontinuous when $p(t)$ runs into a new constraint $a_j(p(t)) = 0$. This is the same problem as that in the exchange case where some coordinate of $p_i(t)$ becomes zero, however, and it can be argued that $p(t)$ is continuous in spite of it. Notice that, since $d/dt(a_j(p)) = Da_j(p)\dot{p}$ and $Da_j(p)\dot{p} \leq 0$ whenever $a_j(p(t)) = 0, p(t)$ stays in $Y^* = \{p \in R^n \mid a_j(p) \leq 0, j = 1, \dots, k\}$. Notice too that, if $\hat{p} = 0$ at \hat{p} , then \hat{p} is an equilibrium: q solves the above problem if and only if there exists a non-negative $\tilde{l} \times 1$ vector of

Lagrange multipliers y such that

$$q - f(p) + \tilde{B}(p)y = 0, \quad y' \tilde{B}'(p)q = 0.$$

At $q = 0$ this becomes $f(\hat{p}) = \tilde{B}(\hat{p})y$.

Let $B(p)$ be the $n \times l$ submatrix of \tilde{B} whose columns are associated with strictly positive Lagrange multipliers. Then we can solve explicitly for q to obtain

$$\hat{p} = (I - B(p)(B'(p)B(p))^{-1}B'(p))f(p).$$

Like the tâtonnement process for exchange economies, this process leaves $\|p\|$ constant. Also like the tâtonnement process for exchange economies, this process is globally asymptotically stable if the weak axiom of revealed preference holds in comparisons between arbitrary price vectors p and the equilibrium price vector \hat{p} . Suppose that $p \in Y^*$. Then $f(\hat{p}) \in Y$ implies $p'f(\hat{p}) \leq 0$. The weak axiom then implies $\hat{p}'f(p) > 0$. The Liapunov function is again $L(p) = \frac{1}{2}(p - \hat{p})'(p - \hat{p})$.

$$\dot{L}(p) = (p - \hat{p})' \dot{p} = \hat{p}'f(p) + \hat{p}'B(p)(B'(p)B(p))^{-1}B'(p)f(p).$$

Notice that $y = (B'(p)B(p))^{-1}B'(p)f(p) > 0$ and $\hat{p}'B(p) \leq 0$ since $\hat{p} \in Y^*$. Consequently, $\dot{L}(p) < 0$ unless $p = \hat{p}$.

Van den Elzen, van der Laan and Talman (1989) have generalized the path following method of van der Laan and Talman (1987) for computing equilibria of exchange economies to compute equilibria of economies with activity analysis production technologies. Their method, like the method for exchange economies, is similar to tâtonnement, and, like the above method, always stays in the set of prices where $p'A \leq 0$.

4.4. Computation in the space of factor prices

The dimension of the space in which we must search for an equilibrium is usually the critical determinant of how difficult it is to find one. In production economies with a generalized input-output structure, where goods can be partitioned into produced goods and factors of production, we can reduce the dimension of the space to the number of factors. This reduction has often been used by applied general equilibrium modelers to improve computational efficiency [see, for example, Helpman (1976)]. It has also been used by international trade theorists in their discussions of factor-price equalization [see, for example, McKenzie (1955)]. Kehoe and Whalley (1985) exploit a

reduction in dimension of this sort to carry out exhaustive searches to verify that two large-scale applied general equilibrium models have unique equilibria.

We begin with the activity analysis case. A production economy (f, A) has a generalized input–output structure if it satisfies the following conditions:

- There are $h < n$ factors of production: $a_{ij} \leq 0$ for $i = 1, \dots, n$ and $j = 1, \dots, k$.
 - There is no joint production: for every $j = 1, \dots, k$, $a_{ij} > 0$ for at most one i .
 - Production of all produced goods is possible: there exists $y \geq 0$ such that $\sum_{j=1}^m a_{ij}y_j > 0$, $i = 1, \dots, n - h$.
 - Every good that can be produced is actually produced at every equilibrium.
- To ensure that this final condition holds, we could require that $f_i(p) \geq 0$, $i = 1, \dots, n - h$, for all p or, what is almost the same thing, that consumers have no endowments of produced goods. In the case where $h = 1$ these conditions are those of the non-substitution theorem [see Samuelson (1951)].

Let $p \in R^{n-h}$ now be the vector of prices of produced goods and $q \in R^h$ be the vector of factor prices. Partition A into

$$\begin{bmatrix} A_1 \\ A_2 \end{bmatrix}$$

where A_1 is $(n - h) \times k$ and A_2 is $h \times k$. Similarly, partition $f(p, q)$ into $(f^1(p, q), f^2(p, q))$.

In the case where A consists of $2n - h$ activities, n disposal activities and an $n \times (n - h)$ matrix B with one activity to produce each of the produced goods, the reduction of the search to the space of factor prices is easy. Our assumptions imply that the $(n - h) \times (n - h)$ matrix B_1 is a productive Leontief matrix. Under a mild indecomposability assumption, B_1^{-1} is strictly positive. The equilibrium condition $B_1 \hat{y} = f^1(\hat{p}, \hat{q})$ implies that $\hat{y} = B_1^{-1} f^1(\hat{p}, \hat{q})$, and the zero profit condition $\hat{p}' B_1 + \hat{q}' B_2 = 0$ implies that $\hat{p} = -(B_2 B_1^{-1})' \hat{q}$. We are left with the equilibrium condition $B_2 \hat{y} = f^2(\hat{p}, \hat{q})$. We define the function $\psi : R_+^h \setminus \{0\} \rightarrow R^h$ by the rule

$$\psi(q) = f^2(-(B_2 B_1^{-1})' q, q) - B_2 B_1^{-1} f^1(-(B_2 B_1^{-1})' q, q).$$

It is easy to verify the ψ is continuous, is homogeneous of degree zero and obeys Walras's law because f satisfies these properties. Notice that $\psi(\hat{q}) = 0$ is equivalent to

$$f^2(\hat{p}, \hat{q}) = B_2 B_1^{-1} f^1(\hat{p}, \hat{q}) = B_2 \hat{y}.$$

Consequently, \hat{q} is an equilibrium of the h -good exchange economy ψ is and only if (\hat{p}, \hat{q}) is an equilibrium of the n -good production economy (f, A) .

When there is more than one possible activity for producing each good the situation is slightly more complicated. To calculate $\psi(q)$ we start by solving the linear programming problem

$$\min -q'A_2y \text{ subject to } A_1y = e, y \geq 0.$$

Our assumptions imply that this problem is feasible and has a finite maximum. The non-substitution theorem says that the solution is associated with a feasible basis,

$$\begin{bmatrix} -q'B_2 \\ B_1 \end{bmatrix},$$

that is, a matrix of $n - h$ columns associated with positive activity levels y_j that does not vary as the right-hand side varies, although the activity levels themselves do. Furthermore, there is a vector of prices p such that $p'B_1 + q'B_2 = 0$ and $p'A_1 + q'A_2 \leq 0$ [see Gale (1960, pp. 301–306)]. When the basis is uniquely defined, we can proceed as above.

There may, however, be more than one feasible basis possible in the solution. Although the linear programming problem may be degenerate, the economy itself need not be. Such is the case in Example 4.1, where the economy has this generalized input–output structure with $n = 4$ and $h = 2$. At two of its three equilibria, this example has $3 > 2 = n - h$ activities in use. When there is more than one feasible basis possible, the demand for factors becomes a convex-valued, upper-hemi-continuous correspondence; $0 \in \psi(\hat{q})$ is then the equilibrium condition [see Kehoe (1984) for details].

With more general production technologies, the situation is similar to the activity analysis case with many activities. For any vector of factor prices q we find the cost minimizing production plan for producing an arbitrary vector, say e , of produced goods. This plan is associated with a vector of prices $p(q)$, which can be plugged into the demand function f^1 to find the production plan that satisfies the feasibility condition in the produced goods markets. This production plan induces a demand for factors of production. We systematically vary q to make the excess demand for factors equal zero.

The transformation of an economy with production into an exchange economy in factors is also useful for developing conditions sufficient for uniqueness of equilibrium. If ψ satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference or gross substitutability, for example, then there is a unique equilibrium. Mas-Colell (1989) uses this approach to show that an economy with a generalized input–output structure in which all utility functions and production functions are Cobb–Douglas has a unique equilibrium because ψ then exhibits gross substitutability. (He also reports that similar results have been obtained

by Michael Jerison.) Mas-Colell (1989) further generalizes this to the assumption that utility and production functions are super-Cobb–Douglas in that they locally exhibit as much substitutability as a Cobb–Douglas function. The precise condition on $u : R_+^n \rightarrow R$, for example, is that for every $x \in R_+^n$ there exists a Cobb–Douglas function $u_x : R_+^n \rightarrow R$ and a neighborhood U_x of x such that $u_x(x) = u(x)$ and $u_x(z) \leq u_x(x)$ for all $z \in U_x$. For generalized input–output economies where $n - h = h = 2$ and all utility and production functions are CES, John (1989) has developed necessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium.

5. Economies with a finite number of infinitely lived consumers

We now consider economies in which goods are indexed by date and, possibly, state of nature. We assume that both time and uncertainty are discrete. If there are a finite number of time periods and a finite number of states of nature, then there is a finite number of goods, and this type of economy fits into the previous framework. Here, and in the next section, we consider economies with an infinite number of goods. Mas-Colell and Zame (1991) study questions related to existence of equilibrium in this type of economy in detail in Chapter 34; here we focus on questions related to computation and multiplicity.

5.1. Deterministic exchange economies

We begin by analysing a deterministic stationary exchange economy with m consumers and n goods in each period. Each consumer is specified by a utility function of the form $\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma_i^{t-1} u_i(x_t)$ and a vector of endowments that is the same in every period. Here $1 > \gamma_i > 0$ is a discount factor. We assume that $u_i : R_+^n \rightarrow R$ is strictly concave and monotonically increasing and that w^i is strictly positive.

Let $p_t = (p_{1t}, \dots, p_{nt})$ be the vector of prices in period t . An equilibrium of this economy is a price sequence $\hat{p}_1, \hat{p}_2, \dots$, where $\hat{p}_t \in R_+^n \setminus \{0\}$, and an allocation $(\hat{x}^1, \dots, \hat{x}^m)$, $\hat{x}_1^i, \hat{x}_2^i, \dots$, where $\hat{x}_t^i \in R_+^n$,

- $\hat{x}_1^i, \hat{x}_2^i, \dots$, solves

$$\max \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma_i^{t-1} u_i(x_t) \text{ subject to}$$

$$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \hat{p}'_t x_t \leq \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \hat{p}'_t w^i, x_t \geq 0,$$

- $\sum_{t=1}^m \hat{x}_t^i \leq \sum_{t=1}^m w^i, t = 1, 2, \dots$

Using the Negishi (1960) approach, we characterize equilibria as solutions to social planning problems. This approach has been applied to dynamic economies by Bewley (1982) and Yano (1984).

Consider the Pareto problem

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma_i^{t-1} u_i(x_t^i) \text{ subject to} \\ & \sum_{i=1}^m x_t^i \leq \sum_{i=1}^m w^i, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, \\ & x_t^i \geq 0, \end{aligned}$$

for a vector α of strictly positive welfare weights. Using the same reasoning as before, we can argue that, if $\alpha_i = 1/\hat{\lambda}_i$ where $\hat{\lambda}_i$ is the equilibrium value of the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint of consumer i , then the competitive allocation $(\hat{x}^1, \dots, \hat{x}^m)$ solves this problem where $p_t(\alpha) = \hat{p}_t$ is the vector of Lagrange multipliers for the feasibility constraint in period t . Consequently, the first welfare theorem holds for this economy.

The crucial step in the reasoning is taking the necessary and sufficient condition for the solution to the consumer's maximization problem,

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma_i^{t-1} u_i(\hat{x}_t^i) + \lambda_i \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \hat{p}'_t (w^i - \hat{x}_t^i) & \geq \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma_i^{t-1} u_i(\hat{x}_t^i) + \hat{\lambda}_i \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \hat{p}'_t (w^i - \hat{x}_t^i) \\ & \geq \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma_i^{t-1} u_i(x_t^i) + \hat{\lambda}_i \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \hat{p}'_t (w^i - x_t^i) \end{aligned}$$

for all $\lambda_i \geq 0$ and $x_t^i \geq 0$, dividing through by $\hat{\lambda}_i > 0$, and summing over consumers to produce

$$\begin{aligned} & \sum_{i=1}^m (1/\hat{\lambda}_i) \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma_i^{t-1} u_i(\hat{x}_t^i) + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \hat{p}'_t \sum_{i=1}^m (w^i - \hat{x}_t^i) \\ & \geq \sum_{i=1}^m (1/\hat{\lambda}_i) \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma_i^{t-1} u_i(x_t^i) + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \hat{p}'_t \sum_{i=1}^m (w^i - x_t^i) \end{aligned}$$

for all $x_t^i \geq 0$. Since $\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \hat{p}'_t w^i$ must be finite for the consumer's utility maximization problem to have a solution, $\sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \hat{p}'_t w^i$ must also be finite.

The second welfare theorem holds for this economy as well. The transfer payments needed to decentralize a solution to the Pareto problem $(x^1(\alpha), \dots, x^m(\alpha))$ as an equilibrium with transfer payments are

$$t_i(\alpha) = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} p_t(\alpha)' (x_t^i(\alpha) - w^i), \quad i = 1, \dots, m.$$

Once again we can argue that t is a convex-valued, bounded, upper-hemi-continuous correspondence. Consequently, Proposition 3.2 applies and there exists a vector of welfare weights $\hat{\alpha}$ such that $(p(\hat{\alpha}), (x^1(\hat{\alpha}), \dots, x^m(\hat{\alpha})))$ is an equilibrium $0 \in t(\hat{\alpha})$.

It is possible to extend our analysis to the more general stationary preferences described by Koopmans, Diamond and Williamson (1964). This extension is most easily done using the dynamic programming framework described in the next section.

Example 5.1. Consider a simple economy with one good in each period and two consumers. Suppose that $u_1(x_t) = u_2(x_t) = \log x_t$ and that $w^1 = w^2 = 1$. The only difference between the two consumers is that $\gamma_1 < \gamma_2$. A solution to the utility maximization is characterized by the conditions

$$\gamma_i^{t-1}/x_t^i = \lambda_t p_t, \quad \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} p_t x_t^i = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} p_t.$$

An equilibrium satisfies these conditions and the condition that demand equals supply:

$$c_t^1 + c_t^2 = 2, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots$$

The Pareto problem is

$$\max \alpha_1 \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma_1^{t-1} \log x_t^1 + \alpha_2 \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma_2^{t-1} \log x_t^2 \quad \text{subject to}$$

$$x_t^1 + x_t^2 = 2, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots$$

A solution to this problem is characterized by the conditions

$$\alpha_i \gamma_i^{t-1} / x_t^i = p_t, \quad i = 1, 2,$$

and the feasibility conditions. These equations can easily be solved to yield

$$x_t^i = \frac{2\alpha_i \gamma_i^{t-1}}{\alpha_1 \gamma_1^{t-1} + \alpha_2 \gamma_2^{t-1}}, \quad i = 1, 2,$$

$$p_t = \frac{1}{2}(\alpha_1 \gamma_1^{t-1} + \alpha_2 \gamma_2^{t-1}).$$

The transfer payments needed to implement as a competitive equilibrium the allocation associated with the weights α_1 and α_2 are, therefore,

$$t_1(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} p_t(x_t^1 - 1) = \frac{\alpha_1}{1 - \gamma_1} - \frac{\alpha_2}{1 - \gamma_2},$$

$$t_2(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} p_t(x_t^2 - 1) = \frac{\alpha_2}{1 - \gamma_2} - \frac{\alpha_1}{1 - \gamma_1}.$$

Notice that these functions are continuously differentiable, are homogeneous of degree one and sum to zero. The unique equilibrium is found by setting these transfer payments equal to zero. It is $(\hat{\alpha}_1, \hat{\alpha}_2) = ((1 - \gamma_1)/(2 - \gamma_1 - \gamma_2), (1 - \gamma_2)/(2 - \gamma_1 - \gamma_2))$.

5.2. Dynamic production economies and dynamic programming

It is possible to analyse economies with production and durable goods in much the same way as we have just done with exchange economies. Frequently, however, it is convenient, both for computing equilibria and for studying their properties, to recast the problem of determining an equilibrium of a dynamic economy with production as a dynamic programming problem.

Consider an economy with m infinitely lived consumers and n_c perishable consumption goods. Each consumer has a utility function $\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma^{t-1} u_i(x_t)$. Here u_i is strictly concave and monotonically increasing and γ is a discount factor common to all consumers; we later discuss heterogeneous discount factors. The endowment of these goods held by consumer i in each period is $w^i \in R_+^{n_c}$; it may include different types of labor. In addition, there are n_k capital goods, reproducible factors of production. The endowment of these goods held by consumer i in the first period is $k_1^i \in R_+^{n_k}$.

There are many ways to specify the production technology. One of the easiest is to define an aggregate production function $h : R_+^{n_k} \times R_+^{n_k} \times R^{n_c} \rightarrow R$ that is continuous, concave, homogeneous of degree one, increasing in the first vector of arguments, and decreasing in the second and third. A feasible production-consumption plan in period t is then a triple that satisfies

$$h\left(k_t, k_{t+1}, \sum_{i=1}^m (x_t^i - w^i)\right) \geq 0.$$

Here k_t is the input of capital goods, k_{t+1} is the output of capital goods that can be used in the next period and $\sum_{i=1}^m (x_t^i - w^i)$ is the net output of consumption goods. To keep the equilibrium path of capital stocks bounded, we assume that there exists a vector $k^{\max} \in R_+^{n_k}$ such that if $\|k_t\| \geq \|k^{\max}\|$ and $\|k_{t+1}\| \geq \|k_t\|$, where $k_t, k_{t+1} \in R_+^{n_k}$, then $h(k_t, k_{t+1}, z) < 0$ for all $z \geq -\sum_{i=1}^m w^i$; in other words, it is not feasible to sustain a path of capital stocks with $\|k_t\| \geq \|k^{\max}\|$.

A simple example of such a function h is

$$h(k_t, k_{t+1}, z_{1t}, z_{2t}) = \eta k_t^\theta (-z_{1t})^{1-\theta} + (1 - \delta)k_t - k_{t+1} - z_{2t}.$$

Here there is a single capital good, k_t , and two consumption goods, leisure, z_{1t} , and consumption z_{2t} . The feasibility constraint says that consumption and investment net of depreciation must be less than the output of a Cobb–Douglas production function.

An equilibrium of this economy is a sequence of prices for the consumption goods $\hat{p}_1, \hat{p}_2, \dots$, where $\hat{p}_t \in R_+^n \setminus \{0\}$; a price $\hat{r} \in R_+^k$ for the initial capital stock; an allocation, $\hat{x}_1^i, \hat{x}_2^i, \dots$, where $\hat{x}_t^i \in R_+^n$, for each consumer i ; a sequence of net outputs of consumption goods $\hat{z}_1, \hat{z}_2, \dots$, where $\hat{z}_t \in R^{n_c}$; and a sequence of capital goods $\hat{k}_1, \hat{k}_2, \dots$, where $\hat{k}_t \in R_+^k$ such that

- $\hat{x}_1^i, \hat{x}_2^i, \dots$ solves

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma^{t-1} u_i(x_t) \text{ subject to} \\ & \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \hat{p}_t' x_t \leq \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \hat{p}_t' w^i + \hat{r}' k_1^i, \quad x_t \geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

- $\hat{z}_1, \hat{z}_2, \dots$, and $\hat{k}_1, \hat{k}_2, \dots$ solve

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \hat{p}_t z_t - \hat{r} k_1 \text{ subject to} \\ & h(k_t, k_{t+1}, z_t) \geq 0, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, \\ & k_t \geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

- $\sum_{i=1}^m \hat{x}_t^i = \hat{z}_t + \sum_{i=1}^m w^i, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots$
- $\sum_{i=1}^m k_1^i = \hat{k}_1.$

Again, an equilibrium is Pareto efficient and solves a Pareto problem of the form

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma^{t-1} u_i(x_t^i) \text{ subject to} \\ & h\left(k_t, k_{t+1}, \sum_{i=1}^m (x_t^i - w^i)\right) \geq 0, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, \\ & k_1 = \sum_{i=1}^m k_1^i, \\ & x_t^i, k_t \geq 0, \end{aligned}$$

for an appropriate vector α of strictly positive welfare weights.

In principle, we have all that we need to characterize equilibria of this economy: using the Lagrange multipliers π_t for this problem and the derivatives of h , or subgradients if h is not continuously differentiable, we can calculate

$$p_t(\alpha) = -\pi_t(\alpha) D_3 h\left(k_t(\alpha), k_{t+1}(\alpha), \sum_{i=1}^m (x_t^i(\alpha) - w^i)\right)', \quad t = 1, 2, \dots,$$

$$r(\alpha) = \pi_1(\alpha) D_1 h\left(\sum_{i=1}^m k_1^i, k_2(\alpha), \sum_{i=1}^m (x_1^i(\alpha) - w^i)\right)',$$

$$t_i(\alpha) = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} p_t(\alpha)' (x_t^i(\alpha) - w^i) - r(\alpha)' k_1^i, \quad i = 1, \dots, m.$$

Once again, equilibria are solutions to the equation $t(\alpha) = 0$.

