

$X =$ choice set, $X = \mathbb{R}_+^L$ in consumer theory

$F =$ some family of subsets of X .

$F =$ all sets, $B = \{x \in X : px \leq pe\}$ for some $p \gg 0, e \geq 0$

in consumer theory

A choice function is a function $\gamma: F \rightarrow X$ with
 $\gamma(B) \in B \quad \forall B \in F$

$\gamma(p) =$ demand function, or excess demand function, in consumer theory

γ is **RATIONAL** if there exists a relation $G \subset X \times X$, complete, transitive, and acyclic, such that $\forall B \in F, \forall x \in B$
 $\gamma(B) G x$.

G is a preference relation in consumer theory. We say that such a G rationalizes γ .

Main question: characterize all rational choice functions intrinsically, i.e. without reference to G .

Example 1 $X = \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta, \epsilon\}$

$F = \{\alpha\beta\gamma\delta, \alpha\gamma\delta\epsilon, \beta\gamma\delta, \alpha\epsilon\}$

$G = \delta \succ \gamma \succ \alpha \succ \beta \succ \epsilon$ (δ is the top choice, γ the second best choice, etc...)

G as a relation is then written as

$$G = \{ \delta\alpha, \delta\beta, \delta\gamma, \delta\epsilon, \gamma\alpha, \gamma\beta, \gamma\epsilon, \alpha\beta, \alpha\epsilon \}$$

Each choice function η defines a relation on F

REVEALED PREFERENCE ON FEASIBLE SETS

$$B \rightarrow C \text{ if } \eta(B) \neq \eta(C) \text{ and } \eta(C) \in B$$


$\eta(C)$ is available at B , but η chooses $\eta(B) \neq \eta(C)$.

Example 1 Consider the choice function $\eta : F \rightarrow X$, given by

$$\eta(\alpha\beta\gamma\delta) = \gamma; \eta(\alpha\gamma\delta\epsilon) = \delta, \eta(\beta\gamma\delta) = \delta, \eta(\alpha\epsilon) = \alpha$$

Then η induces the following partial order on F

Choice function η




Red letters are targets of arrows from sets that include the same letter in black. No other arrows exist

and the induced relation on F

Lemma 1: If η is rational, then the induced relation on F has no cycles of length 0 or 1.

Proof: $B \rightarrow B$ is impossible, hence \rightarrow has no cycles of length 0.

If \succsim has cycles of length 1, then there exist B, C in F such that



ie $\succ(B) \neq \succ(C)$, $\succ(C) \in B$, $\succ(B) \in C$. Let G be the relation that rationalizes \succ . Then

$\succ(C) \in B \Rightarrow \succ(B) G \succ(C)$ | This contradicts the asymmetry
 $\succ(B) \in C \Rightarrow \succ(C) G \succ(B)$ | of G


WARP

Definition: \succ satisfies the Weak Axiom of revealed preference if its induced relation on feasible sets has no cycles of length zero or one.

Lemma 1 If \succ is rational, then \succ satisfies WARP

Example 1: \succ is not rational, because its induced relation has two cycles of length 1. The choice function h , given by the diagram below, is rational

Rational choice function h



and induced relation on F

Lemma 2: If \succsim is rational then the induced relation on F has no cycles of any length.

Proof: Suppose, for contradiction, that \succsim is rational and that its induced relation on F has a cycle of length $N \geq 2$,

$$B = B^1 \rightarrow B^2 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow B^N = B. \text{ Then}$$

$$\succsim(B^i) \neq \succsim(B^{i+1}), \quad \succsim(B^{i+1}) \in B^i \quad \forall i=1 - N-1, \text{ i.e.}$$

$$\succsim(B) \neq \succsim(B^2) \neq \dots \neq \succsim(B^{N-1}) \neq \succsim(B), \text{ and}$$

$$\succsim(B^2) \in B, \quad \succsim(B^3) \in B^2, \dots, \succsim(B^{N-1}) \in B^{N-2}, \quad \succsim(B) \in B^{N-1}$$

Since \succsim is rationalized by G , we obtain

$$\succsim(B) G \succsim(B^2)$$

$$\succsim(B^2) G \succsim(B^3)$$

⋮

$$\succsim(B^{N-2}) G \succsim(B^{N-1})$$

$$\succsim(B^{N-1}) G \succsim(B)$$

\Rightarrow

by
transitivity
of G

$$\succsim(B) G \succsim(B),$$

contradiction because

G is irreflexive

Definition: A choice function \succsim satisfies the strong axiom of revealed preference (SARP) if the induced relation on F has no cycles of any length.