We can greatly simplify the characterization of solutions to the Pareto problem, and computation of equilibria, however, using the theory of dynamic programming [see Bellman (1957) and Blackwell (1965); Harris (1987), Sargent (1987) and Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989) provide useful summaries and economic applications]. Given an aggregate endowment of capital in the first period $k_1 \in R_+^{n_k}$, an aggregate endowment of consumption goods in each period $w \in R_+^{n_c}$ and welfare weights $\alpha \in R_+^m \setminus \{0\}$, we define the value function $V(k_1, w, \alpha)$ as

$$\max \sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma^{t-1} u_i(x_t^i) \quad \text{subject to}$$

$$h\left(k_t, k_{t+1}, \sum_{i=1}^m x_t^i - w\right) \geq 0, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots,$$

$$x_t^i, k_t \geq 0.$$

It is easy to show that V is continuous, concave in k_1 and w and convex in α . If it is continuously differentiable, the envelope theorem allows us to $D_1 V(k_1, w, \alpha)$ as a price vector of capital, r' , and $D_2 V(k_1, w, \alpha)$ as a price vector for the present value of the endowment of consumption goods, $\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} p_t'$. If V is not continuously differentiable, we can work with subgradients. [Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) provide general conditions that ensure the V is continuously differentiable.] The value of the total endowment of consumer i is

$$D_1 V\left(\sum_{j=1}^m k_1^j, \sum_{j=1}^m w^j, \alpha\right) k_1^i + D_2 V\left(\sum_{j=1}^m k_1^j, \sum_{j=1}^m w^j, \alpha\right) w^i.$$

To calculate the transfer functions $t_i(\alpha)$, we need to calculate the value of expenditures. To do this in terms of the value function, we introduce m consumer specific goods and define $U_i : R_+^{n_c} \times R_+^m \rightarrow R$ as $U_i(x, y) = y_i u_i(x/y_i)$. Notice that U_i is homogeneous of degree one and that $U_i(x, e) = u_i(x)$ where $e = (1, \dots, 1)$. We endow consumer i with the entire aggregate endowment of one unit of y_i . We now define $V(k_1, w, y, \alpha)$ as the maximum of weighted sum of the augmented utility functions subject to the feasibility constraints. If x_t^i is the optimal consumption of consumer i in period t , its value is

$$\gamma^{t-1} \alpha_i D u_i(x_t^i) x_t^i = \gamma^{t-1} \alpha_i D_i U_i(x_t^i, e) x_t^i.$$

Since U_i is homogeneous of degree one, we know that

$$D_1 U_i(x_t^i, e) x_t^i = U_i(x_t^i, e) - D_2 U_i(x_t^i, e) e.$$

Using the envelope theorem, we can show that

$$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma^{t-1} \alpha_i U_i(x_t^i, e) = \alpha_i \frac{\partial V}{\partial \alpha_i} \left(\sum_{i=1}^m k_1^i, \sum_{i=1}^m w^i, e, \alpha \right)$$

and that

$$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma^{t-1} \alpha_i D_2 U_i(x_t^i, e) e = \frac{\partial V}{\partial y_i} \left(\sum_{i=1}^m k_1^i, \sum_{i=1}^m w^i, e, \alpha \right).$$

Consequently, the value of the expenditures of consumer i is

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma^{t-1} \alpha_i D_1 U_i(x_t^i, e) x_t^i &= \alpha_i \frac{\partial V}{\partial \alpha_i} \left(\sum_{i=1}^m k_1^i, \sum_{i=1}^m w^i, e, \alpha \right) \\ &\quad - \frac{\partial V}{\partial y_i} \left(\sum_{i=1}^m k_1^i, \sum_{i=1}^m w^i, e, \alpha \right). \end{aligned}$$

We can now define the transfer function $t : R_+^m \setminus \{0\} \rightarrow R^m$ as

$$\begin{aligned} t_i(\alpha) &= \alpha_i \frac{\partial V}{\partial \alpha_i} \left(\sum_{j=1}^m k_1^j, \sum_{j=1}^m w^j, e, \alpha \right) - \frac{\partial V}{\partial y_i} \left(\sum_{j=1}^m k_1^j, \sum_{j=1}^m w^j, e, \alpha \right) \\ &\quad - D_1 V \left(\sum_{j=1}^m k_1^j, \sum_{j=1}^m w^j, e, \alpha \right) k_1^i - D_2 V \left(\sum_{j=1}^m k_1^j, \sum_{j=1}^m w^j, e, \alpha \right) w^i. \end{aligned}$$

If V is continuously differentiable, t is a continuous function. If V is not continuously differentiable, t is a non-empty, upper-hemi-continuous, convex-

valued correspondence. Once again, t is homogeneous of degree one and satisfies the identity

$$\sum_{i=1}^m t_i(\alpha) \equiv 0.$$

See Kehoe, Levine and Romer (1989b, 1990) for details. Furthermore, if $\alpha \in R_+^m \setminus \{0\}$ and $\alpha_i = 0$, then $t_i(\alpha) < 0$. The same argument as in the proof of Proposition 3.2 now implies the existence of equilibrium.

Using dynamic programming theory, we can investigate the properties of V and, therefore, of t . We define the return function $v(k_t, k_{t+1}, w, y, \alpha)$ as

$$\begin{aligned} \max \sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i U_i(x^i, y) \text{ subject to} \\ h\left(k_t, k_{t+1}, \sum_{i=1}^m x^i - w\right) \geq 0, x^i \geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

If $h(k_t, k_{t+1}, -w) < 0$, we let $v(k_t, k_{t+1}, w, y, \alpha) = -\infty$. The function v is upper-semi-continuous on the extended real line $R \cup \{-\infty\}$ [see Kehoe, Levine and Romer (1989b, 1990)]. The value function V can be found by choosing k_2, k_3, \dots to solve

$$\max \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma^{t-1} v(k_t, k_{t+1}, w, y, \alpha) \text{ subject to } k_t \geq 0.$$

The direct approach to this problem focuses on the first order conditions, often referred to as Euler equations,

$$\gamma D_1 v(k_t, k_{t+1}, w, y, \alpha) + D_2 v(k_{t-1}, k_t, w, y, \alpha) = 0.$$

This is a system of n_k second-order difference equations in the state variables k_t . There are, however, only n_k initial conditions, the fixed values of k_1 . For some choices of k_2 the corresponding path k_1, k_2, k_3, \dots eventually leads to negative capital stocks and the system breaks down. For others, we need additional boundary conditions to single out the unique path that is optimal. These are given by the transversality conditions

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \gamma^{t-1} D_1 v(k_t, k_{t+1}) k_t = 0.$$

Showing that the transversality conditions together with the Euler equations are sufficient for optimality is relatively easy [see, for example, Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989, pp. 97–99)]. Under additional assumptions they can also

be shown to be necessary [see Peleg and Ryder (1972), Weitzman (1973) and Ekeland and Scheinkman (1986)].

An alternative approach to finding the value function involves solving the functional equation

$$V(k_t, w, y, \alpha) = \max[v(k_t, k_{t+1}, w, y, \alpha) + \gamma V(k_{t+1}, w, y, \alpha)]$$

subject to $k_{t+1} \geq 0$

for the function V . The vector $k_{t+1} = g(k_t, w, y, \alpha)$ that solves this problem is referred to as the policy function. Calculating optimal paths is much easier using the policy function than it is using the Euler equations: we simply run the n_k first-order difference equations

$$k_{t+1} = g\left(k_t, \sum_{i=1}^m w^i, e, \alpha\right)$$

forward from k_1 without worrying about the transversality conditions. The difficulty is in finding the policy function g . Keep in mind that, using either the Euler equation approach or this second, the dynamic programming approach, we must somehow calculate the equilibrium values of α .

Example 5.2. Consider an economy with two consumption goods, leisure and consumption, and one capital good. There is a representative consumer with utility

$$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma^{t-1} u(l_t, c_t) = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma^{t-1} \log c_t.$$

(This function does not actually satisfy our assumptions because u is not strictly concave in l_t and it is not continuous at $c_t = 0$; this is not essential, however.) The endowment is $(w, 0)$ of labor and consumption every period and k_1 of capital in the first period. The production function is

$$h(k_t, k_{t+1}, z_{1t}, z_{2t}) = \eta k_t^\theta (-z_{1t})^{1-\theta} - k_{t+1} - z_{2t}.$$

The return function is

$$v(k_t, k_{t+1}, w, y, \alpha) = \alpha y \log(\eta k_t^\theta w^{1-\theta} - k_{t+1}) - \alpha y \log y.$$

This return function is special in that we can analytically solve for the value function $V(k_t, w, y, \alpha)$. This example is a member of a class of examples first studied by Radner (1966). Notice that we do not allow the per period

endowment of consumption to vary from zero; if we do, we cannot solve for the value function analytically. The value function has the form $a_1 + a_2 \log k_t$. Using the functional relation

$$a_1 + a_2 \log k_t = \max[\alpha y \log(\eta k_t^\theta w^{1-\theta} - k_{t+1}) - \alpha y \log y \\ + \gamma(a_1 + a_2 \log k_{t+1})]$$

subject to $k_{t+1} \geq 0$,

we first solve for k_{t+1} , then substitute in the results and solve for a_1 and a_2 . We obtain

$$V(k_t, w, y, \alpha) = \frac{\alpha y}{1-\gamma} \left[\log \eta(1-\gamma\theta) + \frac{\gamma\theta}{1-\gamma\theta} \log \gamma\eta\theta - \log y \right. \\ \left. + \frac{1-\theta}{1-\gamma\theta} \log w + \frac{\theta-\gamma\theta}{1-\gamma\theta} \log k_t \right].$$

The policy function is

$$g(k_t, w, y, \alpha) = \gamma\theta\eta w^{1-\theta} k_t^\theta.$$

Notice that, for any initial value k_1 , the sequence k_1, k_2, \dots converges to the steady state $\bar{k} = (\gamma\theta\eta)^{1/(1-\theta)} w$. To see this, consider

$$\log k_{t+1} = \log \gamma\theta\eta w^{1-\theta} + \theta \log k_t.$$

Since $0 < \theta < 1$, $\log k_t$ converges to $(\log \gamma\theta\eta w^{1-\theta}) / (1-\theta)$.

The Euler equation is

$$\frac{\gamma\theta\eta w^{1-\theta} k_t^{\theta-1}}{\eta w^{1-\theta} k_t^\theta - k_{t+1}} - \frac{1}{\eta w^{1-\theta} k_{t-1}^\theta - k_t} = 0, \quad t = 2, 3, \dots$$

We know the initial value k_1 , but we need a value for k_2 to get started. If we use any value other than $k_2 = \gamma\theta\eta w^{1-\theta} k_1^\theta$, however, we eventually have a negative capital stock, at which point the different equation breaks down, or we violate the transversality condition. (To see this rewrite the Euler equation as a first-order linear difference equation in $K_t = k_{t+1} k_t^{-\theta}$.)

Since this example has a representative consumer, the transfer function is identically equal to zero. Although the transfer function itself is not particularly interesting, we can use the value function $V(k_t, w, y, \alpha)$ to find the equilibrium value of the endowment

$$r = D_1 V(k_1, w, 1, 1) = \frac{\theta}{(1 - \gamma\theta)k_1}$$

$$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} p_{1t} = D_2 V(k_1, w, 1, 1) = \frac{1 - \theta}{(1 - \gamma)(1 - \gamma\theta)w}.$$

Consequently,

$$rk_1 + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} p_{1t}w = \frac{1}{1 - \gamma}$$

is both the value of the endowment and the value of expenditures.

Remark. This example is a special case of the model developed by Brock and Mirman (1972). Long and Plosser (1983) work out a multisector version of a model with the same functional forms that permit an analytical solution.

Many extensions of this sort of analysis are possible. One is to economies with more general preferences of the sort described by Koopmans, Diamond and Williamson (1964). Letting $c = (c_t, c_{t+1}, \dots)$, these preferences satisfy the functional relation

$$U(c) = W(c_t, U(c_{t+1}))$$

for an aggregator function $W : R_+^n \times R \rightarrow R$ that satisfies certain properties [see, for example, Lucas and Stokey (1984), Dana and Le Van (1987) and Streufert (1990)].

Another possible extension is to retain additively separable utility functions but allow heterogeneous discount factors. One approach is to allow the return function $v(k_t, k_{t+1}, w, y, \alpha, t)$ to vary over time as the solution to maximizing $\sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i (\beta_i / \beta_1)^t U_i(x^i, y)$ subject to feasibility constraints; here β_1 is the largest discount factor [see Coles (1985)].

Yet another extension is to allow k_t and x_t to grow without bound. This is particularly useful in growth models of the sort considered by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). For an example that fits clearly into the competitive framework used here, see Jones and Manuelli (1990). In this sort of model care must be taken to ensure that x_t cannot grow so fast that the present value of utility can become infinitely large.

5.3. Stochastic economies

The analysis of the previous section can be easily modified to include random events. To do so, we follow the approach of Arrow (1953) and Debreu (1959)

in indexing goods by both date and state of nature. Suppose that in period t one of a finite number of events $\eta_t = 1, \dots, l$ can occur. A state is a history of events $s_t = (\eta_1, \dots, \eta_t)$, a node on the event tree. The event η_t can effect preferences, endowments or technology. Since the set of date-state pairs is countable, the analysis of Section 5.1 can be applied to prove the existence of equilibrium. We can again reduce the problem of computing an equilibrium to finding a set of welfare weights for which the corresponding Pareto efficient allocation can be decentralized as a transfer equilibrium with all transfers equal to zero.

Suppose that the probability of event i is $\pi_i > 0$ where $\sum_{j=1}^l \pi_j = 1$. The induced probability distribution even states is given by $\pi(s_t) = \pi_{\eta_1} \cdots \pi_{\eta_t}$. Let S be the set of all possible states; let $t(s)$ be the date in which s occurs, that is, the length of the history s ; let s_{-1} be the history of length $t(s) - 1$ that coincides with s ; and let $\eta_s = \eta_{t(s)}$, that is, the last event in the history s . Assuming that consumers maximize expected utility, we can write the Pareto problem as

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i \sum_{s \in S} \gamma^{t(s)-1} \pi(s) u_i(x^i(s), \eta_s) \text{ subject to} \\ & h\left(k(s_{-1}), k(s), \sum_{i=1}^m (x^i(s) - w^i(\eta_s)), \eta_s\right) \geq 0, \quad s \in S, \\ & k_1 \leq \sum_{i=1}^m k_1^i, \\ & x^i(s), k(s) \geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

Here k_1 is the amount of capital before the event in the first period occurs. As before, we define the return function $v(k_t, k_{t+1}, \eta_t, w, y, \alpha)$ as

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i U_i(x^i, y, \eta_t) \text{ subject to} \\ & h\left(k_t, k_{t+1}, \sum_{i=1}^m x^i - w(\eta_t), \eta_t\right) \geq 0, \quad x^i \geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

(Notice that now w is a vector of dimension $n_c \times l$.) The value function $V(k_1, \eta_1, w, y, \alpha)$ can be found by choosing $k(s), s \in S$, to solve

$$\max_{s \in S} \gamma^{t(s)-1} \pi(s) v(k(s_{-1}), k(s), \eta_s, w, y, \alpha) \text{ subject to } k(s) \geq 0.$$

Once again we can characterize solutions to the Pareto problem using either the Euler equations

$$D_2 v(k_{t-1}, k_t, \eta_{t-1}, w, y, \alpha) + \gamma \sum_{\eta=1}^I \pi_\eta D_1 v(k_t, k_{t+1}, \eta, w, y, \alpha) = 0$$

and an expected value version of the transversality condition or using the functional equation

$$V(k_t, \eta_t, w, y, \alpha) = \max \left[v(k_t, k_{t+1}, \eta_t, w, y, \alpha) + \gamma \sum_{\eta=1}^I \pi_\eta V(k_{t+1}, \eta, w, y, \alpha) \right]$$

subject to $k_{t+1} \geq 0$.

This approach can be generalized to allow events to be elements of a continuum. In this case $x^i(s)$ and $k(s)$ are functions and we can rewrite both Euler equations and the dynamic programming functional equation using integrals. We can further generalize the probability distribution to be a Markov process [see Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989) for details].

Example 5.3 (5.2 revisited). Consider an economy identical to that in Example 5.2 except that

$$h(k_t, k_{t+1}, z_{1t}, z_{2t}, \eta_t) = \eta_t k_t^\theta (-z_{1t})^{1-\theta} - k_{t+1} - z_{2t}$$

where $\eta_t = \eta_1$ with probability π_1 and $\eta_t = \eta_2$ with probability π_2 . The return function is

$$v(k_t, k_{t+1}, \eta_t, w, y, \alpha) = \alpha y \log(\eta_t k_t^\theta w^{1-\theta} - k_{t+1}) - \alpha y \log y;$$

the Euler equation is

$$-\frac{1}{\eta_{t-1} k_{t-1}^\theta w^{1-\theta} - k_t} + \gamma \left[\frac{\pi_1 \eta_1^\theta k_t^{\theta-1} w^{1-\theta}}{\eta_1 k_t^\theta w^{1-\theta} - k_{t+1}} + \frac{\pi_2 \eta_2^\theta k_t^{\theta-1} w^{1-\theta}}{\eta_2 k_t^\theta w^{1-\theta} - k_{t+1}} \right] = 0;$$

the value function is

$$V(k_t, \eta_t, w, y, \alpha) = \frac{\alpha y}{1-\gamma} \left[\log(1-\gamma\theta) + \frac{\gamma\theta}{1-\gamma\theta} \log \gamma\theta + \frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma\theta} (\pi_1 \log \eta_1 + \pi_2 \log \eta_2) + \frac{1-\gamma}{1-\gamma\theta} \log \eta_t - \log y + \frac{1-\theta}{1-\gamma\theta} \log w + \frac{\theta-\gamma\theta}{1-\gamma\theta} \log k_t \right];$$

and the policy function is

$$g(k_t, \eta_t, w, y, \alpha) = \gamma \theta \eta_t w^{1-\theta} k_t^\theta.$$

In the case where η_t is a continuous random variable, for example, when $\log \eta_t$ is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ^2 , the Euler equation and the value function are easily modified and the policy function remains the same. (This latter feature does not hold in general, however.)

Once again our analysis can be extended in many directions. For an example of a stochastic equilibrium with recursive preferences that are not additively separable, see Epstein and Zin (1989).

5.4. Differentiability and regularity

The analysis of the previous two sections allows us to easily extend the regularity analysis for static exchange economies to dynamic production economies. In economies where the value function $V(k_1, w, y, \alpha)$ is continuously twice differentiable (C^2), the transfer function t is continuously differentiable (C^1). In this case the analysis is very similar to that of static exchange economies: An equilibrium is a vector of welfare weights $\hat{\alpha}$ for which $t(\hat{\alpha}) = 0$, a system of m equations in m unknowns. Since t is homogeneous of degree one, we can eliminate one unknown with a normalization. Since $\sum_{i=1}^m t_i(\alpha) \equiv 0$, we can eliminate one equation. A regular economy is one for which the Jacobian matrix of the transfer function $Dt(\hat{\alpha})$ with the first row and column deleted, an $(m-1) \times (m-1)$ matrix, is non-singular at every equilibrium. As with static exchange economy, a regular dynamic economy with production has a finite number of equilibria that vary continuously with the parameters of the economy. Kehoe, Levine and Romer (1990) have extended Debreu's (1970) analysis to show that almost all economies with C^2 value functions are regular.

The problem has been to develop conditions that ensure that the value function is C^2 . As we have mentioned, Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) have shown that V is C^1 under fairly general conditions on u_i and h . Araujo and Scheinkman (1977) show that under suitable conditions on u_i and h that a C^2 value function follows from a global turnpike property. In other words, if all socially optimal paths converge to a unique steady state (which may depend on the welfare weights α), then V is C^2 and equilibria are generically determinate. Recently, Santos (1989a, b) has shown that V is C^2 under far more general conditions. The most restrictive of these conditions serves only to ensure that k_t remain uniformly separated from the boundary of R_+^k . [Montrucchio (1987), Boldrin and Montrucchio (1988) and Araujo (1989) present

earlier partial results.] A different approach to proving that value functions are C^2 in stochastic economies has been pursued by Blume, Easley and O'Hara (1982).

5.5. Computational methods

The case of computing equilibria depends on how easy it is to solve dynamic programming problems. In this section we discuss two popular procedures, value function iteration and linear-quadratic approximation. These and a variety of other methods, together with applications to an example similar to Example 5.3, are discussed in a collection of papers edited by Taylor and Uhlig (1990).

Consider a dynamic programming problem expressed in terms of the functional equation

$$V(k_t, b) = \max[v(k_t, k_{t+1}, b) + \gamma V(k_{t+1}, b)] \text{ subject to } k_{t+1} \geq 0.$$

Here b is a vector of parameters that includes the variables (w, y, α) discussed previously. The standard approach to proving the existence of a solution V to this functional equation relies on the contraction mapping theorem.

Contraction Mapping Theorem. *Let S be a complete metric space with metric $d : S \rightarrow R_+$. Suppose that $T : S \rightarrow S$ is a contraction with modulus β ; that is, suppose that, for some $0 < \beta < 1$, $d(Tx, Ty) \leq \beta d(x, y)$ for all $x, y \in S$. Then there is a unique fixed point of T in S , $\hat{x} = T\hat{x}$.*

The proof of this theorem suggests an algorithm for computing a fixed point: Start with $x^0 \in S$ and let $x^{n+1} = Tx^n$. Since

$$d(x^{n+1}, x^{n+2}) = d(Tx^n, Tx^{n+1}) \leq \beta d(x^n, x^{n+1}),$$

the sequence x^0, x^1, \dots is a Cauchy sequence and, since S is complete, converges to a limit $\hat{x} \in S$ that satisfies $d(\hat{x}, T\hat{x}) = 0$, or $\hat{x} = T\hat{x}$. To see that this fixed point is unique, suppose to the contrary, that there exists another fixed point $\bar{x} = T\bar{x}$. Then

$$d(T\hat{x}, T\bar{x}) = d(\hat{x}, \bar{x}) > \beta d(\hat{x}, \bar{x}),$$

which contradicts T being a contraction [see, for example, Luenberger (1969, Chap. 2) or Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989, Chap. 3) for details].

To apply this theorem to our dynamic programming problem, we need to

give the space of functions $V(\cdot, b)$ a topological structure. Let S be the set of continuous bounded functions that map $R_+^{n_k}$ into R with

$$d(V^1, V^2) = \sup_k |V^1(k, b) - V^2(k, b)|.$$

S is a complete metric space. There is a technical problem in that the return function v , and therefore the value function V , may not be bounded. We can get around this problem either by bounding v in a way that does not affect solutions or by using special properties of the mapping T [see, for example, Bertsekas (1976, Chap. 6) or Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989, Chap. 4)]. In either case, the generalization is straightforward but technically tedious, and we shall ignore it.