Lemma 2: If γ is rational, then γ satisfies SARP

Theorem: γ is rational iff it satisfies SARP

Proof: By Lemma 2, if γ is rational then it satisfies SARP.

Suppose that γ satisfies SARP. Show that γ is rational


Define a new relation \Rightarrow on X by

$x \Rightarrow y$ iff $x \neq y$ and there is $B \in \bar{F}$, $x = \gamma(B)$, $y \in B$.

(At B , y was available but x was chosen by γ)


Note that the choice function h of example 1 induces the following relation \Rightarrow on X

Choice function h



and induced relation on F

Induced relation \Rightarrow on X



Red letters point to any other letter that belongs together with red in some $B \in \bar{F}$

\Rightarrow is acyclic, for if not, there exists a path in X
(hence irreflexive, asymmetric)

$$x = x^1 \Rightarrow x^2 \Rightarrow \dots \Rightarrow x^{N-1} \Rightarrow x^N = x$$

Hence $x = x^1 \neq x^2 \neq \dots \neq x^{N-1} \neq x^N = x$, and there exist $B^i \in \mathcal{F}$ such that $x^i = \gamma(B^i)$, $x^{i+1} \in B^i$, $\forall i = 1, \dots, N-1$, Hence $\gamma(B^i) \neq \gamma(B^{i+1}) \forall i = 1, \dots, N-1$, $\gamma(B^{i+1}) \in B^i$, i.e.

$$B^1 \rightarrow B^2 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow B^{N-1}$$

Finally $x = x^1 = \gamma(B^1)$ and $x = x^N \in B^{N-1}$ i.e.

$$\gamma(B^1) \in B^{N-1}. \text{ Then if } \gamma(B^1) \neq \gamma(B^{N-1})$$

we must conclude that $B^{N-1} \rightarrow B^1$, contradicting IARP.

Hence $\gamma(B^1) = \gamma(B^{N-1})$, i.e. $x = x^1 = x^{N-1}$. But $x^N = x$

implies, $x^{N-1} = x^N$, a contradiction.

\Rightarrow may not be complete or transitive


In the example, \Rightarrow is not transitive because it misses the arrow $\delta \Rightarrow \alpha$, and it is not complete because there is no arrow between α and β .

Extend \Rightarrow to its transitive closure \Rightarrow^* , by filling in triangles. Hence \Rightarrow^x satisfies

$x \Rightarrow y$ implies $x \Rightarrow^x y$, and

\Rightarrow^* is acyclic and transitive

\Rightarrow is acyclic and transitive




The transitive closure \Rightarrow^* of \Rightarrow

Extend \Rightarrow^* to its complete closure G

(Topological sorting of X is finite, Zorn otherwise). Hence G satisfies

$x \Rightarrow y$ implies $x G y$

G is acyclic, complete and transitive




The complete transitive closure G of \Rightarrow

Show that G rationalizes ∇

Let $y \in B$, $y \neq \nabla(B)$. Then $\nabla(B) \Rightarrow y$, hence $\nabla(B) G y$.-

Proposition: If F contains all 3-element subsets of X , then \succsim satisfies WARP iff \succsim satisfies SARP

Proof Suppose \succsim satisfies WARP. We show that the induced relation \rightarrow on F is transitive. Let $B \rightarrow C \rightarrow D$. Then $\succsim(B) \neq \succsim(C) \neq \succsim(D)$, $\succsim(C) \in B$, $\succsim(D) \in C$. We need to show that $B \rightarrow D$ i.e. $\succsim(B) \neq \succsim(D)$ and $\succsim(D) \in B$.



Then $\succsim(C) \in B$
 $\succsim(B) \in C$
 $\succsim(B) \neq \succsim(C)$
 $B \rightarrow C \rightarrow B$
 contradicting WARP

Let $E = \{\succsim(B), \succsim(C), \succsim(D)\}$.
 If $\succsim_E = \succsim_C$ then
 $B \xrightarrow{\quad} E$, contradicting WARP
 If $\succsim_E = \succsim_D$ then
 $C \xrightarrow{\quad} E$, contradicting WARP
 Hence $\succsim_E = \succsim_B$, and
 $B \rightarrow C \rightarrow D$

 If $\succsim_D \notin B$ then $\succsim_D \neq \succsim_E$, hence $D \rightarrow E$

contradicting WARP, hence $y_D \in B$.

But then $B \rightarrow D$, $Q \in D$

Consumption set R_+^L .

A consumer is a pair (C, e) , where

$$e \in R_+^L$$

C is a complete and transitive relation on R_+^L .

The consumer problem at prices $p \gg 0$ is

$$\max C$$

Objective relation

$$\text{subject to } py \leq pe, y \geq 0$$

Feasible set

(M_p)

Variables: y ; Parameters: p, e .

A solution to the consumer's problem at p is a point \hat{y} that is feasible, and that satisfies $\hat{y} C y$ for any other feasible point y .

We will only consider preferences C such that $\forall p \gg 0$ the solution \hat{y} is unique and exhausts income ($p\hat{y} = pe$).

The solution \hat{y} at p is denoted by $y(p)$.

The excess demand of consumer (C, e) at p is the vector $\eta(p) = y(p) - e$. The function η is called

an individual excess demand function. Every such function satisfies, for all $p \gg 0$

$\eta(\lambda p) = \lambda \eta(p), \forall \lambda > 0$	Zero-homogeneity	H
$p \eta(p) = 0$	WALRAS LAW	W
$\eta(p) + b \gg 0$, for some $b \gg 0$	Bounded from below	B

Example 1 For the consumer with $U(y_1, y_2) = y_1 y_2$ and $e = (1, 0)$

$$\eta(p) = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{1}{2} \\ \frac{p_1}{2p_2} \end{pmatrix}, \quad \eta(p) = \begin{pmatrix} -\frac{1}{2} \\ \frac{p_2}{2p_1} \end{pmatrix}$$

H, W are obvious by calculation. Take $b = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$

A function $\eta: \mathbb{R}_{++}^L \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^L$ is **RATIONAL** if there exists a consumer (C, e) whose excess demand function is η

Lemma 1: If η is rational, then it satisfies H-W-B

Is this all? To answer this, introduce a relation on prices

Each function $f: R_+^L \rightarrow R^L$ induces a relation on prices
REVEALED PREFERENCE


$$p \rightarrow q \quad \text{iff} \quad f(p) \neq f(q) \quad \text{and} \quad p \cdot f(q) \leq 0$$

Reasoning: At p I could buy $f(q)$ but I chose $f(p)$

Example 1: Let $p = (1, 1)$. Then

$$p \cdot f(q) = -\frac{1}{2} + \frac{q_1}{2q_2} \leq 0 \quad \text{iff} \quad q_1 \leq q_2 \quad . \quad \text{Hence}$$

$$p \rightarrow q \quad \text{iff} \quad q_1 < q_2$$



$p = (1, 1)$ is revealed preferred to every q below the line $q_2 = q_1$.

WEAK AXIOM OF REVEALED PREFERENCE **WARP**

f satisfies WARP if the induced relation \rightarrow on prices has no cycles of length zero or one, i.e. if $p \rightarrow p$ is impossible (it is by definition) and also if any circuit $p \rightarrow q \rightarrow p$ is impossible. Hence

$$p \cdot y(q) \leq 0 \text{ and } q \cdot y(p) \leq 0 \Rightarrow y(p) = y(q)$$

WARP

Lemma 2: y rational implies y satisfies WARP

Proof: Let (C, e) rationalize y , and let p, q satisfy $p \cdot y(q) \leq 0, q \cdot y(p) \leq 0$. Then $p \cdot (y(q) + e) \leq p \cdot e$, and $q \cdot (y(p) + e) \leq q \cdot e$. Hence

Consumer problem at p

$$\max C$$

$$p \cdot y \leq p \cdot e$$

$$y \geq 0$$

Unique solution: $y(p) + e$

Feasible point: $y(q) + e$

Hence

$$(y(p) + e) \succeq (y(q) + e)$$

Consumer problem at q

$$\max C$$

$$q \cdot y \leq q \cdot e$$

$$y \geq 0$$

Unique solution $y(q) + e$

Feasible point $y(p) + e$

Hence

$$(y(q) + e) \succeq (y(p) + e)$$

C is indifferent between $y(p) + e$ and $y(q) + e$

$$J(p) + e \text{ and } J(q) + e$$

$$J(p) + e = J(q) + e, \text{ by uniqueness of maximizers}$$


$$J(p) = J(q) \quad \bullet$$

STRONG AXIOM OF REVEALED PREFERENCE **SARP**

J satisfies SARP if the induced relation \rightarrow on prices has no cycles of any finite length