Proposition 5.1 [Blackwell (1965)]. *There exists a unique $V \in S$ that satisfies the functional equation of the dynamic programming problem.*

Proof. Consider the mapping $T : S \rightarrow S$ defined by

$$(TV)(k_t, b) = \max[v(k_t, k_{t+1}, b) + \gamma V(k_{t+1}, b)] \text{ subject to } k_{t+1} \geq 0.$$

If v and V are bounded and continuous, then so is TV . It therefore suffices to demonstrate that T is a contraction:

$$\begin{aligned} d(TV^1, TV^2) &= \sup_{k_t, k_{t+1}} |\max[v(k_t, k_{t+1}, b) + \gamma V^1(k_{t+1}, b)] \\ &\quad - \max[v(k_t, k_{t+1}, b) + \gamma V^2(k_{t+1}, b)]| \\ &\leq \sup_{k_{t+1}} |\gamma V^1(k_{t+1}, b) - \gamma V^2(k_{t+1}, b)|. \end{aligned}$$

This last expression is just $\gamma d(V^1, V^2)$, which means that T is a contraction with modulus γ .

Remark. It is easy to prove that V satisfies such properties as being monotonically increasing and concave in k_t . Using the properties of v , we can argue that, if V is monotonically increasing and concave, then so is TV ; that is, T maps the subset of S whose elements are monotonically increasing and concave into itself. Since this set is itself a complete metric space, the fixed point $\hat{V} = T\hat{V}$ lies in it.

To implement this approach on the computer, we need to discretize the space of capital stocks. In particular, let $K = \{k_1, k_2, \dots, k, l\}$, $k_j \in R_+^{n_k}$, be a

finite, but large, set of capital stocks. The method of successive approximation treats V as an l dimensional vector [see Bertsekas (1976, Chap. 5)]. Starting with a simple guess for V^0 , for example, $V^0(k_j, b) = 0$, $j = 1, \dots, l$, we compute $V^{n+1}(k_j, b)$ by solving

$$\max v(k_j, k, b) + \gamma V^n(k, b) \text{ subject to } k \in K.$$

The same argument as the proof of Proposition 5.1 establishes that this procedure is a contraction mapping. Furthermore, if the grid K is fine enough, then its fixed point is a good approximation to the true value function V . Variants on this method do not restrict k to the finite set K in the above maximization but interpolate or use polynomial approximations [see, for example, Tauchen (1990)].

Unfortunately, although the method of successive approximation is guaranteed to converge, convergence can be very slow. An algorithm that greatly speeds convergence involves applying Newton's method to the equation

$$V = T(V)$$

where we think of T as a mapping R^l into R^l . This method is known as the policy iteration algorithm. [See Bertsekas (1976, Chap. 6); Rust (1987) and Christiano (1990) discuss variations and present economic applications.] The updating rule is

$$V^{n+1} = V^n - [I - DT(V^n)]^{-1}[V^n - T(V^n)].$$

Although the $l \times l$ matrix $[I - DT(V^n)]$ is very large if the grid K is very fine, it typically contains a large number of zeros.

To apply these sorts of methods to stochastic problems, we must discretize the distribution of events η if it is not already discrete. In the case of the method of successive approximation, for example, we compute $V^{n+1}(k_i, \eta_j, b)$ by solving

$$\max v(k_i, k, \eta_j, b) + \gamma \sum_{\eta} \pi(\eta) V^n(k, \eta, b)$$

where k is restricted to the grid K and η ranges over the discrete distribution of η in the summation.

Example 5.4 (5.2 revisited). Consider the functional equation

$$V(k_t, b) = \max[\log(bk_t^\theta - k_{t+1}) + \gamma V(k_{t+1}, b)] \text{ subject to } k_{t+1} \geq 0.$$

Because of the special form of this problem we can solve for $V(k_t, b)$ analytically using the method of successive approximation. Let $V^0(k_t, b) = 0$ for all k_t, b . Maximizing $\log(bk_t^\theta - k_{t+1})$ with respect to k_{t+1} , we obtain the policy function

$$g^1(k_t, b) = 0$$

and the value function

$$V^1(k_t, b) = \log b + \theta \log k_t.$$

Now maximizing $[\log(bk_t^\theta - k_{t+1}) + \gamma V^1(k_{t+1}, b)]$ with respect to k_{t+1} , we obtain the policy function

$$g^2(k_t, b) = \left(\frac{\gamma\theta b}{1 + \gamma\theta} \right) k_t^\theta$$

and the value function

$$V^2(k_t, b) = \log \frac{b}{1 + \gamma\theta} + \gamma \log b + \gamma\theta \log \frac{\gamma\theta b}{1 + \gamma\theta} + \theta(1 + \gamma\theta) \log k_t.$$

In general, at iteration n we obtain the policy function

$$g^n(k_t, b) = \left[\frac{1 - (\gamma\theta)^{n-1}}{1 - (\gamma\theta)^n} \right] \gamma\theta b k_t^\theta$$

and the value function

$$\begin{aligned} V^n(k_t, b) &= \sum_{i=1}^n \gamma^{i-1} \log \left[\frac{b(1 - \gamma\theta)}{1 - (\gamma\theta)^{n-i+1}} \right] \\ &\quad + \gamma\theta \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \gamma^{i-1} \left[\frac{1 - (\gamma\theta)^{n-i}}{1 - \gamma\theta} \right] \log \left[\frac{\gamma\theta b(1 - (\gamma\theta)^{n-i})}{1 - (\gamma\theta)^{n-i+1}} \right] \\ &\quad + \theta \left[\frac{1 - (\gamma\theta)^n}{1 - \gamma\theta} \right] \log k_t. \end{aligned}$$

In the limit these converge to

$$\begin{aligned} g(k_t, b) &= \gamma\theta b k_t^\theta, \\ V(k_t, b) &= \frac{1}{1 - \gamma} \left[\log b(1 - \gamma\theta) + \frac{\gamma\theta}{1 - \gamma\theta} \log \gamma\theta b \right] + \frac{\theta}{1 - \gamma\theta} \log k_t. \end{aligned}$$

Writing

$$g^n(k_t, b) = a_0^n k_t^\theta,$$

$$V^n(k_t, b) = a_1^n + a_2^n \log k_t,$$

we compute successive approximations for the problem with $\gamma = 0.95$, $\theta = 0.3$ and $b = 2$.

n	a_0^n	a_1^n	a_2^n
1	0	0.693147	0.3
2	0.443580	0.869208	0.3855
5	0.567306	1.150158	0.418791
10	0.569995	1.719038	0.419579
∞	0.57	2.672261	0.419580

Remark. Notice that the successive approximations for V converge monotonically. It is a general property of this algorithm that, if $V^1(k, b) > V^0(k, b)$ for all k , then $V^{n+1}(k, b) > V^n(k, b)$ for all k . This property, which is the result of $v(k_t, k_{t+1}, b)$ increasing in k_t , is frequently useful for proving convergence when v is unbounded and for developing more efficient algorithms [see, for example, Bertsekas (1976, Chap. 6)].

Value function iteration methods can be very costly in terms of computer time when the number of state variables, n_k , is more than two or three or if there is uncertainty. Another solution method that is popular in applications is to solve the linear-quadratic approximation to the original problem (see, for example, Bertsekas (1976, Chap. 4), Kydland and Prescott (1980, 1982) and Sargent (1987)]. The idea is to approximate the return function $v(k_t, k_{t+1}, b)$ by a quadratic function or, equivalently, to linearize the Euler equations. The approximate model can then be solved exactly.

We start by computing a steady state, a capital stock $\bar{k} \in R_+^{n_k}$ that satisfies the Euler equation

$$D_2 v(\bar{k}, \bar{k}, b) + \gamma D_1 v(\bar{k}, \bar{k}, b) = 0.$$

The problem of computing a steady state can be easily formulated as a fixed point problem. Let $S = \{k \in R_+^{n_k} \mid \|k\| \leq \|k^{\max}\|\}$ and let $\kappa(k)$ be the vector $\kappa \in R^{n_k}$ that solves

$$\max v(k, \kappa, b) + \gamma v(\kappa, k, b) \text{ subject to } \|\kappa\| \leq \|k^{\max}\|, \kappa \geq 0.$$

Notice that $\kappa(k)$ is continuous and maps S into S and that S is non-empty, compact and convex. Consequently, κ has a fixed point $\bar{k} = \kappa(\bar{k})$ that can be computed using the methods of Section 2. Unfortunately, although the dynamic programming problem itself always has a unique solution because of the concavity of v , there may be multiple steady states [see Burmeister (1980, Chap. 4) for a discussion].

We approximate $v(k_t, k_{t+1}, b)$ by the second-order Taylor series

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{v}(x_t, x_{t+1}) = & v + D_1 v x_t + D_2 v x_{t+1} \\ & + \frac{1}{2} (x'_t D_{11} v x_t + x'_{t+1} D_{22} v x_{t+1} + x'_t D_{12} v x_{t+1} + x'_{t+1} D_{21} v x_t). \end{aligned}$$

Here, for example, $D_1 v$ is the $1 \times n_k$ gradient vector of v with respect to its first vector of arguments evaluated at (\bar{k}, \bar{k}, b) and $D_{11} v$ is the $n_k \times n_k$ matrix of second derivatives, also $x_t = k_t - \bar{k}$. There are two approaches to solving the dynamic programming problem with v replaced by its quadratic approximation \tilde{v} . The first is like the method in Example 5.2: we guess the functional form of $\tilde{v}(x_t)$, in this case a quadratic,

$$\tilde{V}(x_t) = a_1 + a'_2 x_t + \frac{1}{2} x'_t A_3 x_t$$

where a_1 is 1×1 , a_2 is $n_k \times 1$ and A_3 is $n_k \times n_k$, and then solve for a_1 , a_2 and A_3 . The second method is to directly attack the linear Euler equations

$$D_{21} v x_{t-1} + (\gamma D_{11} v + D_{22} v) x_t + \gamma D_{12} v x_{t+1} = 0.$$

If we follow the first method, we solve

$$\max \tilde{v}(x_t, x_{t+1}) + \gamma (a_1 + a'_2 x_t + \frac{1}{2} x'_t A_3 x_t)$$

to find

$$x_{t+1} = -(D_{22} v + \gamma A_3)^{-1} (D_{21} v x_t + \gamma a_2 + D_2 v').$$

Since we know that $x_t = 0$ implies $x_{t+1} = 0$ because \bar{k} is a steady state, we can easily solve

$$a_2 = -\gamma^{-1} D_2 v' = D_1 v',$$

$$a_1 = v / (1 - \gamma).$$

Plugging $x_{t+1} = -(D_{22} v + \gamma A_3)^{-1} D_{21} v x_t$ into the functional equation that defines \tilde{V} , we obtain the matrix equation

$$A_3 = D_{11}v - D_{12}v(D_{22}v + \gamma A_3)^{-1}D_{21}v ,$$

often called the Riccati equation. One approach to solving this is to guess A_3^0 and iterate

$$A_3^n = D_{11}v - D_{12}v(D_{22}v + \gamma A_3^{n-1})^{-1}D_{21}v .$$

Bertsekas (1976, Chap. 3) presents conditions under which this algorithm converges.

Alternatively, we could turn the linear Euler equations into the system of $2n_k$ first order difference equations

$$\begin{bmatrix} x_t \\ x_{t+1} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & I \\ -\gamma^{-1}D_{12}vD_{21}v & -D_{12}v^{-1}(D_{11}v + \gamma^{-1}D_{22}v) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x_{t-1} \\ x_t \end{bmatrix} .$$

Denote the $2n_k \times 2n_k$ on the right side of the equation as G . As long as the eigenvalues of G are distinct, we can write $G = X\Lambda X^{-1}$, where Λ is the $2n_k \times 2n_k$ diagonal matrix of eigenvalues of G and X is the $2n_k \times 2n_k$ matrix whose columns are the associated eigenvectors. The theory for systems with repeated eigenvalues is similar but more tedious; we ignore this possibility, however, because it is easy to show that having distinct eigenvalues holds for almost all v [see, for example, Hirsch and Smale (1974, Chap. 7)]. Writing

$$\begin{bmatrix} x_t \\ x_{t+1} \end{bmatrix} = G^{t-1} \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{bmatrix} = X\Lambda^{t-1}X^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{bmatrix} ,$$

we see that x_t converges to zero if and only if the $2n_k \times 1$ vector

$$c = X^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{bmatrix}$$

has non-zero elements only where the corresponding eigenvalues λ_i has modulus less than one. This means that the vector (x_1, x_2) must lie in the subspace of R^{2n_k} , called the stable subspace of G , spanned by the (possibly) complex eigenvectors of G associated with eigenvalues less than one in modulus.

An easy way to see this is to rewrite the above relationship as

$$\begin{bmatrix} x_t \\ x_{t+1} \end{bmatrix} = \sum_{i=1}^{2n_k} c_i \lambda_i^{t-1} \begin{bmatrix} z_i \\ \lambda_i z_i \end{bmatrix}$$

where $(z_i, \lambda_i z_i) \in C^{2n}$ is the eigenvector associated with λ_i and also write

$$\begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{bmatrix} = \sum_{i=1}^{2n_k} c_i \begin{bmatrix} z_i \\ \lambda_i z_i \end{bmatrix} .$$

For x_t to converge to zero, the vector c must be such that (x_1, x_2) is a linear combination of eigenvectors associated with stable eigenvalues. If x_t converges to zero, then $k_t = x_t + \bar{k}$ satisfies the transversality conditions

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \gamma^{t-1} D_1 v(\bar{k}, \bar{k}, b) k_t = 0.$$

A case of particular interest is when exactly half, n_k , of the eigenvalues of G are stable and the other half are unstable. This case is often called saddlepoint splitting of the eigenvalues. If this condition holds, we can uniquely solve

$$x_1 = \sum_{i=1}^{2n_k} c_i z_i$$

for the n_k constants c_i associated with the stable eigenvectors and use the result to uniquely determine x_2 . There would be a continuum of solutions if there were more than n_k stable eigenvalues. If, however, there were fewer than n_k stable eigenvalues, then there would be, in general, no solution at all that converges to the steady state.

Since v and its quadratic approximation \tilde{v} are concave, we would not expect there to be multiple solutions to the dynamic programming problem. (Remember, however, that there may be multiple equilibria corresponding to different welfare weights α .) To see that there cannot be more than n_k stable eigenvalues of G , we can write the characteristic equation as

$$\det[D_{21}v + \lambda(\gamma D_{11}v + D_{22}v) + \lambda^2 \gamma D_{12}v] = 0.$$

Suppose that there is a vector $x \in R^{n_k}$ such that

$$[D_{21}v + \lambda(\gamma D_{11}v + D_{22}v) + \lambda^2 \gamma D_{12}v]x = 0.$$

Then, since $D_{11}v$ and $D_{22}v$ are symmetric and $D_{21}v = D_{12}v'$,

$$x'[D_{21}v + \mu(\gamma D_{11}v + D_{22}v) + \mu \gamma D_{12}v] = 0$$

where $\mu = (\gamma \lambda)^{-1}$. Consequently, if λ is an eigenvalue of G , so is $(\gamma \lambda)^{-1}$. This implies that n_k eigenvalues are smaller than $\gamma^{-1/2} > 1$ in modulus and n_k eigenvalues are larger.

If γ is close to one, then we would expect the eigenvalues of G to exhibit saddlepoint splitting. Indeed, there are turnpike theorems that guarantee convergence to a steady state in this case [see McKenzie (1987) for a survey of such results]. If γ is not close to one, there may be less than n_k stable eigenvalues, and the solution may converge to a cycle or even exhibit chaotic dynamics [see, for example, Ryder and Heal (1973), Benhabib and Nishimura

(1979) and Boldrin and Montrucchio (1986)]. Indeed, Boldrin and Montrucchio (1986) prove that, if K is a compact subset of R^{n_k} and $g : K \rightarrow K$ is twice continuously differentiable, then there exists a return function v and a discount factor γ such that g is the optimal policy function. Since the dynamics of the solution path are governed solely by the policy function, this says that equilibrium dynamics are arbitrary. The construction used in the proof of this theorem, not surprisingly, relies on small discount factors.

Example 5.5 (5.2 revisited). The return function $v(k_t, k_{t+1}, b) = \log(bk_t^\theta - k_{t+1})$ can be linearized around the steady state $\bar{k} = (\gamma\theta b)^{1/(1-\theta)}$ as

$$\log \bar{c} + (\gamma\bar{c})^{-1}x_t - \bar{c}^{-1}x_{t+1} - \frac{1}{2}[(1-\theta)(\gamma\bar{c}\bar{k})^{-1} + (\gamma\bar{c})^{-2}]x_t^2 + \bar{c}^{-2}x_{t+1}^2 - 2\gamma^{-1}\bar{c}^{-2}x_t x_{t+1}].$$

Here $\bar{c} = b\bar{k}^\theta - \bar{k}$. The value function $\tilde{V}(k_t) = a_1 + a_2x_t + \frac{1}{2}a_3x_t^2$ is such that $a_1 = (\log c)/(1-\theta)$, $a_2 = (\gamma\bar{c})^{-1}$ and a_3 can be solved for using the Riccati equation

$$a_3 = -((1-\theta)(\gamma\bar{c}\bar{k})^{-1} + (\gamma\bar{c})^{-2}) - \gamma^{-2}\bar{c}^{-4}(\gamma a_3 - \bar{c}^{-2})^{-1}.$$

There are two solutions to this equation, $a_3 = -(1-\gamma\theta)\gamma^{-2}\theta^{-1}\bar{c}^{-2}$ and $a_3 = (1-\theta)\gamma^{-1}\bar{c}^{-2}$, the first of which is the non-positive number (in general, negative semi-definite matrix) that we need for \tilde{V} to be concave. The policy function is $\tilde{g}(x_t) = \theta x_t$.

An alternative for finding this policy function is to analyse the Euler equation

$$\bar{c}^{-2}x_{t+1} - ((1-\theta)(\bar{c}\bar{k})^{-1} + \gamma^{-1}\bar{c}^{-2} + \bar{c}^{-2})x_t + \gamma^{-1}\bar{c}^{-2}x_{t-1} = 0.$$

The corresponding characteristic equation has two roots, $\lambda = \theta$ and $\lambda = (\lambda\theta)^{-1}$, only the first of which satisfies $|\lambda| < 1$.

To see the relative accuracy of the linear-quadratic approximation, we again consider the model where $\gamma = 0.95$, $\theta = 0.3$ and $b = 2$ and solve for the equilibrium path for k_t starting at $k_1 = 0.1$ using both the linear-quadratic policy function, $\bar{k} + \theta(k_t - \bar{k})$, and the true policy function, $\gamma\theta b k_t^\theta$.

	Exact	Linear-Quadratic
1	0.1	0.1
2	0.285677	0.343580
3	0.391415	0.416654
4	0.430196	0.438576
5	0.442563	0.445152
10	0.447958	0.447964
∞	0.447971	0.447971

Remark. This example has the property that the \tilde{V} is the second-order Taylor series approximation to V and \tilde{g} is the first-order approximation to g ; this is not a general feature of this method. An alternative approach is to use the linear-quadratic approximation where $x_t = (\log k_t - \log \bar{k})$. For our specific example, such an approximation is exact as can be easily verified.

Another promising approach to approximating solutions to dynamic programming problems relies on restricting the policy functions that solve the Euler equations to a finite dimensional function space. The linear-quadratic approximation restricts the policy function to being linear. Other possibilities include polynomials of a fixed finite order or various finite sequences of polynomial and trigonometric functions. For an exposition and economic applications of these methods, known as minimum weighted residual methods, see Judd (1989). A closely related method, which parameterizes the expectations of next period's value function, rather than the policy function, using a finite dimensional approximation to the function space, has been proposed by den Haan and Marcet (1990).

6. Overlapping generations economies

Even though they have an infinite number of goods, the economies in the previous section are relatively easy to study because the two welfare theorems allow us to characterize their equilibria as solutions to welfare maximization problems. Many dynamic economies have equilibria that do not solve such maximization problems. An important example is the overlapping generations model originally studied by Samuelson (1958). Frequently, to approximate equilibria of such an economy on the computer, we must truncate it so that it has a finite number of goods. Studying the properties of economies with infinite numbers of goods, however, provides insights into the properties of those with large, but finite, numbers of goods.

6.1. Existence of equilibrium

To keep the discussion simple we focus on exchange economies. Overlapping generations economies with production can be analysed using a similar approach [see, for example, Burke (1986) and Muller and Woodford (1988)]. Consider a stationary economy with n goods in each period and in consumers who live for two periods in the generation born in period t , $t = 1, 2, \dots$. In addition there are m_0 consumers, generation 0, who live only in the first period. Balasko, Cass and Shell (1980) present a simple procedure for convert-

ing a model in which consumers live for k periods into one in which they live for two: Redefine generations $-k+2, -k+1, \dots, 0$ to be generation 0, generations $1, 2, \dots, k-1$ to be generation 1, and so on. Similarly, redefine periods. Notice that the number of goods in each period and the number of consumers in each generation increase by a factor of $k-1$. The important feature of the procedure is that each redefined generation lives for two redefined periods.

Each consumer in generation t has a utility function $u_i: R_+^{2n} \rightarrow R$ that is strictly concave and monotonically increasing and an endowment $(w_1^i, w_2^i) \in R_{++}^{2n}$. Faced with prices p_t, p_{t+1} , the consumer solves

$$\begin{aligned} & \max u_i(x_t, x_{t+1}) \text{ subject to} \\ & p_t'x_t + p_{t+1}'x_{t+1} \leq p_t'w_1^i + p_{t+1}'w_2^i, \\ & x_t, x_{t+1} \geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

Each consumer in generation 0 solves the problem

$$\begin{aligned} & \max u_{i0}(x_1) \text{ subject to} \\ & p_1'x_1 \leq p_1'w_2^{i0} + M_i, x_1 \geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

Here M_i is the consumer's endowment of fiat money, which can be positive, negative or zero.