Lemma 3: J rational implies J satisfies SARP

Proof: By Lemma 2, the induced relation \rightarrow on prices has no cycles of length 0, 1. Suppose, for contradiction, there is a cycle of length N



Let $x^i = J(p^i)$. Then $x^i \neq x^{i+1}$ $p^i x^{i+1} \leq 0 \quad \forall i = 1 \dots N-1$

Let (C, e) rationalize γ . Then for each i

(M^i)	$\max C$	Unique solution $y^i = x^i + e$
	$p^i y \leq p^i e$ $y \geq 0$	Feasible point $y^{i+1} = x^{i+1} + e$
		$y^i \sim C y^{i+1}$

Since $y^1 = y^N$, we obtain that all y^i are equivalent for C .
 Hence each y^i solves (M^i) . By uniqueness, $y^i = y^1 \forall i$
 i.e. $x^i + e = x^1 + e \forall i$, i.e. $x^i = x^1 \forall i$, contradiction

Is this all? Yes

Theorem: $\gamma: \mathbb{R}_+^L \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^L$ is rational iff it satisfies
 H - W - B - SARP

Proof: We have already shown that if γ is rational then it satisfies H - W - B - SARP.

Suppose γ satisfies H - W - B - SARP. We construct a consumer (C, e) that rationalizes γ .

$e = b$ (the lower bound of γ)

For any two $x, y \in \mathbb{R}_+^L$ define a new relation \Rightarrow

$$x \Rightarrow y$$

iff

AND

$$x \neq y$$

$$\exists p, x = \eta(p) + e, p y \leq p e$$


ie for some p , x is the choice and y is feasible

\Rightarrow has no cycles of length 0, since $x \Rightarrow x$ is never true

We show that \Rightarrow has no cycles of any finite length

Suppose, for contradiction, that \Rightarrow has a cycle of length N

namely



Then there exist prices p^1, p^2, \dots, p^N such that

$$x^i \neq x^{i+1}$$

$$x^i = \eta(p^i) + e$$

$$p^i x^{i+1} \leq p^i e$$

$$x^1 = x^N$$

$$\eta(p^i) \neq \eta(p^{i+1})$$

$$p^i \eta(p^{i+1}) \leq 0$$

$$\eta(p^1) = \eta(p^N)$$

$$p^1 \rightarrow p^2 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow p^{N-1} \rightarrow p^1$$

contradiction to SARP

By Zorn's lemma, \Rightarrow extends to a complete and transitive relation \Rightarrow^* with no cycles, i.e.

$$x \Rightarrow y \text{ implies } x \Rightarrow^* y$$

\Rightarrow^* is acyclic, complete, and transitive

We define C by

$$xCy \text{ if } x=y \text{ or } x \Rightarrow^* y$$

C is also complete and transitive. We now show that

(C, e) rationalizes C , i.e. that for each $p \gg 0$ the problem $\max C$, subject to $py \leq pe, y \geq 0$ is uniquely solved by $\hat{y} = \eta(p) + e$

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{By W} \\ \text{By B} \end{array} \quad \left. \begin{array}{l} p\hat{y} = p\eta(p) + pe = pe \\ \hat{y} \gg 0 \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow \hat{y} \text{ is feasible}$$

Let $y \neq \eta(p) + e$ be any feasible point, i.e. $py \leq pe, y \geq 0$.

Then $\hat{y} \Rightarrow y$, hence $\hat{y} Cy$, i.e. \hat{y} is a maximizer.

We now show that \hat{y} is the unique maximizer. Suppose $y \neq \hat{y}$ is another. Then $\hat{y} Cy$ and $y C \hat{y}$. Since $y \neq \hat{y}$ we have

$y \stackrel{*}{\Rightarrow} \hat{y}$ and $\hat{y} \stackrel{*}{\Rightarrow} y$, contradicting cyclicity of $\stackrel{*}{\Rightarrow}$