We define the aggregate excess demand functions

$$\begin{aligned} z_0(p_1) &= \sum_{i=1}^{m_0} [x_1^{i0}(p_1) - w_2^{i0}], \\ y(p_t, p_{t+1}) &= \sum_{i=1}^m [x_t^{it}(p_t, p_{t+1}) - w_1^i], \\ z(p_t, p_{t+1}) &= \sum_{i=1}^m [x_{t+1}^{it}(p_t, p_{t+1}) - w_2^i]. \end{aligned}$$

These functions are continuous at least for strictly positive prices; they are bounded below by $-\sum_{i=1}^{m_0} w_2^{i0}$, $-\sum_{i=1}^m w_1^i$ and $-\sum_{i=1}^m w_2^i$, respectively; y and z are homogeneous of degree zero while z_0 is homogeneous of degree zero if and only if $M_i = 0$, $i = 1, \dots, m_0$; and z_0 , y and z obey the following versions of Walras's law:

$$p'_1 z_0(p_1) \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{m_0} M_i,$$

$$p'_t y(p_t, p_{t+1}) + p'_{t+1} x(p_t, p_{t+1}) \equiv 0.$$

An equilibrium of this economy is a price sequence $\hat{p}_1, \hat{p}_2, \dots$ such that

$$z_0(\hat{p}_1) + y(\hat{p}_1, \hat{p}_2) \leq 0,$$

$$z(\hat{p}_{t-1}, \hat{p}_t) + y(\hat{p}_t, \hat{p}_{t-1}) \leq 0, \quad t = 2, 3, \dots$$

where there is equality whenever the price \hat{p}_{it} is strictly positive.

Consider a truncated version of this economy, an economy that ends in period T . There is a terminal young generation with excess demand function $y_T(p_T)$ that satisfies

$$p'_T y_T(p_T) = - \sum_{i=1}^{m_0} M_i.$$

There are many ways of constructing such a function. One is to set

$$y_T(p_T) = - \left(\sum_{i=1}^{m_0} \frac{M_i}{e' p_T} \right) e.$$

This is now a finite economy with transfer payments.

To prove the existence of equilibria we consider a sequence of truncated economies where the truncation date T tends to infinity. To keep our discussion simple we focus on economies without fiat money. In the simple economy that we study here, this is often the only case in which we can prove existence [see, for example, Balasko, Cass and Shell (1980)]. There are, however, modified versions of this economy in which the only equilibria that exist involve non-zero quantities of fiat money [see Wilson (1981) and Burke (1988)].

In a truncated economy without fiat money existence of equilibrium follows directly from the arguments in Section 2.1. To ensure that the equilibrium does not involve prices being all equal to zero in any period, we employ two additional assumptions: first, there exists $\underline{\alpha} > 0$ and $B > \max[\sum_{i=1}^{m_0} w_0^i + \sum_{i=1}^m w_1^i, \sum_{i=1}^m (w_1^i + w_2^i)]$ such that $e' p_{t+1} / e' p_t < \underline{\alpha}$ implies $\|z(p_t, p_{t+1})\| > B$; second, there exists $\bar{\alpha} > \underline{\alpha}$ such that $e' p_{t+1} / e' p_t > \bar{\alpha}$ implies $\|y(p_t, p_{t+1})\| > B$. See Balasko, Cass and Shell (1980) for conditions on preferences and endowments that imply these conditions.

Proposition 6.1 [Balasko, Cass and Shell (1980) and Wilson (1981)]. *There exists an equilibrium $\hat{p}_1, \hat{p}_2, \dots$ for the overlapping generations model without fiat money.*

Proof. Consider the economy truncated at period T . Proposition 2.1 and Brouwer's fixed point theorem imply that it has an equilibrium $(\hat{p}_1, \dots, \hat{p}_T)$. Consider now the sequence of prices $p_t^T = \hat{p}_t / (e' \hat{p}_1)$, $t = 1, \dots, T$, $p_t^T = e$, $t = T + 1, T + 2, \dots$. Our assumptions on y and z imply that p_t^T , $t = 1, 2, \dots$, is an element of the non-empty, compact and convex set

$$S_t = \{ p \in R^n \mid p \geq 0, \underline{\alpha}^{t-1} \leq e' p \leq \bar{\alpha}^{t-1} \}.$$

The product $\prod_{t=1}^{\infty} S_t$ is compact in the product topology. Consequently, the sequence (of sequences) $p_1^1, p_2^1, \dots, p_1^2, p_2^2, \dots$ has a convergent subsequence. Let $\bar{p}_1, \bar{p}_2, \dots$ be the limit of this subsequence. Notice that, since the functions z_0 , y and z involve only a finite number of variables, the functions $z_0 + y$ and $z + y$, $t = 2, 3, \dots$, are continuous in the product topology. Consequently, since each sequence p_1^T, p_2^T, \dots satisfies the equilibrium conditions in periods $t = 1, 2, \dots, T - 1$, the sequence $\bar{p}_1, \bar{p}_2, \dots$ satisfies them in all periods.

Remark. The only role played by stationarity, the assumption that y and z do not change over time, is to provide the bounds $\underline{\alpha}$ and $\bar{\alpha}$. Consequently, this result applies to non-stationary economies in which such bounds are assumed to hold. In particular, it applies to economies that are stationary after a given date.

6.2. Multiplicity of equilibria

Unfortunately, in contrast to economies with a finite number of infinitely lived consumers, there are robust examples of overlapping generations economies with an infinite number of equilibria. As we shall see, this has strong implications for computational methods for approximating equilibria, including methods that truncate the economy at a finite date. Our discussion of multiplicity follows Gale (1973) and Kehoe and Levine (1985, 1990b).

Ignoring the possibility of free goods, we can write the equilibrium conditions as

$$z_0(p_1) + y(p_1, p_2) = 0,$$

$$z(p_{t-1}, p_t) + y(p_t, p_{t+1}) = 0, \quad t = 2, 3, \dots$$

Once p_1 and p_2 are determined, the second condition acts as a non-linear difference equation determining p_{t+1} as a function of (p_{t-1}, p_t) . In this section we focus attention on the behavior of equilibrium price paths near a steady state $p_t = \beta^{t-1}p$, where $p \in R_+^n \setminus \{0\}$ and $\beta \in R_{++}$, to the second condition,

$$z(\beta^{t-2}p, \beta^{t-1}p) + y(\beta^{t-1}p, \beta^t p) = z(p, \beta p) + y(p, \beta p) = 0.$$

We are interested in prices that converge to a steady state, $(p_t, p_{t+1}) / \|(p_t, p_{t+1})\| \rightarrow (p, \beta p) / \|(p, \beta p)\|$ as $t \rightarrow \infty$.

Focusing on prices that start and remain in some neighborhood of a steady state has two advantages. First, the implicit function theorem says that, if $D_2y(p, \beta p)$ is non-singular, a condition that according to Kehoe and Levine (1984) holds almost always, p_{t+1} can be calculated as a unique, continuously differentiable function of (p_{t-1}, p_t) in some neighborhood of $(p, \beta p)$. In general, there may be multiple solutions p_{t+1} . Second, the local stable manifold theorem says that the qualitative behavior of the non-linear dynamical system generated by the equilibrium conditions is almost always the same as that of its linear approximation [see Scheinkman (1976) and Irwin (1980, Chap. 6)]. Furthermore, using the same sort of redefinition of generations and periods that we use to transform an economy with consumers who live for many periods into one in which they live for two, we can formally transform an economy with a k cycle, (p^1, p^2, \dots, p^k) , into an economy with $n \times k$ goods in each period in which this cycle is a steady state. What we are missing therefore is a study of chaotic equilibria that converge neither to steady states nor to cycles. See Benhabib and Day (1982) and Grandmont (1985) for examples of such equilibria.

There are two types of steady states, those in which there is fiat money and those in which there is not. Using Walras's law and the equilibrium conditions, we can show that

$$p'_1 z_0(p_1) = -p'_1 y(p_1, p_2) = p'_2 z(p_1, p_2) = \dots = -p'_t y(p_t, p_{t+1}).$$

Let $M = -p'y(p, \beta p)$. Walras's law, $p'y(p, \beta p) + \beta p'z(p, \beta p) = 0$ and the steady state condition imply that $(\beta - 1)p'y(p, \beta p) = 0$; that is, $\beta = 1$ or $M = 0$. Kehoe and Levine (1984) prove that these two possibilities almost never occur simultaneously. Steady states in which $\beta = 1$ and $M \neq 0$ are called monetary steady states; those in which $\beta \neq 0$ and $M = 0$ are called real steady states. Proving the existence of, and computing, steady states of each type is similar to doing the same for static exchange economies. Monetary steady states are given by a price vector $p \in R_+^n \setminus \{0\}$ that satisfies

$$f(p) = z(p, p) + y(p, p) = 0.$$

Here the function f has all of the properties of the excess demand function of a static exchange economy. Real steady states are given by a pair (p, β) that satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} z(p, \beta p) + y(p, \beta p) &= 0, \\ p'y(p, \beta p) &= 0. \end{aligned}$$

Using arguments similar to those in Section 2, Kehoe and Levine (1984) characterize the solution to this system of equations as the solution to a fixed point problem in R^{n+1} . As well as proving the existence of each type of steady state, they argue that there is almost always a finite number of each type, and they provide index theorems that imply uniqueness conditions for each type.

Let us now study the question of how many equilibria converge to the steady state $(p, \beta p)$ by linearizing the equilibrium conditions. Making use of the homogeneity of y and z , which implies that their derivatives are homogeneous of degree minus one and that

$$D_1 y p + \beta D_2 y p = D_1 z p + \beta D_2 z p = 0,$$

we write the linearized system as

$$\begin{aligned} D_2 y p + (D_1 y + D z_0) p_1 &= D z_0 p - z_0(p) - y(p, \beta p), \\ D_2 y p_{t+1} + (D_1 y + \beta D_2 z) p_t + \beta D_1 z p_{t-1} &= 0, \quad t = 2, 3, \dots \end{aligned}$$

Here $D_2 y$ is, for example, the $n \times n$ matrix of partial derivatives of y with respect to its second vector of arguments evaluated at $(p, \beta p)$.

We can write the equilibrium conditions in periods $t = 2, 3, \dots$ as the first-order system $q_t = G q_{t-1}$ where $q_t = (p_t, p_{t+1})$ and

$$G = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & I \\ -\beta D_2 y^{-1} D_1 z & -D_2 y^{-1} (D_1 y + \beta D_2 z) \end{bmatrix}.$$

As in the linear-quadratic model of Section 5.5, the stability properties of this difference equation are governed by the eigenvalues of G . The homogeneity of y and z imply that β is an eigenvalue since

$$G \begin{bmatrix} p \\ \beta p \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \beta p \\ \beta^2 p \end{bmatrix}.$$

Differentiating Walras's law and evaluating the result at $(p_t, p_{t+1}) = (p, \beta p)$ implies that

$$y' + p'D_1y + \beta p'D_1z = 0,$$

$$z' + p'D_2y + \beta p'D_2z = 0.$$

Consequently, 1 is another eigenvalue since

$$[\beta p'D_1z - p'D_2y]G = [\beta p'D_1z - p'D_2y].$$

In the case where $\beta = 1$, these are generally the same restriction and we have information only about one eigenvalue.

Again solutions to the difference equation $q_t = Gq_{t-1}$ take the form

$$\begin{bmatrix} p_t \\ p_{t+1} \end{bmatrix} = \sum_{i=1}^{2n} c_i \lambda_i^{t-1} \begin{bmatrix} z_i \\ \lambda_i z_i \end{bmatrix}$$

where the (possibly) complex constants c_i are determined by the initial conditions

$$\begin{bmatrix} p_1 \\ p_2 \end{bmatrix} = \sum_{i=1}^{2n} c_i \begin{bmatrix} z_i \\ \lambda_i z_i \end{bmatrix}.$$

To ensure convergence to the steady state $(p, \beta p)$ we need to put positive weight on the eigenvector $(p, \beta p)$ and zero weights on eigenvectors $(z_i, \lambda_i z_i)$ for which the modulus $|\lambda_i|$ is greater than β .

The situation is in many ways similar to that in the linear-quadratic model of Section 5. In place of the n_k initial conditions k_1 of the $2n_k$ conditions (k_1, k_2) that we need to start up the difference equation, we have n restrictions

$$D_2yp + (D_1y + Dz_0)p_1 = Dz_0p - z_0(p) - y(p, \beta p)$$

on the $2n$ required initial conditions (p_1, p_2) . Unlike the linear-quadratic model, however, there is no need for there to be fewer than n stable eigenvalues of G .

By counting the number of eigenvalues of G less than β in modulus, we can determine the dimension of the stable manifold, the sets of points $(p_1, p_2) \in R^{2n}$ that serve as starting values for the implicit difference equation generated by the equilibrium conditions in periods $t=2, 3, \dots$, and converge to the steady state $(p, \beta p)$. If we then subtract the number of restrictions on (p_1, p_2) implied by the equilibrium conditions in the first period, we can, in general, determine the dimension of the manifold of equilibria that converge to the steady state. We need to distinguish between two cases, economies without fiat money and economies with fiat money. The distinction is crucial because Walras's law and the equilibrium conditions in the first period imply that

$$[\beta p' D_1 z \quad -p' D_2 y] \begin{bmatrix} p_1 \\ p_2 \end{bmatrix} = \sum_{i=1}^{m_0} M_i.$$

This, in turn, implies that the eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue $\lambda = 1$ must receive zero weight c_i in the initial conditions if $\sum_{i=1}^{m_0} M_i = 0$ and must receive non-zero weight if $\sum_{i=1}^{m_0} M_i \neq 0$ [see Kehoe and Levine (1985, 1990b) for details]. In the case where there is fiat money, the dimension of the set of equilibria is generically $n^s + 1 - n$, where n^s is the number of eigenvalues with $|\lambda| < \beta$; there is one eigenvalue $\lambda = \beta$, and n is the number of restrictions implied by the initial conditions. This number can be as large as n . In the case where there is no fiat money, the dimension of the set of equilibria is generically $\bar{n}^s + 1 - n$, where \bar{n}^s is the number of eigenvalues with $|\lambda| < \beta$ excluding, if need be, the eigenvalue $\lambda = 1$. This number can be as large as $n - 1$ and is equal to zero when there is saddlepoint splitting, when half of the $2n - 2$ eigenvalues of G , not counting $\lambda = 1$ or β , are less than β in modulus and the other half are greater.

Another possibility, of course, is that there are too few stable eigenvalues. In this case, for almost all initial generations z_0 , there is no equilibrium that converges to the steady state. In this case we call the steady state unstable.

Example 6.1. Consider overlapping generations in which generation $t, t = 1, 2, \dots$, contains a single consumer who lives for three periods. There is one good in every period. Using the procedure described in Section 6.1, we could convert this to an economy with two consumers who live for two periods in each generation and two goods in each period. The consumer born in period t has the utility function

$$u(x_t, x_{t+1}, x_{t+2}) = \sum_{j=1}^3 a^{j-1} (x_{t+j-1}^b - 1) / b$$

where $a > 0$ and $b < 1$. Given an endowment stream (w_1, w_2, w_3) , the consumer maximizes this utility function subject to the constraint

$$\sum_{j=1}^3 p_{t+j-1} x_{t+j-1} \leq \sum_{j=1}^3 p_{t+j-1} w_j.$$

The consumer's excess demand functions are

$$z_j(p_t, p_{t+1}, p_{t+2}) = \frac{\gamma_j \sum_{k=1}^3 p_{t+k-1} w_k}{p_{t+j-1}^\eta \sum_{k=1}^3 \gamma_k p_{t+k-1}^{1-\eta}} - w_j, \quad j = 1, 2, 3.$$

Here $\eta = 1/(1 - b)$ and $\gamma_j = a^{(j-1)\eta}, j = 1, 2, 3$.

In addition to these consumers, there are two others, an old consumer who lives only in period 1 and a middle-aged consumer who lives in periods 1 and 2. The old consumer, consumer -1 , derives utility only from consumption of the single good in the first period, so we need not specify a utility function. If he has M_{-1} units of fiat money, which may be positive, negative, or zero, his excess demand function is

$$z_3^{-1}(p_1) = M_{-1}/p_1.$$

The middle-aged consumer, consumer 0 has the utility function

$$u_0(x_2, x_3) = \sum_{j=1}^2 a^j (x_{j+1}^b - 1)/b,$$

an endowment stream of goods, (w_2^0, w_3^0) , and an endowment of fiat money, M_0 . His excess demand functions are

$$z_j^0(p_1, p_2) = \frac{\gamma_j \left(\sum_{k=1}^2 p_k w_{k+1}^0 + M_0 \right)}{p_{j-1}^\eta \sum_{k=1}^2 \gamma_{k+1} p_k^{1-\eta}} - w_j^0, \quad j = 2, 3.$$

The equilibrium conditions for this economy are

$$z_3^{-1}(p_1) + z_2^0(p_1, p_2) + z_1(p_1, p_2, p_3) = 0,$$

$$z_3^0(p_1, p_2) + z_2(p_1, p_2, p_3) + z_1(p_2, p_3, p_4) = 0,$$

$$z_3(p_{t-2}, p_{t-1}, p_t) + z_2(p_{t-1}, p_t, p_{t+1}) + z_1(p_t, p_{t+1}, p_{t+2}) = 0, \quad t = 3, 4.$$

The equilibrium condition for period t , $t = 3, 4, \dots$, can be linearized at a steady state $(1, \beta, \beta^2)$ as

$$\begin{aligned} & \beta^2 D_1 z_3 p_{t-2} + (\beta^2 D_2 z_3 + \beta D_1 z_2) p_{t-1} + (\beta^2 D_3 z_3 + \beta D_2 z_2 + D_1 z_1) p_t \\ & + (\beta D_3 z_2 + D_2 z_1) p_{t+1} + D_3 z_1 p_{t+2} = 0. \end{aligned}$$

Here all derivatives are evaluated at the $(1, \beta, \beta^2)$. Corresponding to the condition that $D_2 y$ is non-singular in the general two-period-lived case is the condition that $D_3 z_1$ is non-zero. Corresponding to the eigenvalues of G are the roots of the fourth-order polynomial

$$\beta^2 D_1 z_3 + (\beta^2 D_2 z_3 + \beta D_1 z_2) \lambda + (\beta^2 D_3 z_3 + \beta D_2 z_2 + D_1 z_1) \lambda^2 + (\beta D_3 z_2 + D_2 z_1) \lambda^3 + D_3 z_1 \lambda^4 = 0.$$

The consumer has $a = \frac{1}{2}$, $b = -4$, and $(w_1, w_2, w_3) = (5, 20, 1)$. To calculate the roots of the fourth-order polynomial, which determine the determinacy properties of equilibria near a steady state, we start by evaluating the derivatives of excess demand at $(p_t, p_{t+1}, p_{t+2}) = (1, \beta, \beta^2)$. At $\beta = 1$, for example, these derivatives are

$$\begin{bmatrix} D_1 z_1 & D_2 z_1 & D_3 z_1 \\ D_1 z_2 & D_2 z_2 & D_3 z_2 \\ D_1 z_3 & D_2 z_3 & D_3 z_3 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -3.0869 & 4.9881 & -1.9013 \\ -0.9650 & 2.6201 & -1.6551 \\ -0.8401 & 3.7803 & -2.9402 \end{bmatrix}.$$

(Notice that, since this matrix has some negative off-diagonal elements, (z_1, z_2, z_3) violates gross substitutability.) The polynomial that we are interested in is

$$-0.8401 + 2.8153\lambda - 3.4070\lambda^2 + 3.3330\lambda^3 - 1.9013\lambda^4 = 0.$$

The four roots are $\lambda = 1, 0.4860, 0.1335 + 0.9441i$ and $0.1335 - 0.9441i$ as can easily be verified. This example has four steady states. The steady states and the corresponding roots are listed below.

β	Other roots		
0.0976	1	-0.0102	0.3845
0.4286	1	$0.1275 \pm 0.3337i$	
1	0.4861	$0.1335 \pm 0.9441i$	
903.6581	1	-1196.3574	2.2889

As the steady state $\beta = 0.4286$ the modulus of the pair of complex conjugates is 0.3572; at $\beta = 1$ it is 0.9535.

To generate examples with multiplicity of equilibria, we can choose the initial two consumers, generations -1 and 0 , so that $(1, \beta, \beta^2, \beta^3)$ satisfies the equilibrium conditions in the first two periods. When $\beta = 0.4286$, we can generate an example without fiat money that has a one-dimensional manifold of equilibria since $\bar{n}^s = 2$ and $\bar{n}^s + 1 - n = 1$. (To do so we set $(w_2^0, w_3^0) = (12.0650, 1)$.) When $\beta = 1$, we can generate an example with fiat money that has a two-dimensional manifold of equilibria since $n^s = 3$ and $n^s + 1 - n = 2$ [see Kehoe and Levine (1990b) for details].

A similar analysis of the possibility of indeterminacy in economies with production and a mixture of overlapping generations and infinitely lived

consumers is presented by Muller and Woodford (1988). Similar analyses for non-stationary economies, economies in which the functions y_t and z_t vary over time, have been presented by Geanakoplos and Brown (1985) and Santos and Bona (1989).

6.3. Computational methods

There are two alternatives for approximating an equilibrium of an infinite horizon overlapping generations model: The first is to linearize the equilibrium conditions around a steady state (or cycle) and then solve the linearized model [see Laitner (1984, 1990) and Kehoe and Levine (1985, 1990b)]. The second is to truncate the model and to compute an equilibrium of the truncated model. The crucial question is: What terminal conditions should we impose? A popular choice is to impose the condition that the equilibrium converges to a given steady state [see, for example, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987)]. Care must be taken in this case to make sure that the truncated economy as a whole satisfies Walras's law.

The two methods proposed above are probably best viewed as complements rather than substitutes. Indeed, before computing a truncated equilibrium using as terminal conditions the requirement that the equilibrium converge to a given steady state, we should linearize the model around the steady state. This would allow us to check for indeterminacy, where a continuum of equilibria converge to the steady state, or instability, where no equilibrium converges to it. We would not want to impose the condition of convergence to an unstable steady state in a truncated model. Indeterminacy is more problematical, but we would certainly want to be aware of it since it indicates that the equilibrium that is computed is acutely sensitive to the truncation date T and the exact form of the terminal conditions. Figure 38.6 depicts three different equilibria of the economy in Example 6.1, each of which converges to the steady state $\beta = 0.4286$. Notice how small differences in the equilibrium paths at $T = 20$ correspond to large differences earlier in the path [see Kehoe and Levine (1990b) for a discussion].

To compute an equilibrium of a truncated model, we could use the methods developed for static economies. The truncated model may be very large, however, and it is often more convenient to view the problem of computing an equilibrium as a two-point boundary-value problem. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and Lipton, Poterba, Sachs and Summers (1982) have proposed alternative methods for solving this sort of problem. The equilibrium condition in period t , $t = 2, 3, \dots, T - 1$, implicitly defines a system of n second-order non-linear difference equations. The equilibrium conditions in period 1 implicitly provide n of the $2n$ necessary boundary conditions. The equilibrium




Figure 38.6

conditions in period T implicitly prove the other n . Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) solve this problem using a non-linear Gauss–Seidel method. They start by guessing a solution, the steady state for instance. They then solve the model going forward using this guess as expectations for future variables. After they are done, they use the calculated solution as a new guess and repeat the process. They stop when, and if, the calculated solution agrees with the previous guess.

We write the equilibrium conditions in period t as

$$f(p_{t-1}, p_t, p_{t+1}) = z(p_{t-1}, p_t) + y(p_t, p_{t+1}) = 0.$$

Suppose that we are interested in equilibria that converge to the steady state $(p, \beta p)$. We perform a change of variables, deflating prices in each period by the factor β , so that $\tilde{p}_t = \beta^{-t} p_t$ and

$$\tilde{f}(\tilde{p}_{t-1}, \tilde{p}_t, \tilde{p}_{t+1}) = f(\tilde{p}_{t-1}, \beta \tilde{p}_t, \beta^2 \tilde{p}_{t+1}) = f(p_{t-1}, p_t, p_{t+1}).$$

We henceforth write p_t for \tilde{p}_t and f for \tilde{f} .

Given the guess p_1^k, \dots, p_T^k , the non-linear Gauss-Seidel method sets $p_i^{k+1} = g_i(p^k)$ in the system

$$f_1(g_1(p^k), p_2^k) = 0,$$

$$f(g_{t-1}(p^k), g_t(p^k), p_{t+1}^k) = 0, \quad t = 2, \dots, T-1,$$

$$f_T(g_{T-1}(p^k), g_T(p^k)) = 0.$$

Near the equilibrium $\hat{p}_1, \hat{p}_2, \dots, \hat{p}_T$, this algorithm converges to the linear Gauss-Seidel method for solving

$$\begin{bmatrix} I & D_1 f_1^{-1} D_2 f_1 & 0 & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ D_2 f^{-1} D_1 f & I & D_2 f^{-1} D_3 f & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & D_2 f^{-1} D_1 f & I & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \dots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & I & D_2 f^{-1} D_3 f \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & D_2 f_T^{-1} D_1 f_T & I \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} p_1 \\ p_2 \\ p_3 \\ \vdots \\ p_{T-1} \\ p_T \end{bmatrix}$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} \hat{p}_1 + D_1 f_1^{-1} D_2 f_1 \hat{p}_2 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \vdots \\ 0 \\ D_2 f_T^{-1} D_1 f_T \hat{p}_{T-1} + \hat{p}_T \end{bmatrix}.$$

(Depending on whether there is no fiat money, we may need to normalize $\hat{p}_{11} = 0$ and delete one equation in the first period.) In this system of equations the derivatives are evaluated at $\hat{p}_1, \hat{p}_2, \dots, \hat{p}_T$ rather than at the steady state p . Notice, however, that, if the equilibrium of the infinite horizon model converges to p , then as we move down the matrix the derivatives approach those at the steady state.

The Gauss-Seidel method splits the coefficient matrix of this system, which we write as

$$Ap = c,$$

into a strictly upper-triangular component U , a strictly lower-triangular component L and a diagonal component D . We then solve

$$(D + L)p^{k+1} = -Up^k + c$$

recursively. This method converges if and only if the eigenvalues of $-(D + L)^{-1}U$ are less than one in modulus. Young (1971) provides conditions for convergence. It can be shown, for example, that, if f exhibits gross substitutability and there is no fiat money, the method converges [compare with Kehoe, Levine, Mas-Colell and Woodford (1986)].

The speed of convergence is $-\log|\lambda|$ where λ is the eigenvalue of $-(D + L)^{-1}U$ with the largest modulus. If the infinite horizon model exhibits indeterminacy, then the matrix A is almost singular and $-\log|\lambda|$ is close to zero. To see this, notice that there would then be two vectors $p^1 \neq p^2$ such that, for T large,

$$Ap^1 \approx Ap^2 \approx c,$$

$$A(p^1 - p^2) \approx 0.$$

A slight perturbation in A would then make it singular. Standard results in linear algebra then imply that A has an eigenvalue very close to zero and, therefore, that $-(D + L)^{-1}U$ has an eigenvalue very close to one. Similarly, instability in the infinite horizon model, where no solution converges to the steady state, also corresponds to A being almost singular. This is because, while indeterminacy corresponds to the infinite version of A not being one-to-one, instability corresponds to it not being onto [see Kehoe, Levine, Mas-Colell and Zame (1989)].

This means that the Gauss–Seidel method does not work if there is indeterminacy or instability: One possibility is that convergence may be impossibly slow. If there is indeterminacy, another possibility is that the algorithm may stop at a point far from the true equilibrium of the truncated model but close to an equilibrium of the infinite horizon model. If there is instability, in contrast, the algorithm may stop at a point far from either. In either case, a crucial factor determining the results is the convergence criterion, the degree to which the equilibrium conditions must be satisfied for the algorithm to stop [see Kehoe and Levine (1990a)].

Our analysis suggests directions for further research. One way to speed up the Auerbach–Kotlikoff algorithm would be to linearize the equilibrium conditions around a guess and then solve, not using Gauss–Seidel, but a successive overrelaxation method,

$$(D + \alpha L)p^{k+1} = ((1 - \alpha) - \alpha U)p^k + \alpha c,$$

for a good choice of α [see Young (1971)]. The system can then be linearized around the new guess and the procedure repeated. This method is just Newton's method with a fast way of inverting the sparse matrix A . Unfortu-

nately, of course it does not work well when A is almost singular or when $-(D + L)^{-1}U$ has an eigenvalue greater than one in modulus.

An alternative method for solving this sort of equilibrium problem has been suggested by Lipton, Poterba, Sachs and Summers (1982). This is a method widely used by engineers and physical scientists called multiple shooting [see, for example, Keller (1968)]. They start by guessing the initial values for prices and solving forward for the resulting price path up to T :

$$f_1(p_1, p_2(p_1)) = 0,$$

$$f(p_{t-1}(p_1), p_t(p_1), p_{t+1}(p_1)) = 0, \quad t = 2, \dots, T.$$

They then apply Newton's method to solve $p_T(p_1) - \|p_T(p_1)\|\beta p = 0$, where $(p, \beta p)$ is the steady state. Unless the equilibria are completely indeterminate, however, most paths diverge very rapidly. Because of this the algorithm is very numerically unstable. They therefore propose dividing the time period into difference time segments, then solving

$$p_{T_1}(p_1) - p_{T_1} = 0$$

$$p_{T_2}(p_{T_1}) - p_{T_2} = 0$$

$$\vdots$$

$$p_{T_m}(p_{T_{m-1}}) - \|p_{T_m}(p_{T_{m-1}})\|\beta p = 0$$

for $p_1, p_{T_1}, \dots, p_{T_{m-1}}$ where m is the number of time segments.

Unfortunately, this method is not a good one for many economic problems for at least three related reasons: First, it is often difficult to solve $f(p_{t-1}, p_t, p_{t+1}) = 0$ for p_{t+1} as a function of (p_{t-1}, p_t) . There may be multiple solutions (this, however, is a problem with most methods). Furthermore, any small divergence from the true solution for (p_{t-1}, p_t) can cause p_{t+1} to become negative or not to exist. Second, dividing the time horizon into segments causes the number of variables in Newton's method to go up rapidly. In Auerbach and Kotlikoff's model the number of variables in what corresponds to p_1 is 54 and T is 150. Dividing into three time segments produces 3×54 variables, which is greater than the original number of variables in the system, 150. Even dividing into three segments is probably inadequate, however, since, as Laitner (1990) reports, the linearization of Auerbach and Kotlikoff's model has unstable eigenvalues 1.6 times as large in modulus as the largest stable eigenvalue. This implies that almost all small errors in guessing p_1 have a non-zero complement that is blown up by a factor of 1.6^{50} , which has order of magnitude 10^{10} , in $p_{T_1}(p_1)$. Third, and most importantly, shooting methods work well on ordinary two-point boundary-value problems, not saddlepoint problems. In fact, it is

exactly this sort of problem for which Press, Flannery, Teukolsky and Vetterling (1986, pp. 580–581) advise that shooting methods should not be used.

Kehoe and Levine (1990a) suggest several methods for computing approximate equilibria that combine the advantages of solving the linearized model with those of solving the truncated model. The simplest is to replace the terminal condition of convergence to a steady state by date T with the condition of convergence to the stable subspace of the linearized equilibrium conditions. When the equilibrium path is close to the steady state, this subspace is a very good approximation to the stable manifold of the non-linear system defined by the original equilibrium conditions.

All of the methods proposed in this section are applicable to non-stationary economies that are stationary after some date. Extensions to economies with uncertainty seem much more difficult, however; see Duffie, Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell and McLennan (1988) for a discussion of some of the problems involved in even proving the existence of equilibria with the sort of stationarity properties that make them tractable.

7. Economies with taxes and externalities

In applications many economies fail to satisfy the conditions of the two welfare theorems because of such features as distortionary taxes, externalities, rationing and institutionally fixed prices.

7.1. Static economies with taxes

Large scale general equilibrium models with taxes and government spending are frequently used in policy analysis [see Shoven and Whalley (1984) for a survey]. An early approach to proving the existence of, and computing, equilibrium of such models is given by Shoven and Whalley (1973). Here, as do Todd (1979) and Kehoe (1985a), we follow an approach similar to that in Sections 2.1 and 4.1 for proving the existence of equilibrium in static economies without taxes.

Consider an economy similar to that in Section 4. Consumer i now faces the budget constraint $\sum_{j=1}^n p_j(1 + \tau_j)x_j \leq p'w^i + \theta_i r$ where τ_j is the ad valorem tax on good j and θ_i , $\theta_i \geq 0$, $\sum_{i=1}^m \theta_i = 1$, is the share of government revenue r received by consumer i . In many applications $\theta_1 = 1$ while $\theta_2 = \dots = \theta_m = 0$; that is, the first consumer is the government.

The responses of the consumers to a vector of prices and a level of government revenue can be aggregated into an aggregate excess demand function $f : (R_+^n \setminus \{0\}) \times R_+ \rightarrow R^n$ and a tax function $t : (R_+^n \setminus \{0\}) \times R_+ \rightarrow R_+$,

$$t(p, r) = \sum_{j=1}^n p_j \tau_j \sum_{i=1}^m x_j^i(p, r).$$

Both f and t are continuous. f is also homogeneous of degree zero, is bounded below by $-\sum_{i=1}^m w^i$, and satisfies $\|f(p, r')\| \rightarrow \infty$ as $r' \rightarrow \infty$ for any $p \in R_+^n \setminus \{0\}$. t is homogeneous of degree one. Together f and t satisfy a modified version of Walras's law, $p'f(p, r) + t(p, r) \equiv r$. Analogously with the model without taxes, we can specify the consumers either in terms of utility functions and endowment vectors or in terms of excess demand functions and tax functions.

To keep the presentation simple, let us specify the production technology using an $n \times k$ activity analysis matrix A . We again assume that A includes free disposal activities and does not allow outputs with inputs. Production taxes are specified by an $n \times k$ matrix A^* that satisfies $A^* \leq A$. Here $a_{ij}^* = a_{ij} - \tau_{ij}|a_{ij}|$ where τ_{ij} is the ad valorem tax on the output or input of commodity i in activity j . There are no taxes on disposal activities. The revenue from production taxes at prices $p \in R_+^n \setminus \{0\}$ and activity levels $y \in R_+^k$ is $p'(A - A^*)y$.

An equilibrium of an economy (f, t, A, A^*) is a price vector $\hat{p} \in R_+^n$, a revenue level $\hat{r} \in R_+$, and a vector of activity levels $\hat{y} \in R_+^k$ such that

- $\hat{p}'A^* \leq 0$,
- $f(\hat{p}, \hat{r}) = A\hat{y}$,
- $\hat{r} = t(\hat{p}, \hat{r}) + \hat{p}'(A - A^*)\hat{y}$.

Walras's law implies that $\hat{p}'A^*\hat{y} = 0$.

Once again we can use homogeneity to normalize prices to lie in the unit simplex S . To bound the set of potential levels of government revenue, we note that the assumption of no outputs without inputs implies that there exists some $\alpha > 0$ such that $\|x\| < \alpha$ for all x in the production possibility set $\{x \in R^n \mid x = Ay \geq -\sum_{i=1}^m w^i, y \geq 0\}$. Our assumptions on f imply that there exists $\beta > 0$ such that $\|f(p, r)\| \geq \alpha$ for all $p \in S, r \geq \beta$. Consequently, we can restrict our attention to the non-empty, compact, convex set $S \times [0, \beta]$ in searching for equilibria. To define $g : S \times [0, \beta] \rightarrow S \times [0, \beta]$, we let $g(p, r) = (g_1(p, r), g_2(p, r))$ be the vector (g_1, g_2) that solves

$$\min \frac{1}{2} [(g_1 - p - f(p, r))'(g_1 - p - f(p, r)) + (g_2 - t(p, r))^2] \text{ subject to}$$

$$g_1'A - (1 + g_2 - r)p'(A - A^*) \leq 0$$

$$g_1'e = 1, 0 \leq g_2 \leq \beta.$$

Notice that the assumption of free disposal and the first constraint imply that $g_1 \geq 0$.

Proposition 7.1 [Kehoe (1985a)]. $(\hat{p}, \hat{r}, \hat{y})$ is an equilibrium if and only if (\hat{p}, \hat{r}) is a fixed point of g , $(\hat{p}, \hat{r}) = g(\hat{p}, \hat{r})$.

Proof. The Kuhn–Tucker theorem implies that $(g_1(p, r), g_2(p, r)) = g(p, r)$ solves the minimization problem that defines it if and only if there exist Lagrange multipliers $y \in R_+^k$, $\lambda \in R$ and $\mu, \nu \in R_+$ such that

$$\begin{aligned} g_1(p, r) - p - f(p, r) + Ay + \lambda e &= 0, \\ g_2(p, r) - t(p, r) - p'(A - A^*)y + \mu - \nu &= 0, \\ [g_1(p, r)'A - (1 + g_2(p, r) - r)p'(A - A^*)]y &= 0, \\ \mu g_2(p, r) &= 0, \\ \nu(\beta - g_2(p, r)) &= 0. \end{aligned}$$

Suppose that $(\hat{p}, \hat{r}) = g(\hat{p}, \hat{r})$ and, for the moment, that $\hat{\mu} = \hat{\nu} = 0$. This implies that $\hat{p}'A^* \leq 0$ and $\hat{r} = t(\hat{p}, \hat{r}) + \hat{p}'(A - A^*)\hat{y}$. To obtain the remaining equilibrium condition, we multiply the first condition above by \hat{p}' to produce

$$-\hat{p}'f(\hat{p}, \hat{r}) + \hat{p}'A\hat{y} + \hat{\lambda} = 0.$$

Walras's law now implies that $\hat{\lambda} = 0$, and the first condition becomes $-f(\hat{p}, \hat{r}) + A\hat{y} = 0$. That $t(\hat{p}, \hat{r}) \geq 0$ and $\hat{p}'(A + A^*)\hat{y} \geq 0$ justifies us in ignoring the possibility that $\hat{u} > 0$. Suppose, however, that $\hat{\nu} > 0$ at a fixed point (\hat{p}, β) . Our above reasoning then implies that $-f(\hat{p}, \beta) + A\hat{y} > 0$, which would contradict our choice of β . Consequently, any fixed point is an equilibrium.

To demonstrate the converse, that any equilibrium is a fixed point, we set $y = \hat{y}$ and $\lambda = \mu = \nu = 0$ in the Kuhn–Tucker conditions.

Kehoe (1985a) develops regularity analysis and an index theorem for economies with taxes and government spending. The index of an equilibrium $(\hat{p}, \hat{r}, \hat{y})$ is

$$\text{sgn}\left(\det\begin{bmatrix} -D_1 f(\hat{p}, \hat{r}) & B \\ -B^* & 0 \end{bmatrix}\right).$$

Here B and B^* are the matrices whose columns are the activities of A and A^* , respectively, that are associated with strictly positive activity levels \hat{y}_j . A

regular economy has this expression non-zero at all equilibria. Once again, $\Sigma \text{index}(p, r) = +1$ where the sum is over all equilibria of a regular economy.

Unfortunately, not even the assumptions of a representative consumer or a non-substitution theorem technology and endowment pattern, each of which guarantees uniqueness of equilibrium in an economy without taxes, rules out multiplicity of equilibria. The following example illustrates this point. It is based on the analysis of Foster and Sonnenschein (1970) [see also Hatta (1977) and Kehoe, Levine and Romer (1989b)].

Example 7.1. Consider an economy with two consumption goods and labor. There is a representative consumer with utility function

$$u(x_1, x_2, x_3) = \begin{cases} -(3 - x_1)^2(x_2 + 2)^{-1} & \text{if } x_1 \leq 3, \\ x_1 - 3 & \text{if } x_1 \geq 3, \end{cases}$$

and endowment $(w_1, w_2, w_3) = (0, 0, 2)$. There is an ad valorem tax $\tau_1 = 2$ on the consumption of the first good. All tax revenues are returned to the consumer in the form of a lump and rebate, r . The excess demand functions are

$$f_1(p, r) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } 9p_1 - 4p_2 - 2p_3 - r \geq 2p_3 + r, \\ (-9p_1 + 4p_2 + 4p_3 + 2r)/3p_1 & \text{if } 2p_3 + r \geq 9p_1 - 4p_2 - 2p_3 - r \geq 0, \\ (2p_3 + r)/3p_1 & \text{if } 0 \geq 9p_1 - 4p_2 - 2p_3 - r; \end{cases}$$

$$f_2(p, r) = \begin{cases} (2p_3 + r)/p_2 & \text{if } 9p_1 - 4p_2 - 2p_3 - r \geq 2p_3 + r, \\ (9p_1 - 4p_2 - 2p_3 - r)/p_2 & \text{if } 2p_3 + r \geq 9p_1 - 4p_2 - 2p_3 - r \geq 0, \\ 0 & \text{if } 0 \geq 9p_1 - 4p_2 - 2p_3 - r; \end{cases}$$

$$f_3(p, r) = -2.$$

The tax function is $t(p, r) = 2p_1 f_1(p, r)$.

The production technology is specified by the matrix

$$A = A^* = \begin{bmatrix} -1 & 0 & 0 & 2 & -1 \\ 0 & -1 & 0 & -1 & 2 \\ 0 & 0 & -1 & -1 & -1 \end{bmatrix}.$$

There are three equilibria, given below.

	Equilibrium 1	Equilibrium 2	Equilibrium 3
\hat{p}_1	1/3	1/3	1/3
\hat{p}_2	1/3	1/3	1/3
\hat{p}_3	1/3	1/3	1/3
\hat{r}	4/3	2/3	0
\hat{y}_4	4/3	1	2/3
\hat{y}_5	2/3	1	4/3
\hat{x}_1	2	1	0
\hat{x}_2	0	1	2
\hat{u}	-1/2	-4/3	-9/4

Equilibria 1 and 3 have index +1, and equilibrium 2 has index -1.

7.2. *Dynamic economies with taxes and externalities*

The existence of equilibrium in economies whose equilibria are not necessarily Pareto efficient can be established using sequences of truncations as in Section 6. Similar computational techniques can be used to approximate equilibria. Unfortunately, dynamic economies with taxes and externalities, like overlapping generations economies, can have robust continua of equilibria.

Example 7.2. Consider a dynamic economy with a representative consumer and a one-sector production technology. The consumer derives utility not only from consumption but also from investment. The consumer purchases the investment good, perhaps human capital in the form of education that is valued for its own sake, in one period and sells it to the representative firm in the next. He faces an ad valorem tax on purchases of the consumption good. All tax revenues are rebated in lump-sum form to the consumer. He chooses $(c_1, x_1), (c_2, x_2), \dots$, to solve

$$\begin{aligned} &\max \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma^{t-1} u(c_t, x_t) \text{ subject to} \\ &\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} (p_t(1 + \tau)c_t + p_t x_t) \leq \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} (y_t + r_t k_t), \\ &k_1 \leq \bar{k}_1, k_t \leq x_{t-1}, c_t, x_t \geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

Here x_t is the amount of the investment good purchased by the consumer in period t , p_t is the price paid, r_{t+1} is the price paid by the firm for the same good in period $t + 1$ and y_t is the consumer's labor income plus tax rebate

$$y_t = (p_t f(k_t) - r_t k_t) + \tau p_t k_t.$$

The representative firm chooses k_1, k_2 to solve

$$\max \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} (p_t f(k_t) - r_t k_t).$$

In equilibrium, consumers maximize utility taking p_t, y_t and r_t as given, producers maximize profits taking p_t and r_t as given, $k_t = x_{t-1}$ and

$$c_t + k_{t+1} \leq f(k_t), \quad t = 1, 2, \dots$$

The first-order conditions for the consumer's problem are

$$\gamma^{t-1} u_1(c_t, k_{t+1}) - \lambda p_t (1 + \tau) = 0,$$

$$\gamma^{t-1} u_2(c_t, k_{t+1}) - \lambda (p_t - r_{t+1}) = 0, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots$$

The first-order condition for the firm's problem is

$$p_t f'(k_t) - r_t = 0, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots$$

Combining these three conditions to eliminate p_t and r_t , we obtain

$$(1 + \tau) u_2(c_t, k_{t+1}) - u_1(c_t, k_{t+1}) + \gamma u_1(c_{t+1}, k_{t+2}) f'(k_{t+2}) = 0, \\ t = 1, 2, \dots$$

Substituting in the feasibility condition

$$c_t = f(k_t) - k_{t+1}$$

yields a second-order difference equation in k_t .

This difference equation requires two initial conditions. The value of k_1 is given. To find how much freedom there is in choosing k_2 , we linearize the difference equation around a stationary solution of \hat{k} . We obtain

$$\alpha_2 (k_{t+2} - \hat{k}) + \alpha_1 (k_{t+1} - \hat{k}) + \alpha_0 (k_t - \hat{k}) = 0$$

where

$$\alpha_0 = ((1 + \tau) u_{21} - u_{11}) f',$$

$$\alpha_1 = -(1 + \tau) u_{21} + (1 + \tau) u_{22} + u_{11} - u_{12} + \gamma u_{11} f'^2 + \gamma u_1 f'',$$

$$\alpha_2 = \gamma (u_{12} - u_{11}) f'.$$

Consider the example where $\gamma = 3/4$, $\tau = 2$,

$$u(c, k) = 8c + \left(\frac{157}{48}\right)k - \frac{1}{2}(5c^2 + 4ck + k^2),$$

$$f(k) = \frac{55 + 10k - k^2}{32}.$$

In this case $\hat{c} = \hat{k} = 1$ is a stationary solution where $u_{11} = -5$, $u_{12} = u_{21} = -2$, $u_{22} = -1$, $u_1 = 1$, $f' = 1/4$ and $f'' = -1/16$. This implies that $\alpha_0 = -1/4$, $\alpha_1 = -9/32$ and $\alpha_2 = 9/16$. The two roots of the characteristic equation

$$\alpha_2 \lambda^2 + \alpha_1 \lambda + \alpha_0 = 0$$

are $\lambda = 0.2500 \pm 0.7120i$. Since both roots have moduli less than one, there is a continuum of equilibria for which k_t converges to $\bar{k} = 1$.

Example 7.3. Consider another dynamic economy with a representative consumer and a one-sector production technology. The consumer chooses c_1, c_2, \dots to solve

$$\begin{aligned} \max \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma^{t-1} u(c_t) \text{ subject to} \\ \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} p_t c_t \leq \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} y_t, \quad c_t \geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

Here y_t is the total of labor and capital income in period t . There is a congestion externality in that output depends not only on the inputs of capital k_t and the fixed amount of labor but on the average amount capital K_t . The representative firm chooses k_1, k_2, \dots to solve

$$\max \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} (p_t f(k_t, K_t) - p_t k_{t+1}) - r_1 k_1.$$

Here the firm cannot control the average K_t although, in equilibrium $K_t = k_t$. The other equilibrium conditions are

$$y_t = p_t f(k_t, K_t),$$

$$c_t + k_{t+1} \leq f(k_t, K_t),$$

$$k_1 \leq \bar{k}_1.$$

The first-order conditions for the consumer's problem

$$\gamma'^{-1}u'(c_t) - \lambda p_t = 0$$

can be combined with the first-order conditions for the firm's problem

$$p_{t+1}f_1(k_{t+1}, K_{t+1}) - p_t = 0$$

to yield

$$\gamma u'(c_{t+1})f_1(k_{t+1}, K_{t+1}) - u'(c_t) = 0.$$

Substituting in the equilibrium conditions, we obtain a second-order difference equation in k_t

$$\gamma u'(f(k_{t+1}, k_{t+1}) - k_{t+2})f_1(k_{t+1}, k_{t+1}) - u'(f(k_t, k_t) - k_{t+1}) = 0.$$

Once again, we have only one initial condition k_1 . Linearizing around a stationary solution \bar{k} , we obtain

$$\alpha_2(k_{t+2} - \bar{k}) + \alpha_1(k_{t+1} - \bar{k}) + \alpha_0(k_t - \bar{k}) = 0$$

where

$$\alpha_0 = -u''(f_1 + f_2),$$

$$\alpha_1 = \gamma u''f_1(f_1 + f_2) + \gamma u'(f_{11} + f_{12}) + u'',$$

$$\alpha_2 = -\gamma u''f_1.$$

In the case where $\bar{c} = \bar{k} = 1$, $\gamma = 3/4$, $u' = 2$, $u'' = -1$, $f_1 = 4/3$, $f_2 = -1$, $f_{11} = -1$ and $f_{12} = 2$, we can calculate $\alpha_0 = -1/3$, $\alpha_1 = 1/6$ and $\alpha_2 = 1$. The two roots of the characteristic equation are $1/2$, $-2/3$. Since both roots have moduli less than one, there is a continuum of equilibria for which k_t converges to $\bar{k} = 1$.

As in Example 7.2, we can choose u and f as quadratic functions so that the linear approximation to the equilibrium conditions is exact.

Remark. Similar examples of multiplicity of equilibria in economies with externalities have been constructed by Howitt and McAfee (1988), Spear (1988) and Kehoe, Levine and Romer (1989a).

7.3. Characterizing equilibria as solutions to optimization problems

As we have mentioned, the computational methods for overlapping generations economies can also be applied to economies with taxes and externalities.

An alternative is to characterize equilibria as solutions to optimization problems where some of the parameters of the optimization problem are endogenously determined. The characterization is formally similar to the Negishi approach described in Section 3, where the welfare weights α are endogenously determined, although there is now no interpretation in terms of Pareto efficiency.

Example 7.4 (7.1 revisited). Consider the “Pareto” problem

$$\max u(x_1, x_2, x_3) - zx_1 \text{ subject to } x - w \leq Ay, x, y \geq 0,$$

where the function u , the vector w and the matrix A are as in Example 7.1. Letting $p \in R_+^3$ be the Langrange multipliers, we can write the first-order conditions as

$$u_1(x_1, x_2, x_3) - z - p_1 \leq 0, \quad = 0 \text{ if } x_1 > 0,$$

$$u_2(x_1, x_2, x_3) - p_2 \leq 0, \quad = 0 \text{ if } x_2 > 0,$$

$$p'A \leq 0, \quad p'Ay = 0,$$

$$Ay - x + w = 0.$$

These are the same as the equilibrium conditions of Example 7.1 in the case where $z = \tau p_1$. Equilibria are, therefore, fixed points of $g(z) = \tau p_1(z)$.

For a fixed value of z , we can solve the maximization problem and find the solution $(x(z), y(z), p(z))$. For any value of z there is a unique solution.

	$z \geq 15/16$	$15/16 \geq z \geq 3/4$	$3/4 \geq z$
x_1	0	$4 - (1 - z)^{-1/2}$	2
x_2	2	$(1 - z)^{-1/2} - 2$	0
y_4	$2/3$	$2 - (1 - z)^{-1/2}/3$	$4/3$
y_5	$4/3$	$(1 - z)^{-1/2}/3$	$2/3$
p_1	$9/16$	$2 - z - 2(1 - z)^{1/2}$	$1 - z$
p_2	$9/16$	$2 - z - 2(1 - z)^{1/2}$	$1 - z$
p_3	$9/16$	$2 - z - 2(1 - z)^{1/2}$	$1 - z$

The function $g(z) = 2p_1(z)$ has three fixed points, $z^1 = 2/3$, $z^2 = 8/9$ and $z^3 = 9/8$, which correspond to the three equilibria of Example 7.1.

The equilibria of the dynamic economies in Examples 7.2 and 7.3 can also be characterized as solutions to optimization problems with endogenous parameters. In each case, however, there is an infinite number of endogenous

parameters. In the case of the dynamic economy with externalities, for example, the “Pareto” problem is to choose $(c_1, k_1), (c_2, k_2), \dots$ to solve

$$\max \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma^{t-1} u(c_t) \text{ subject to}$$

$$c_t + k_t \leq f(k_t, z_t),$$

$$k_1 \leq \bar{k}_1,$$

$$c_t, k_t \geq 0.$$

For the solution to this problem to be an equilibrium, the parameters z_1, z_2, \dots must solve the fixed point problem $z_t = k_t(z_t), t = 1, 2, \dots$ [see Kehoe, Levine and Romer (1989a) for details and references].

Sometimes the equilibrium of an economy with taxes or externalities solves an optimization problem without additional equilibrium conditions. Becker (1985), for example, considers a model in which the representative consumer solves

$$\max \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma^{t-1} u(c_t) \text{ subject to}$$

$$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} p_t (c_t + k_{t+1}) \leq \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} (y_t + (1 - \tau)r_t k_t),$$

$$k_1 \leq \bar{k}_1,$$

$$c_t, k_t \geq 0.$$

Here $y_t = p_t f(k_t) - r_t k_t + \tau r_t k_t$ is the consumer’s labor income plus a lump sum rebate. Becker shows that an equilibrium also solves

$$\max \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (\gamma(1 - \tau))^t u(c_t) \text{ subject to}$$

$$c_t + k_{t+1} \leq f(k_t), \quad t = 1, 2, \dots,$$

$$k_1 \leq \bar{k}_1,$$

$$c_t, k_t \geq 0.$$

Danthine and Donaldson (1986) extend Becker’s analysis to economies that

allow uncertainty. Judd (1987) shows that some similar, continuous time tax models also have equilibria that solve optimization problems without side conditions. He further argues that, although there are few cases in which equilibria of tax models can be computed exactly by solving an optimization problem without additional conditions on some of the parameters, research in this area may be helpful in updating guesses in iterative methods for computing equilibria.

Suppose, for example, that we characterize the equilibria of either the dynamic economy with taxes in Example 7.2 or the dynamic economy with externalities in Example 7.3 as solutions to optimization problems that depend on a sequence z_1, z_2, \dots of endogenous parameters. We start with a guess for this sequence, say, the steady state. We then solve the optimization problem for this guess of z_i and then use the solution to update z_i and so on. Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Whiteman (1983) discuss algorithms of this sort for computing equilibria in economies with externalities; Braun (1988), Chang (1988) and McGrattan (1988) have applied such algorithms to economies with taxes; and Ginsburgh and van der Heyden (1988) have applied such an algorithm to an economy with institutionally fixed prices. Further research is needed to see whether this algorithm has any advantages over alternatives.

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SOME EXAMPLES OF GLOBAL INSTABILITY OF THE COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM*

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IN THIS PAPER we shall consider the problem of stability of the competitive equilibrium. The market demand functions are sums of individual demand functions obtained directly by utility maximization. The rate of change of the price of each commodity is assumed to be proportional to the excess market demand for that commodity. A number of examples are given for which the motion of the prices is globally unstable in the sense that starting from any set of prices other than equilibrium, the prices oscillate without tending towards equilibrium.

1. INTRODUCTION

The problem of stability of the competitive equilibrium is described in [3], and we shall content ourselves with a review². Several individuals with utility functions $U_i(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ for the same commodities are engaged in the trade of these commodities. Each individual begins the trading with an initial endowment of goods, say $I_1^i, I_2^i, \dots, I_n^i$, for the i th individual. An initial vector of prices p_1, \dots, p_n is announced, and each consumer then determines his demand for all of the commodities by the usual procedure of maximizing his utility function, subject to the constraint that his expenditure shall not exceed the value of his initial endowment of goods at the stated price vector.

For each commodity the sum of the individuals' demand functions

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² The reader may wish to consult the excellent bibliography given in [3] and also in [1].

minus the sum of the initial endowments of that commodity is called the market excess demand for the commodity; in this paper it will be denoted by $f_i(p_1, \dots, p_n)$, where the subscript refers to the commodity in question. (These functions are homogeneous of degree zero and satisfy the Walras Law $\sum p_i f_i \equiv 0$.) Excess demand functions for individuals will always be denoted by x_i .

An equilibrium price vector is, of course, a vector of prices for which all of the excess demand functions vanish, and recent work in this area [2, 8] has shown that under suitable regularity conditions equilibrium prices will always exist. (Because of the homogeneity of the demand functions, any positive multiple of an equilibrium is again an equilibrium, and in this sense we should speak of an equilibrium ray. There may be several such rays.) The stability problem, on the other hand, is less concerned with the existence of equilibrium and more with the question of what happens to the prices if initially they are different from the equilibrium.

There is nothing in the model described so far which enables us to compute the motion of prices if we are not at an equilibrium point. For this we need some specific assumptions on the price adjustment process, that is, the procedure by which prices may be expected to change if we are away from an equilibrium price. The intuitive notion that an excess of supply over demand should result in a decrease in price, and an excess of demand should result in an increase in price, has been formalized mathematically in [7] and [3] by the statement that

$$\frac{dp_i}{dt} = H_i[f_i(p_1, \dots, p_n)],$$

where H_i is a sufficiently regular sign-preserving function of its argument. (These equations are to hold if all $p_i \geq 0$.) In order to be concrete, in this paper we shall generally take the functions H to be equal to their respective arguments, so that for each commodity the rate of change of price is equal to the excess demand.

Now let us turn our attention to the problem of stability with this type of adjustment process. Early work in this area [5, 6] tends to emphasize what might be called "local" stability; the initial prices are assumed to be close to some equilibrium point, and an analysis is made of whether there is a tendency to converge to the equilibrium point, depart from the equilibrium point, or perhaps even a tendency to more complex types of behavior. The "local" analysis proceeds by means of the linear terms of the Taylor series expansion about the equilibrium

point, thus converting the problem to a linear differential system with constant coefficients. It is possible in this type of analysis to obtain many examples of completely unstable equilibria (though it should be mentioned that there is an uncomfortable tendency for examples to be produced without any consideration of their origins as market demand functions derived by the summation of individual demand functions). The local analysis, however, is somewhat unsatisfactory, in that it is quite possible for other equilibrium points to exist, and the system cannot be said to be unstable without examining whether the prices tend to another equilibrium point.

This consideration leads naturally to the problem of stability in the "global" sense [3], which is concerned with the solution of the differential equations based on the price adjustment mechanism for an arbitrary initial set of prices. If the solution of the differential equations approaches *some* equilibrium point as time becomes infinite, then we have global stability. Clearly it is quite possible for there to be several equilibrium points, none of which is completely stable from the local point of view (that is, attracts all neighboring points) and where the system, in its entirety, is globally stable.

The problem of global stability, as it has been described above, has been discussed by several authors. Though alternate methods of proof have been found, the results do not go essentially beyond those obtained in [1]. There are, first of all, several special cases which can be mentioned: global stability is known if there is a single consumer, or if there are only two goods, or if it happens that at some equilibrium point there is no trade. There is also an unpublished result of the author's showing that global stability is known if all of the consumers have the same homogeneous utility function, but with different initial distributions of stock. Aside from these very special cases, the most important result is that global stability will occur if all of the goods are gross substitutes; mathematically, this means $\partial f_i / \partial p_j > 0$ if $i \neq j$. Apart from this, very little else has been found; no assumptions substantially different from gross substitutability have been shown to imply stability, and up to the present no examples of instability have been produced.

This paper presents a series of examples, all derived from utility maximization, which are globally unstable. The examples given here involve three consumers and three goods, but the techniques may be extended to either more consumers or more goods. The examples all involve a rather simple relationship between the utility functions of the three consumers, namely

$$(1) \quad \begin{aligned} U_3(x_1, x_2, x_3) &= U_1(x_2, x_3, x_1), \\ U_2(x_1, x_2, x_3) &= U_2(x_2, x_3, x_1), \end{aligned}$$

and a corresponding cyclic permutation of the initial endowments. Specifically, we will assume that if the initial endowments of the first consumer are (I, J, K) for the first, second, and third goods respectively, then those of the second consumer are (K, I, J) and those of the third consumer (J, K, I) . This relationship is introduced to simplify the calculations, and, as the method will show, it may be relaxed.

It is an easy consequence of utility maximization that for the price adjustment process we have selected (rate of change of price equal to excess demand) the motion of the prices will always be constrained to the sphere $p_1^2 + p_2^2 + p_3^2 = \text{constant}$. In all of our examples there will be an equilibrium point at $(p_1 = p_2 = p_3)$, which, except for the first example, will be locally completely unstable (there is a small region around this equilibrium point such that if the initial price is in the region, the prices will eventually leave this region and stay out). In the first example the motion of the prices will be in concentric curves about the equilibrium point, whereas the more complex examples will give rise to limit cycles.

As we shall see from the examples of Section 3, instability does not depend on a delicate assignment of values of initial stocks or parameters in the utility functions. Though it is difficult to characterize precisely those markets which are unstable, it seems clear that instability is a relatively common phenomenon.

What are the implications of these examples? It seems to me that there are several possible interpretations that *might* be made.

1. One possible interpretation is that the model is substantially realistic and that instabilities of the type described in this paper could possibly occur. An even more presumptuous interpretation along these lines is that instability is responsible for some aspects of the business cycle, though for this sort of interpretation it would seem advisable to produce examples of instability with a model of a complete economy rather than a pure trade model alone, and this may be more difficult to do.

2. Another possible interpretation is that the price adjustment process postulated above is not correct. This view can, of course, be held without any reference to the question of stability. An argument for this position is that in one sense or another we are considering a dynamic process, and yet nowhere do the simplest dynamic considerations such as saving, interest, etc. appear in the model.

3. As a final interpretation it might be argued that the types and

diversities of complementarities exhibited in this paper do not appear in reality, and that only relatively similar utility functions should be postulated, and also that some restrictions should be placed on the distribution of initial holdings. This view may be substantiated by the known fact that if all of the individuals are identical in both their utility functions and initial holdings, then global stability obtains.

2. A VERY SIMPLE EXAMPLE OF INSTABILITY

In this section we shall describe a very simple example which leads to instability. It will be seen that this example is quite an extreme one. In the next section we shall describe a number of additional examples which, while somewhat more complex, do not have the disagreeable features of the present one.

Let the utility function of the first consumer be $U_1(x_1, x_2, x_3) = \min(x_1, x_2)$ and his initial endowments $(1, 0, 0)$. This consumer has no desire for the third good and his indifference curves for the first two goods are of the form:




FIGURE 1

For any income M the same quantity will be demanded of goods one and two and therefore the demand functions are

$$y_1(p_1, p_2, p_3, M) = \frac{M}{p_1 + p_2},$$

$$y_2(p_1, p_2, p_3, M) = \frac{M}{p_1 + p_2},$$

$$y_3(p_1, p_2, p_3, M) = 0.$$

Now the income of the first consumer is derived from his endowment of a single unit of good one, so that $M = p_1$ and therefore the excess demand functions of the first consumer (supply is being subtracted off now) are given by

$$\begin{aligned}x_1 &= \frac{-p_2}{p_1 + p_2}, \\x_2 &= \frac{p_1}{p_1 + p_2}, \\x_3 &= 0.\end{aligned}$$

The excess demand functions of the second consumer are obtained by a cyclic permutation of all subscripts, $1 \rightarrow 2, 2 \rightarrow 3, 3 \rightarrow 1$, and once more for the third consumer. If we add these together, the market excess demand functions are given by

$$\begin{aligned}f_1 &= \frac{-p_2}{p_1 + p_2} + \frac{p_3}{p_3 + p_1}, \\f_2 &= \frac{-p_3}{p_2 + p_3} + \frac{p_1}{p_1 + p_2}, \\f_3 &= \frac{-p_1}{p_3 + p_1} + \frac{p_2}{p_2 + p_3},\end{aligned}$$

and of course the price adjustment process leads to the differential equations

$$(2) \quad \frac{dp_i}{dt} = f_i(p_1, p_2, p_3).$$

It is a trivial matter to verify that $p_1 = p_2 = p_3$ is the only equilibrium point. The fact that $\sum p_i^2 = \text{constant}$ follows from $\sum p_i dp_i/dt = 0$, which is the Walras Law. In order to show that the solutions are unstable we shall demonstrate that $p_1 p_2 p_3 = \text{constant}$ for any solution of (2). This would follow if we could show that

$$(3) \quad f_1 p_2 p_3 + f_2 p_1 p_3 + f_3 p_1 p_2$$

equals zero, but (3) is equal to

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{p_3(p_1^2 - p_2^2)}{p_1 + p_2} + \frac{p_2(p_3^2 - p_1^2)}{p_3 + p_1} + \frac{p_1(p_2^2 - p_3^2)}{p_2 + p_3} \\= p_3(p_1 - p_2) + p_2(p_3 - p_1) + p_1(p_2 - p_3) = 0.\end{aligned}$$

That this implies instability is clear. Let the initial prices be chosen such that $p_1^2 + p_2^2 + p_3^2 = 3$, so that the intersection of the equilibrium ray and this sphere is $(1, 1, 1)$. The value of $p_1 p_2 p_3$ at equilibrium is

one, and therefore if the initial price gives a value different from one to $p_1 p_2 p_3$ we never reach equilibrium. It should be remarked that the maximum of $p_1 p_2 p_3$ subject to the constraint $\sum p_i^2 = 3$ is actually one, so that if the initial position is anything other than (1, 1, 1), the path is completely unstable.

Occasionally the following price adjustment process is discussed. One of the goods is singled out and its price kept constant; the remaining goods are meant to vary according to the differential equations given above. If, in our case, we put $p_3 \equiv 1$, then we are led to the system

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{dp_1}{dt} &= \frac{-p_2}{p_1 + p_2} + \frac{1}{1 + p_1}, \\ \frac{dp_2}{dt} &= \frac{-1}{p_2 + 1} + \frac{p_1}{p_1 + p_2}.\end{aligned}$$

Routine calculations show that for this system

$$p_1 p_2 e^{-\frac{1}{2}(p_1^2 + p_2^2)} = \text{const.},$$

and this is again sufficient to show instability.

3. A CLASS OF EXAMPLES

The example of the previous section has a number of special properties. All of the Slutsky terms $[\partial y_i / \partial p_j + y_j (\partial y_i / \partial M)]$ are zero, the indifference surfaces are not *strictly* convex, and certainly not differentiable, and, finally, the initial holdings are of a rather extreme type. It might be thought that one, or several, of these properties is responsible for the instability of the previous example, and that stability would return if these properties were removed. The examples of the present section show, however, that it is quite easy to obtain instability with none of the objectionable properties mentioned above.

We shall make an attempt to keep the reasoning relatively general in this section. Some conditions will be described which imply instability, and we shall demonstrate by specific examples that these conditions may be satisfied.

As was mentioned in the introduction [see equation (1)], the utility functions of the three consumers will be obtained by a cyclic permutation of the goods and the initial endowments. This means that if the *excess* demand functions of the first consumer are represented by

$$x_1(p_1, p_2, p_3), \quad x_2(p_1, p_2, p_3), \quad x_3(p_1, p_2, p_3),$$

then the excess demand functions of the second consumer for the first, second, and third goods respectively will be given by

$$x_3(p_2, p_3, p_1), \quad x_1(p_2, p_3, p_1), \quad x_2(p_2, p_3, p_1),$$

and those of the third consumer by

$$x_2(p_3, p_1, p_2), \quad x_3(p_3, p_1, p_2), \quad x_1(p_3, p_1, p_2).$$

(Continuity and differentiability properties of these functions will be assumed whenever necessary.)

The market excess demand functions are obtained by the summation of individual demands and are therefore given by:

$$\begin{aligned} f_1(p_1, p_2, p_3) &= x_1(p_1, p_2, p_3) + x_3(p_2, p_3, p_1) + x_2(p_3, p_1, p_2), \\ (4) \quad f_2(p_1, p_2, p_3) &= x_2(p_1, p_2, p_3) + x_1(p_2, p_3, p_1) + x_3(p_3, p_1, p_2), \\ f_3(p_1, p_2, p_3) &= x_3(p_1, p_2, p_3) + x_2(p_2, p_3, p_1) + x_1(p_3, p_1, p_2). \end{aligned}$$

The differential equations of stability are, of course, given by $dp_i/dt = f_i(p_1, p_2, p_3)$, when all prices are non-negative.

As we mentioned previously, the Walras Law ($\sum p_i x_i \equiv 0$ for each consumer, and its consequence, $\sum p_i f_i \equiv 0$) implies that $d(\sum p_i^2)/dt = 0$, so that the motion of the prices will always be on that sphere with center at the origin which passes through the initial price vector. Let us assume that the initial prices have been selected such that $\sum p_i^2 = 3$. When we speak of equilibrium prices we shall mean the intersection of the equilibrium ray and this sphere.

LEMMA 1. *The price vector (1, 1, 1) is an equilibrium price.*

This is immediately obvious by an application of the Walras Law to equations (4), when all of the prices are set equal to *one*.

It is not at all correct, for a general selection of the individual demand functions x_1, x_2, x_3 , that the market demand functions f_1, f_2, f_3 (4) must have a *unique* equilibrium point at (1, 1, 1). There are a number of very simple conditions, however, which imply that this equilibrium is unique. We shall give only one such set of conditions.

LEMMA 2. *Let*

$$A = \partial f_1 / \partial p_2 < 0, \quad \text{and} \quad B = \partial f_1 / \partial p_3 > 0,$$

everywhere in the orthant $p_1 \geq 0, p_2 \geq 0, p_3 \geq 0$. Then the equilibrium point (1, 1, 1) is unique (aside from positive multiples).

In order to demonstrate this lemma, let us first make the observation that

$$\begin{aligned} f_2(p_1, p_2, p_3) &= f_1(p_2, p_3, p_1), \\ f_3(p_1, p_2, p_3) &= f_2(p_2, p_3, p_1), \\ f_1(p_1, p_2, p_3) &= f_3(p_2, p_3, p_1). \end{aligned}$$

This implies that if (α, β, γ) is an equilibrium point, then so is (β, γ, α) , and also (γ, α, β) . Therefore, if we have an equilibrium point different from $(1, 1, 1)$, then we may find an equilibrium point (α, β, γ) , perhaps by permutation, with either

$$(5) \quad \alpha \geq \beta \geq \gamma$$

(at least one of the inequalities is strict), or else

$$(6) \quad \alpha \leq \beta \leq \gamma$$

(again the same remark).

Let us assume that the former holds. An argument similar to the one we are about to give works if instead of (5) we have (6).

We shall show that $f_2(\alpha, \beta, \gamma)$ must be different from zero. Now

$$f_2(\alpha, \beta, \gamma) = x_2(\alpha, \beta, \gamma) + x_1(\beta, \gamma, \alpha) + x_3(\gamma, \alpha, \beta).$$

The assumptions of this lemma imply that as a function of α , f_2 is strictly increasing, and as a function of γ , f_2 is strictly decreasing. Since $\alpha \geq \beta \geq \gamma$ (with inequality somewhere), we have

$$f_2(\alpha, \beta, \gamma) > x_2(\beta, \beta, \beta) + x_1(\beta, \beta, \beta) + x_3(\beta, \beta, \beta) = 0,$$

by the Walras Law. This completes the proof of the lemma.

Subsequently, in this paper, we shall have occasion to consider specific examples of demand functions for which the conditions of Lemma 2 do not hold for all prices in the orthant $p_1 \geq 0, p_2 \geq 0, p_3 \geq 0$, but rather for certain subsets. We shall then have recourse to the following lemma, which involves a type of subset convenient for us. The lemma is demonstrated in the same manner as Lemma 2. It should be noted that the operations involved in the proof of Lemma 2 do not take us out of the set described in Lemma 3.

LEMMA 3. *Let the conditions of Lemma 2 hold for the set of prices $(p_1/p_3 > \varepsilon, p_2/p_1 > \varepsilon, p_3/p_2 > \varepsilon)$, where ε is a small positive number. Then there are no equilibrium points in this set other than $(1, 1, 1)$ and its multiples.*

We shall now give a condition on the demand functions which implies that the equilibrium point $(1, 1, 1)$ is unstable.

LEMMA 4. *If $C = \partial f_1 / \partial p_1$ is positive, at the point $(1, 1, 1)$, then this equilibrium point is locally unstable in the following sense: there is a region (on the sphere $\sum p_i^2 = 3$) about the point $(1, 1, 1)$ such that any point in this region (other than the equilibrium point) will move away from the point $(1, 1, 1)$.*

The Jacobian of the functions f_1, f_2, f_3 , at the point $(1, 1, 1)$ is given by

$$\begin{pmatrix} C & A & B \\ B & C & A \\ A & B & C \end{pmatrix},$$

all evaluated at that particular point. Moreover, the functions f_1, f_2, f_3 are homogeneous of degree zero, and therefore the Euler relationship, at the point $(1, 1, 1)$, tells us that

$$(7) \quad A + B + C = 0.$$

The Jacobian, therefore, has one characteristic root equal to zero. The other characteristic roots may be shown to have positive real parts, because of the assumption $C > 0$. It is then possible to apply standard theorems of differential equations (see [4], chap. 13), in order to deduce local instability. However, the various properties of demand functions permit a simple independent proof of this fact, which we shall reproduce here.

Let

$$V(p_1, p_2, p_3) = \frac{1}{2} \sum (p_i - 1)^2,$$

so that

$$\frac{dV}{dt} = \sum (p_i - 1) \frac{dp_i}{dt} = -\sum f_i.$$

We shall show that $\sum f_i < 0$ in a small region on the sphere $\sum p_i^2 = 3$ about $(1, 1, 1)$, (except for this point itself), and this will demonstrate the lemma. Of course at $(1, 1, 1)$, $\sum f_i = 0$. Using the Taylor series expansion, we obtain

$$(8) \quad \sum f_i = \sum_j (p_j - 1) \sum_i \frac{\partial f_i}{\partial p_j} + \frac{1}{2} \sum_j \sum_k (p_j - 1)(p_k - 1) \sum_i \frac{\partial^2 f_i}{\partial p_j \partial p_k} + o(V^{3/2}),$$

where all of the partial derivatives are evaluated at the point $(1, 1, 1)$. Let us simplify some of the terms. The Walras Law reads $\sum p_i f_i \equiv 0$, so that differentiating with respect to p_j , we obtain

$$(9) \quad f_j + \sum_i p_i \frac{\partial f_i}{\partial p_j} \equiv 0.$$

At $(1, 1, 1)$ this implies $\sum_i \partial f_i / \partial p_j = 0$, and therefore the linear terms of the Taylor series vanish. Differentiating (9) once more with respect to p_k , we obtain, at the point $(1, 1, 1)$,

$$(10) \quad \sum_i \frac{\partial^2 f_i}{\partial p_j \partial p_k} = - \left(\frac{\partial f_j}{\partial p_k} + \frac{\partial f_k}{\partial p_j} \right).$$

From (7), (8), and (10) we see that

$$\sum_i f_i = -\frac{1}{2} \sum_{j,k} (p_j - 1)(p_k - 1)c_{jk} + 0(V^{3/2}),$$

where

$$(c_{jk}) = \begin{pmatrix} 2C, & -C, & -C \\ -C, & 2C, & -C \\ -C, & -C, & 2C \end{pmatrix}.$$

Therefore

$$\sum f_i = -\frac{C}{2} \{ (p_1 - p_2)^2 + (p_2 - p_3)^2 + (p_3 - p_1)^2 \} + 0(V^{3/2}).$$

But I claim that on the surface $\sum p_i^2 = 3$, with all $p_i \geq 0$, we always have

$$(11) \quad (p_1 - p_2)^2 + (p_2 - p_3)^2 + (p_3 - p_1)^2 \geq \frac{3}{2} \sum (p_i - 1)^2.$$

Accepting this as correct for the moment, we see that

$$\sum f_i < -\frac{3}{2} CV + 0(V^{3/2}),$$

and therefore $\sum f_i$ is negative for V sufficiently small.

Equation (11) is demonstrated as follows. First of all, on this sphere

$$3 \geq \sum p_i.$$

Multiplying by $\sum p_i$ and expanding, we obtain

$$3 \sum p_i \geq p_1^2 + p_2^2 + p_3^2 + 2(p_1 p_3 + p_1 p_2 + p_2 p_3),$$

and by subtracting 9 from each side we obtain

$$\frac{3}{2} (-\sum p_i^2 + 2\sum p_i - 3) \geq -2(p_1^2 + p_2^2 + p_3^2) + 2(p_1 p_3 + p_1 p_2 + p_2 p_3),$$

which is the same as (11). This finishes the proof of Lemma 4.

We shall shortly exhibit some excess demand functions, derivable from a utility function, which satisfy the hypothesis of both Lemmas 2 and 4. They will provide us with examples of a unique equilibrium point, which is unstable locally. Does this imply global instability? In a certain sense this becomes a matter of definition, the problem being that it is possible that one of the prices might become zero. In this event, some care should be taken, since the differential equa-

tions (2) no longer describe the motion of the prices. In our examples, we shall use special techniques to demonstrate that the paths actually stay away from the boundary of the positive orthant.

Now let us consider utility functions for the first consumer of the form

$$U(x_1, x_2, x_3) = -\left(\frac{\alpha_1^{a+1}}{x_1^a} + \frac{\alpha_2^{a+1}}{x_2^a} + \frac{\alpha_3^{a+1}}{x_3^a}\right),$$

where $(\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3)$ is an arbitrary non-negative vector, and a is a positive constant. Let the initial endowment of the first consumer be represented by (I_1, I_2, I_3) . As before, we permute the utility function cyclically for the second and third consumers, and also permute the initial holdings.

We shall show that instability arises whenever $a > 1$, $(\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3)$ is close to $(b, 1, 0)$ with $b > (a+1)/(a-1)$, and (I_1, I_2, I_3) is close to $(1, 0, 0)$. (The specific meaning of "close" will be clarified.) This will give us examples with none of the disagreeable features of the simple examples in Section 2. Let us first examine in detail the case

$$\begin{aligned}(\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3) &= (b, 1, 0), \\(I_1, I_2, I_3) &= (1, 0, 0),\end{aligned}$$

with

$$b > \frac{a+1}{a-1}.$$

A routine calculation shows us that the excess demand functions for the first individual are given by

$$\begin{aligned}(12) \quad x_1 &= \frac{bp_1^{a/(1+a)}}{bp_1^{a/(1+a)} + p_2^{a/(1+a)}} - 1, \\x_2 &= \frac{1}{p_2^{1/(1+a)}} \frac{p_1}{bp_1^{a/(1+a)} + p_2^{a/(1+a)}}, \\x_3 &= 0.\end{aligned}$$

The reader should notice that if $b = 1$, and $a \rightarrow \infty$, these excess demand functions tend to those of Section 2.

Let us show that the conditions of Lemma 2 are verified. We have

$$\begin{aligned}A &= \frac{\partial x_1(p_1, p_2, p_3)}{\partial p_2} < 0, \\B &= \frac{\partial x_2(p_3, p_1, p_2)}{\partial p_3} > 0.\end{aligned}$$

Therefore the system of market demand functions (4) has a unique equilibrium point given by (1, 1, 1). In order to show that it is unstable we compute

$$C = \frac{\partial f_1}{\partial p_1}$$

at (1, 1, 1), or

$$C = \frac{ab - (b + 1) - a}{(b + 1)^2(a + 1)},$$

which is positive if $b > (a + 1)/(a - 1)$. It follows from Lemma 4 that for this relationship between a and b the unique equilibrium point is also locally unstable.

The next step will be to show that for this example the prices stay away from the boundary of the positive orthant. This will be a consequence of the following lemma.

LEMMA 5. *Let*

$$\varphi = \text{Min} \left(\frac{p_2}{p_1}, \frac{p_3}{p_2}, \frac{p_1}{p_3} \right).$$

There is a small positive constant K , such that if

$$\varphi < K, \text{ then } \frac{d\varphi}{dt} > 0.$$

Let us assume that the minimizing value above is $p_1/p_3 = c$, say. The other cases are handled by a cyclic permutation. We want to show that $d(p_1/p_3)/dt > 0$ or $p_3f_1 - p_1f_3 > 0$, if c is sufficiently small. If f_1 and f_3 are computed according to (4), we see that $p_3f_1 - p_1f_3$ has the sign of

$$(13) \quad \frac{\left(\frac{p_3}{p_1}\right)^2 + 1}{b\left(\frac{p_3}{p_1}\right)^{a/(1+a)} + 1} - \frac{\frac{p_3}{p_1}}{b\left(\frac{p_1}{p_2}\right)^{a/(1+a)} + 1} - \frac{\frac{p_3}{p_3}}{b\left(\frac{p_2}{p_3}\right)^{a/(1+a)} + 1}.$$

The first term of (13) is equal to

$$\frac{\left(\frac{1}{c}\right)^2 + 1}{b\left(\frac{1}{c}\right)^{a/(1+a)} + 1},$$

and since $p_2/p_3 \leq 1/c$, we have

$$\frac{-\frac{p_2}{p_3}}{b\left(\frac{p_2}{p_3}\right)^{a/(1+a)} + 1} \geq \frac{-\frac{1}{c}}{b\left(\frac{1}{c}\right)^{a/(1+a)} + 1} .$$

Also we have

$$\frac{-\frac{p_3}{p_1}}{b\left(\frac{p_1}{p_2}\right)^{a/(1+a)} + 1} > -\frac{1}{c} .$$

Adding these terms together we see that (13) will be positive if

$$\left(\frac{1}{c}\right)^2 + 1 - \frac{2}{c} - b\left(\frac{1}{c}\right)^{1+a/(1+a)} > 0 ,$$

and this is certainly correct for small c . This demonstrates Lemma 5.

These observations, taken together, show us that the system of demand functions defined by (12) gives rise to global instability of the price adjustment mechanism.




FIGURE 2

One more remark is in order. I claim that if we take an excess demand which is close to (12) on a large proper subset of the positive orthant (and which has derivatives which are close) and form the market demand functions using the above method of cyclic permutation, then this will also give rise to global instability. (Such an example may be obtained by taking $(\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3)$ close to $(b, 1, 0)$ and (I_1, I_2, I_3) close to $(1, 0, 0)$, or in other ways.)

In order to see this let us interpret Lemma 5 geometrically.

Figure 2 represents the surface of the sphere $\sum p_i^2 = 3$, and the shaded region the set of points with

$$\text{Min} \left(\frac{p_2}{p_1}, \frac{p_3}{p_2}, \frac{p_1}{p_3} \right) \geq K,$$

for a small value of K . Lemma 5 tells us that a path which begins in this region, with K sufficiently small, will never leave the region. This is true because on the boundary of this region expressions such as $p_3 f_1 - p_1 f_3$ are strictly positive. But this later fact will also be true for market demand functions based on individual demand functions close to (12).

It will also be true that inside this region there will be no equilibrium points other than $(1, 1, 1)$. For if the new demand functions and their derivatives are close to the corresponding quantities for (12) inside the shaded region, then A for the new demand functions will be negative, and since it is homogeneous of degree -1 (being a derivative), A will be everywhere negative in the region defined by

$$\frac{p_2}{p_1} > K, \quad \frac{p_3}{p_2} > K, \quad \frac{p_1}{p_3} > K.$$

A similar statement with a reversed inequality holds for B , and therefore Lemma 3 may be applied to show that there are no equilibrium points other than $(1, 1, 1)$ in the shaded region.

A similar argument convinces us of the local instability of the equilibrium point $(1, 1, 1)$. It should be remarked that even though we have said nothing about possible equilibrium points outside the shaded region for the new demand functions, a path beginning inside the shaded region will not leave this region.

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Mathematical Complexity of Simple Economics

by Donald Saari

A lesson learned from modern dynamics is that natural systems can be surprisingly complex. No longer are we astonished to discover that systems from, say, biology (e.g., [GOI, Ma1, Ma2]) or the Newtonian n -body problem (e.g., [MM, Mo, Mk, SX, X]) admit all sorts of previously unexpected dynamical behavior. This seeming

... even simple economic models can exhibit dynamical behavior far more complex than anything found in classical physics or biology.


randomness, however, sharply contrasts with what we have been conditioned to expect from economics. On the evening news and talk shows, in the newspapers, and during political debate we hear about the powerful moderating force of the market which, if just left alone, would steadily drives prices toward an equilibrium with the desired balance between demand and supply. The way this story is invoked to influence government and even health policies highlights its important, critical role. But, is it true?

I have no idea whether Adam Smith's invisible hand holds for the "real world," but, then, no one else does either. This is because, even though

this story is used to influence national policy, no mathematical theory exists to justify it. Quite to the contrary; what we do know indicates that even the simple models from introductory courses in economics can exhibit dynamical behavior far more complex than anything found in classical physics or biology. In fact, all kinds of complicated dynamics (e.g., involving topological entropy, strange attractors, and even conditions yet to be found) already arise in elementary models that only describe how people exchange goods (a pure exchange model).

Instead of being an anomaly, the mathematical source of this complexity is so common to the social sciences that I suspect it highlights a general problem plaguing these areas. If true, this assertion explains why it is difficult to achieve progress in the social sciences while underscoring the need for new mathematical tools. In this article I explain my suspicion by outlining what goes wrong with the price adjustment story. To do so, in Section 2, after quickly introducing the needed concepts (I recommend [V] for a complete, relaxed description), the price assertion is described in terms of the structure of vector fields on a sphere. Then, an explanation and extension of this counter-intuitive result are given.

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Adam Smith proposed the economic notion of the “invisible hand”, but does it have any mathematical credibility?

A person’s choices at prices \mathbf{p} are governed by personal preferences. As a natural ordering doesn’t exist on R^n , $n \geq 2$, impose one by assuming each person’s preferences are captured by a *utility function* $u_k : R_+^n \rightarrow R$ where $u_k(\mathbf{y}) > u_k(\mathbf{x})$ iff the k th agent prefers bundle \mathbf{y} to \mathbf{x} . To further simplify the mathematics, assume that individual preferences are strictly convex. This means that for any \mathbf{x} , those commodity bundles this person likes as much or better than \mathbf{x} , $\{\mathbf{y} \mid u_k(\mathbf{y}) \geq u_k(\mathbf{x})\}$, is a strictly convex set. Also, assume that all components of ∇u_k are positive. (Thus, all commodities are desired and an agent prefers more than less of each good.) With this idealized set-up, the k th agent’s demand at price \mathbf{p} , $\mathbf{x}_k(\mathbf{p})$, can be determined by elementary Lagrange multiplier techniques; it is where a u_k level set is tangent to the budget plane. (See Figure 1.) As this requires ∇u_k to be orthogonal to the budget plane at $\mathbf{x}_k(\mathbf{p})$, there is a positive scalar λ so that

$$(2.2) \quad \lambda \mathbf{p} = \nabla u_k(\mathbf{x}_k(\mathbf{p})).$$

The k th agent’s *excess demand*, $\xi_k(\mathbf{p}) = \mathbf{x}_k(\mathbf{p}) - \mathbf{w}_k$, is the difference between what is demanded, $\mathbf{x}_k(\mathbf{p})$, and what is supplied, \mathbf{w}_k . This elementary derivation immediately leads to the classical properties of the *aggregate excess demand function*, $\xi(\mathbf{p}) = \sum_{k=1}^n \xi_k(\mathbf{p})$, called *Walras’ laws*.

Figure 1
The k th agent’s demand function


2. The Price Model

In a $n \geq 2$ commodity world without production, agents can exchange goods according to (positive) prices. If p_j is the price per unit of the j th commodity, the cost of $x_j > 0$ units is $p_j x_j$. So, letting vector \mathbf{p} represent the prices of all commodities, the cost of a *commodity bundle* $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n) \in R_+^n$ is computed by the inner product (\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{x}) . In an exchange economy, what the k th agent can afford is based on what he can sell—his *initial endowment* \mathbf{w}_k —which provides wealth $(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{w}_k)$. Thus at prices \mathbf{p} , agent k can afford a commodity bundle \mathbf{x}_k satisfying *the budget constraint* $(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{x}_k) \leq (\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{w}_k)$, or any \mathbf{x}_k in the *budget set*

$$(2.1) \quad \{\mathbf{x}_k \in R_+^n \mid (\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{x}_k - \mathbf{w}_k) \leq 0\}.$$

The boundary plane passing through \mathbf{w}_k with the price vector \mathbf{p} as a normal is the *budget plane*. (See Figure 1)

1. $\xi(\mathbf{p})$ is single-valued and smooth (because of u_k ’s convexity and smoothness),
2. $\xi(\mathbf{p})$ is homogeneous of degree zero (because each $\xi_k(\mathbf{p})$ is defined by the tangency of the utility function with the budget plane, and for any positive scalar μ , both \mathbf{p} and $\mu\mathbf{p}$ define the same budget plane), and
3. $\xi(\mathbf{p})$ is orthogonal to \mathbf{p} (because both \mathbf{w}_k and $\mathbf{x}_k(\mathbf{p})$ are in the budget plane).



What Else Happens?

As only elementary concepts are used, one might anticipate only well-behaved properties to emerge. But, as already promised, this is not true. To place this problem in a mathematically more convenient framework, notice that Proposition 2 allows us to scale the prices to norm 1; so, treat prices as points on the *price simplex* S_+^{n-1} —the intersection of the unit sphere S^{n-1} with the positive orthant R_+^n . On the price simplex, $\xi(\mathbf{p})$ is a smooth, tangent vector field (Propositions 1, 3).

Independent of how prices may change, it is reasonable to wonder whether equilibria for Adam Smith's story exist; namely, is there a price \mathbf{p}^* whereby $\xi(\mathbf{p}^*) = \mathbf{0}$ so supply equals demand? To see why there must be such \mathbf{p}^* , notice from the construction that choosing \mathbf{p} nearly orthogonal to an axis forces the budget plane (the constraint for the Lagrange multiplier problem) to be nearly parallel to this axis. The strict convexity of preferences combined with the optimization procedure, then, forces a large excess demand for this good. This makes sense; the \mathbf{p} choice significantly reduces the (relative) price of a desirable good, so its demand should become unbounded. Mathematically, this forces the vector field $\xi(\mathbf{p})$ to point toward the interior of the price simplex all along the boundary, so, from the Brouwer fixed point theorem (e.g., see [M]), $\xi(\mathbf{p})$ has a zero; thus, price equilibria exist. This description captures the essence of the important Arrow-Debreu construction [AD, AH, De2], establishing in quite general settings the existence of Adam Smith's equilibria.

Price equilibria exist, but do prices tend toward them? In differential form, the commonly told story about the price dynamic, where an increase in demand results in an increase in prices, is

$$(2.3) \quad \mathbf{p}' = \xi(\mathbf{p}),$$

with the discrete analogue

$$(2.4) \quad \mathbf{p}_{n+1} = \mathbf{p}_n + h\xi(\mathbf{p}_n)$$

for some positive constant h . In either setting, the resulting price dynamic is governed by the properties of $\xi(\mathbf{p})$. The natural question posed by Hugo Sonnenschein [So1, 2], then, is to determine all general properties beyond 1 - 3 that $\xi(\mathbf{p})$ must satisfy. For instance, if Adam Smith's invisible hand story holds, then at least one of the price equilibria must be a local attractor (where nearby prices converge to it). Or, if Equations 2.3, 4 never are chaotic, or never have positive topological entropy, or never admit an attractor with a particular fractal dimension, or fail to satisfy the newest form of chaos yet to be discovered, then these conditions constitute still other properties enjoyed by excess demand functions.

To re-express Sonnenschein's question, let $\Xi(n)$ be the set of continuous tangent vector fields on S_+^{n-1} , \mathcal{U} the set of continuous (smoothness is dropped as the tangency of a level set and the budget plane suffices), strictly convex utility functions, and R_+^n the space for initial endowments. With a agents, the construction of the aggregate excess demand function defines a mapping

$$(2.5) \quad \mathcal{F} : [\mathcal{U} \times R_+^n]^a \rightarrow \Xi(n).$$

Using this notation, we can interpret Sonnenschein's question as seeking a characterization of the \mathcal{F} image set in $\Xi(n)$.

Sonnenschein provided an answer, Mantel [M] improved it, and Debreu [De1] proved the version of the SMD theorem which, in our notation, follows. In this theorem,

$$S_{+, \epsilon}^{n-1} = \{\mathbf{p} \in S_+^{n-1} \mid \text{each } p_j \geq \epsilon\}$$

is a trimmed price simplex bounding prices away from zero, and $\Xi_\epsilon(n)$ is the set of continuous tangent vector fields on $S_{+, \epsilon}^{n-1}$.

SMD Theorem. For $n \geq 2$ and $\epsilon > 0$, the price mapping

$$(2.6) \quad \mathcal{F}_\epsilon : [\mathcal{U} \times R_+^n]^a \rightarrow \Xi_\epsilon(n)$$

is surjective iff $a \geq n$.

In other words, with at least as many agents as commodities, anything can happen! Whatever dynamic on $S_{+, \epsilon}^{n-1}$ is contemplated, no matter how complex, or how it may imitate a favored example from physics or the newest form of chaotic dynamics, the SMD theorem ensures there exist endowments and continuous, strictly convex preferences for the $a \geq n$ agents so that, at least on the trimmed price simplex, the aggregate excess demand function is the chosen vector field. It now is trivial to dismiss the Smith story simply by choosing a vector field of the kind illustrated in Figure 2a with a lone, unstable equilibrium. While this economy admits an equilibrium, the prices move away from it. (For supporting preferences, see [Sc].) Of course, as we also could choose a vector field without a zero, the zero promised by the fixed point theorem must be hiding in the excised ϵ -region. On the other hand, should the vector field have the correct global index properties on the boundary of $S_{+, \epsilon}^{n-1}$, preferences can be found where $\xi(\mathbf{p})$ has no zeros in the excised region (which restores the original intent of the conclusion) [MC].

3. Consequences of the SMD Theorem

What a mess! Although the SMD Theorem seriously erodes confidence in Smith's invisible hand, there are counterarguments. A natural approach is to dismiss SMD by speculating that only patho-

logical preferences could define an aggregate excess demand function admitting chaos. To explore this hope, let me provide a quick, intuitive introduction for “chaos” by using the highly random event of continually flipping a coin. As either “Heads” or “Tails” can follow each event, the complexity is manifested by the tree diagram (Figure 2b) where the downward branches list all admissible outcomes. The dynamic governing the path next taken at each node is decided by chance, and the complexity is manifested by the rapid growth of the tree size generated by the two different choices that follow each event. If the “chance moves” of a coin flip could be replaced with a deterministic dynamic $x_{n+1} = f(x_n)$, then the dynamics would admit an equally complicated structure—chaos. This can be accomplished if phase space can be divided into regions where the f image of each is the full space. (Examples are easy to construct; e.g., for $H = [0, a]$, $T = (a, 1]$, let the graph of f connect $(0, 0)$ with $(a, 1)$ with $(1, 0)$; this defines the well-analyzed tent map; e.g., [D, R].) The only difference between the tree diagrams for a flipping penny and this dynamic is that the path taken at each juncture is decided by deterministic dynamics; either choice is admissible and decided by the selection of the initial condition. So, whenever phase space can be divided into several regions where several admissible paths emerge from each node, the complexity defined by the deterministic dynamics can make the random tree of the flipping coin pale in comparison. (For an example with Newton’s method for finding zeros of polynomials, see [S2]. In [S2], concepts from “chaos” are then modified to analyze “static” aggregation paradoxes from statistics, probability, and voting.) Each admissible branch on this tree for dynamics is called a *word*; the set of all words (i.e., all admissible branches) is the *dictionary*.

It now is clear how to construct a dynamic with as complicated a dictionary as desired. The main ingredient is for the map to be sufficiently expansive so that the f image over a specified region covers several other specified regions. As the SMD Theorem ensures that this “overreaction” effect occurs with price dynamics, it remains to understand whether it requires the preferences for agents to be so strained that economists could reject them—along with the troubling consequences of the SMD theorem—as being unrealistic. To analyze this inverse problem, notice that (with the exception of the scalar term λ) Equation 2.2 resembles an inverse function relationship $x = g(g^{-1}(x))$ with its derivative condition $(g^{-1})' = 1/g'$. Thus, one might suspect from Equation 2.2 that expansiveness of individual demands must, in some way, correspond to preferences where the level sets of u_k




Figure 2a Scraf's example




Figure 2b Coin flipping

are fairly flat with small curvature. (While the precise conditions are more complicated [S6], this intuition is correct.) Now, by browsing through books and journals on mathematical economics, one discovers that this is a common choice for utility functions. Thus, the SMD theory cannot be rejected on these grounds.

Another way to try to save Smith’s story is to accept the SMD theorem but wonder whether Equations 2.3, 4 are overly simplistic; maybe the market works in more complicated and mysterious ways. If so, then how should market mechanisms be modeled and what do they require to ensure that some price equilibria always will be reached? The long history of this theme (e.g., see [AH, AHu, H]) includes Smale’s [Sm] “Globalized Newton Method (GNM)” (which can be viewed as using Milnor’s [M] proof of the Brouwer fixed point theorem to extend [KLY].) Smale starts with a vector field, $f(\mathbf{x})$, on a k -dimensional simplex, so its normalized form, $G(\mathbf{x}) = f(\mathbf{x})/\|f(\mathbf{x})\|$, maps the simplex to S^{k-1} . Because Sard’s Theorem ensures that almost all values are regular, for almost all $\mathbf{c} \in S^{k-1}$ the closed set $G^{-1}(\mathbf{c})$ is the image of a finite union of circles and closed line intervals. As the endpoints of an image of a line interval must be in the boundary of the domain of G , they are either boundary points of the simplex, or, of more interest, zeros of f . Imposing appropriate boundary conditions on f (so that, at least generically, the direction defined

by f at each point on the simplex boundary is unique) forces one endpoint to be a zero of f . Thus, by parameterizing the curve by $\alpha(t)$ and differentiating $G(\alpha(t)) = \mathbf{c}$, a zero is found by solving the differential equation $\alpha'(t) = \lambda D_{\alpha(t)}^{-1} f(f(\alpha(t)))$ with an initial condition on the simplex boundary; this is a continuous version of Newton's method.

The GNM generated interest in economics with its guarantee of finding a zero for $\xi(\mathbf{p})$. But, quickly, it was dismissed as an explanation of price dynamics because there was no way to justify the market behaving in this contrived manner. Equally as important was the associated informational overload; not only does GNM feed on all the market information from $\xi(\mathbf{p})$, but also from its Jacobian $D_{\mathbf{p}}\xi$. Such information, requiring knowledge of, say, how the demand for steel varies with the price of bubble gum exceeds all bounds of decency and reasonableness making the GNM an unrealistic explanation of Smith's invisible hand.

If the GNM doesn't work, what does? Simon and I [SS] investigated this question by seeking the minimal conditions that would allow a market mechanism to work. Instead of a particular procedure, we assumed the general form

$$(3.1) \quad \mathbf{p}' = M(\xi(\mathbf{p}), D_{\mathbf{p}}\xi).$$

where M is piecewise smooth and where the dynamics stops iff $\xi(\mathbf{p}) = \mathbf{0}$; our goal was to find what kind of information does M need to ensure convergence to *some* price equilibrium.

Notice that Equation 3.1 extends Equation 2.3 by permitting a wide spectrum of possible choices ranging from where different commodities have different rates of price adjustment (by choosing $M = A(\xi(\mathbf{p}))$, where A is a positive diagonal matrix) to potentially very complex mechanisms. But even with all this flexibility, our result is discouraging for $n \geq 3$ commodities. Namely, should prices adjust as suspected—with some choice of M —then M needs most of the differential information required by GNM to always ensure convergence to at least one of the price equilibria. Some minimal informational savings can arise (i.e., some terms from the Jacobian can be dropped) when designing an M by exploiting the boundary properties of the vector field. (For instance, the integrated information requiring the excess demand to point inwards along the boundary of the price simplex exempts the two-good setting from this

negative assertion; Equation 2.3 does support the $n = 2$ supply and demand story. Here, the price simplex is the portion of the unit circle in the first quadrant. The boundary properties of $\xi(\mathbf{p})$ force an orbit of $\mathbf{p}' = \xi(\mathbf{p})$ starting near the boundary to move inward along the circle until it hits one of the promised price equilibria.) So, trying to preserve the Adam Smith story even in this general

Equation 3.1 framework carries the heavy cost of needing an unrealistic amount of information. (Among the extensions of [SS], I call attention to [J]. In [SS] we used the geometric theory of dynamical systems, the structure of $GL(n)$ and some singularity theory; [J] replaces the singularity theory with a topological argument.)

There is even more bad news; by being a differential equation, Equation 3.1 requires a continuum of market information. Of course, we would replace Equation 3.1 with a discrete version, but could information

be lost in the gaps? To investigate this question, in [S3] the discrete analogue

$$(3.2) \quad \begin{aligned} p_{n+1} = & \\ p_n + M(\xi(p_n), \xi'(p_n), \dots, \xi^{(s)}(p_n); & \\ \dots, \xi(p_{n-j}), \dots, \xi^{(s)}(p_{n-j})) & \end{aligned}$$

was analyzed to find the minimal conditions on M (the price mechanism), the number of derivatives s of the excess demand function, and the time lag j needed to ensure convergence of any exchange economy to some price equilibrium. (There are, of course, convergent mechanisms such as the bisection method, but we need Equation 3.2 to investigate Smith's market pressure story and whether information is lost by using a discrete version of the differential equation.) Again, Equation 3.2, which permits the simplistic approach of Equation 2.4 to be replaced with highly complex, involved mechanisms, appears to subsume most, if not all, proposed price theories. Nevertheless, the theorem asserts that with $n \geq 2$ commodities, no mechanism can always promise convergence to a price equilibria. Instead, because of the admissible chaotic behavior of Equation 3.2 inherited from the SMD Theorem, for any choice of M , s , and j , there exists an open set of aggregate excess demand functions (in any reasonable topology on function space) and an open set of initial conditions where convergence never occurs. (For an inter-

*Maybe the
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esting variation of this impossibility assertion, see [BK].) Incidentally, the same assertion holds for numerical methods used to find the real zeros of real polynomials [S4].

A partial positive conclusion finally was found in [SW]. Stated in words, if demands are driven by preferences, why should the economics of prices be the same in Rio as in Chicago, in Moscow as in Stockholm, or in Zurich as in Paris? Maybe the economists' long time goal of a universal price mechanism is an impossible dream; instead, maybe different locales require different mechanisms. To express this mathematically, say that a given mechanism M covers a set of economies (i.e., a set of individual preferences and initial endowments for the agents) if $p_{n+1} = p_n + M(\xi(p_n))$ converges to at least one equilibrium should the prices start sufficiently close to it. So, mimicking the reason, it is impossible to represent the sphere S^2 with a single chart, maybe the topology of price adjustments requires more than one mechanism to cover the set of all economies.

While Williams and I found (in a more general setting) that this is true, we also found that the space of economies is σ -compact with this topology where the obstacles preventing compactness are singularities. So, for any $\epsilon > 0$, if one is willing to exclude a set of economies of (an appropriate) measure less than ϵ (which eliminates a region around singularities), the remaining set of economies (i.e., the remaining choices of initial endowments and preferences) are covered by a finite number of price adjustment procedures. A successful mechanism exists for each economy, but we don't know which one. To relate this assertion to actual practice, notice that the purpose of "market regulations" is to change the price dynamic. So these results imply that while an unregulated free market might not work as widely advertised, if correct regulations are imposed, the market now might behave as desired. This conclusion probably would not be to Smith's liking, but it finally is a positive assertion and we might not be able to do much better.

4. More Difficulties

Dampening this partial success story is the realization that the situation is much more complex. Start with the fact that by measuring mar-

ket reactions, the aggregate excess demand function is an important tool used in all sorts of ways. For instance, in spite of the SMD Theorem, it is reasonable to use a specified $\xi(\mathbf{p})$ to extract valuable information about the economy. Perhaps



Could this represent the dynamics of prices?

Illustration from *Complex Dynamical systems: The Mathematics Behind the Mandelbrot and Julia Sets*, edited by R. L. Devaney.

we can learn what to expect should a new commodity be added, or another suppressed. Similarly, an area called *consumer surplus* computes the excess demand functions for each commodity and then pieces this information together to obtain conclusions about the full excess demand. The area of macroeconomics, with its concern about measuring $\xi(\mathbf{p})$, quickly encounters realism where any attempt to compute $\xi(\mathbf{p})$ for all ten million commodities would generate GeWhiz comments such as "If a thousand modern computers started during the 'Big Bang,' ..." Consequently they use statistical measures of the excess demand for certain commodities to make inferences about the general situation. All of these topics involve the tacit assumption that, in some way, the excess demand function for different sets of economies are related. But, are they? Must a well behaved economy of ten goods remain well behaved if one good is taken off the market, or could it become highly chaotic? To explore the reality of this assumption, it is natural to mimic Sonnenschein's question by seeking all possible relationships admitted by the ag-

gregate excess demand functions with changes in the set of commodities. To describe this issue with the tree description used to introduce chaos, label the $2^n - (n + 1)$ subsets of two or more commodities in some manner as $C_1, C_2, \dots, C_{2^n - (n+1)}$ where $|C_j|$ is the cardinality of C_j . As above, the aggregate excess demand function for the C_j commodities is a tangent vector field on $S_+^{|C_j|-1}$ and the set of all continuous tangent vector fields is denoted by $\Xi(C_j)$. The tree diagram starts with the uncountable number of choices from $\Xi(C_1)$ emerging from the C_1 node. Attached to each choice are the $\Xi(C_2)$ vector fields representing all of the C_2 choices. This continues until, at the last node, we have the $C_{2^n - (n+1)}$ vector fields. Now, if the implicit assumption that the behavior of the aggregate excess demand function for certain choices of commodities affects what happens with others is true, then certain branches can be pruned off of this chaotic tree of possibilities.

The answer again involves a trimmed price simplex which ignores (relative) prices lower than a specified ϵ value, and $\Xi_\epsilon(C_j)$ which denotes the continuous tangent vector fields on this trimmed simplex. (When the goods from C_j are traded, each agent holds fixed her holdings of all other commodities.)

Theorem ([S5]). *Let $\epsilon > 0$ be given. For $n \geq 2$ commodities, the mapping*

$$(4.2) \quad \mathcal{F}_\epsilon : [\mathcal{U} \times \mathbb{R}_+^n]^a \rightarrow \prod_{j=1}^{2^n - (n+1)} \Xi_\epsilon(C_j)$$

is surjective iff $a \geq n$.

In other words, the “excess demand” tree description is full and chaotic; anything and everything can happen. This permits us to design all sorts of disturbing scenarios, such as where with four goods the aggregate excess demand function carefully adheres to Smith’s story with a single globally attracting price equilibrium. Then, withholding commodity c_j from the market creates a chaotic three-commodity vector field with an attractor of, say, fractal dimension

$$1 + \sqrt{\frac{j}{5}}, \quad j = 1, \dots, 4.$$

The reader can choose what happens for each of the six two-good cases. According to the theorem, this scenario is supported by one of those deceptively innocent appearing four-agent examples where each agent is assigned a preference for goods (of the well behaved type described earlier) and an initial endowment. The market pressures, as found by simple Lagrange multiplier arguments, do the rest.

The theorem can be extended to address other concerns from economics. Namely, for any positive integer K , choose K continuous, tangent vec-

tor fields for each C_j set. Then, there exists an n -agent example where each agent is assigned a fixed preference relationship for the n commodities and K different initial endowments. Computing the aggregate excess demand with these preferences and the i th assignment of the initial endowments, we obtain (on the trimmed simplex) for each C_j its i th assigned vector field. To illustrate with $K = 2$ and only the full set of three commodities, the three agents’ preferences could define a well behaved aggregate excess demand function that would delight Adam Smith should they use one set of initial endowments, but, using different endowments with the same preferences, any imaginable (two-dimensional) form of chaos can break out!

In other words, the SMD Theorem describes what happens with the single set of all commodities and a single assignment of initial endowments; the above result extends this disturbing conclusion to all sets of commodities and it shows that the conclusion can vary significantly with changes in endowments. In particular, this more general conclusion not only causes worry about the invisible hand story, but it forces us to question those tacit assumptions—assumptions basic to several tools from economics—about how the aggregate excess demand function for one commodity set relates to that of others. One might argue (and this is a common reaction during a colloquium lecture—particularly in a department of economics) that there may exist conditions imposing strong relationships. Yes, but it is obvious from the theorem that such constraints cannot be based upon the aggregate excess demand function (as is a common practice); instead they appear to require imposing unrealistically harsh global restrictions on the agents’ preferences—restrictions similar to those shown in [CM] to be needed to justify the consumer surplus approach.

5. Idea Behind the Proofs


What is going on? The derivation of the aggregate excess demand function and Walras’ laws is sufficiently elementary to be taught in a first course on vector calculus. So, we must wonder what a nice, simple model is doing in a complex place like this. Actually, the source of the difficulty—which is common across the social sciences—is that the social sciences are based on aggregation procedures. But, even simple aggregation methods, from probability, statistics, and even voting, admit surprisingly complex paradoxes. (For a description of some of them and why they occur, see [S1, 2].) One way to envision the aggregation difficulties is to recognize that even a simple mapping can admit a complex image should its domain have a larger dimension than its image space. This is an element of the

proof of the last theorem, and it explains the hidden complexity of the social sciences. Namely, the complexity of the social sciences derives from the unlimited variety in individual preferences; preferences that define a sufficiently large dimensional domain that, when aggregated, can generate all imaginable forms of pathological behavior.

To prove the theorem, after selecting a tangent vector field for each $S_+^{|\mathcal{C}_j|-1}$, we need to construct a continuous foliation for each agent so that the leaves (indifference sets of preferences; i.e., the level sets of the u_k functions) have the desired convexity properties and the excess demand function they define (from the Lagrange multiplier argument) agrees with the specified vector field on the trimmed simplex. While the construction is technical and difficult in places, intuition can be provided why the result holds and why we need as many agents as commodities. Start with a two-commodity utility function $u = xy$ where the level sets are hyperbolas. By experimenting with the Lagrange multiplier argument and different initial endowments, it becomes clear that the demand based on an initial endowment with a relatively small amount of one commodity favors this scarce commodity—we want what we don't have. Thus, with two agents with initial endowments emphasizing a different commodity, their excess demands point in opposing directions with zero in the convex hull. So, just by changing the magnitude of each individual excess demand at a price \mathbf{p} (by flattening the level sets), the sum can realize a specified value of $\xi(\mathbf{p})$.

More generally, with any number of commodities, the excess demand associated with an initial endowment lacking in a particular commodity tends to favor that good. Therefore, with n commodities, choosing the j th agent to be shy in the j th good creates an excess demand function pointing in a particular direction; with $a \geq n$ agents, the convex hull defined by these vectors (in the tangent space at \mathbf{p} of the price simplex) includes the origin as an interior point. Clearly, this is false for $a < n$. By varying the lengths of these vectors (i.e., by varying the curvature of the leaves of the foliation), their sum can be whatever we desire. In this way a continuous foliation is defined to do as advertised.

To connect the foliations defined for the various sets of commodities, notice that if a commodity is withheld from the market, the relevant portion of R_+^n is an affine plane passing through \mathbf{w}^k orthogonal to the axis of the missing com-



modity. As such, the budget plane passes through a portion of each level set much different from that used to construct the leaves for the larger sets of commodities. Now, the ϵ restriction forces a spacing among the foliations constructed for the different subsets of commodities. Part of the proof shows how to exploit this gap to connect the leaves from the different foliations to create a single foliation (while preserving the convexity properties, etc.). It follows immediately from this construction that any assertion trying to relate the aggregate excess demand functions from different subsets of commodities must impose strict restrictions on preferences. Therefore, constraints based only on the structure of the excess demand (as is typical) are doomed for failure. Also, since individual preferences drive the social sciences, this situation, with the accompanying troublesome complexity, undoubtedly extends to most other areas.

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